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بسم رب العلم والعلماء
..والصالة والسالم على من بعث باقرأ وبنون والقلم وما يسطرون وعلى آله الطيبين الطاهرين
 هذه هديتي إلى تلك البقعة. لوالكم لما كان هذا العمل المتواضع..إلى اشتياقي أمي وأبي وإخوتي
 إلى.. إلى بنات وأبناء إخواني الذين غمروني بحبهم.المظلومة نسأل هللا الفرج القريب لها وألهلها
 إليكم جميعا ً جزيل.. إلى أصدقائي وكل من دعمني خالل هذه الرحلة الطويلة..زوجات إخواني
 تعلمت من الشقاء والقسوة والفرح.. تعلمت مما مضى. هذه ليست إال البداية.الشكر والعرفان
 إلى فـ. وهاأنذا أقوى وأكثر صالبة من أي وقت مضى.. تعلمت أن ال أستكين أو أستسلم..والسعادة
..ً  إلى الحرية قريبا..إلى لـ إلى سـ إلى طـ إلى يـ إلى نـ
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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the relationship between sports media and politics in Bahrain in
2011 when Bahrainis gathered at the Pearl Roundabout to protest for greater
freedom, equality, and an end to the Al-Khalifa regime during the wave of national
protests in the region that is now known as The Arab Spring. It argues that sports
media in particular was used as a propaganda tool by the Al-Khalifa family regime
to suppress the protest. This thesis addresses two research questions: how did the
pro-regime sports media frame the uprising in Bahrain and what strategies were
used by the Al-Khalifa regime to politicize the sports media? A quantitative and
qualitative content analysis was conducted of the sports media coverage in two
sports newspapers and two television sports programmes in the period between
March and May 2011 when demonstrations spread across Bahrain, sports activities
were suspended and martial law was introduced following a general national strike.
The content analysis identified three main frames that the pro-regime sports media
employed to define the uprising: the characterization frame, the consequences
frame, and the unpatriotic frame. Also identified were three accompanying
strategies that helped implement the frames: vilifying the demonstrations,
glorifying the Al-Khalifa family, and a third double edged strategy undermining the
protesters while simultaneously praising the supporters of the ruling family. These
strategies were supported by a number of techniques including the use of sources,
the use of images of the protests, and the use of visual and audio content. This
thesis concludes that the sports media was used as a propaganda tool by the AlKhalifa family regime in Bahrain to suppress the 2011 uprising, to name and shame
the protesters, and to preserve the status quo.
Keywords:
Sports media, The Arab Spring, Bahrain, the Al-Khalifa family, framing,
propaganda
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Chapter 1: Introduction
Inspired by the demonstrations that swept the Middle East and North Africa,
which the world's media described as The Arab Spring, Bahrainis took to the streets
on February 14, 2011 in protests against the Sunni Al-Khalifa family. The protesters
demanded political reforms including the introduction of a constitutional monarchy
and a fair distribution of the country's wealth. Reports showed that thousands of
families received monthly government aid that did not cover their basic needs
(Bahrain Center for Human Rights 2004; UNDP 2012). The Al-Khalifa family has
had political control of Bahrain since 1783 and maintained it even during the period
of British colonization. The unsuccessful uprising in Bahrain raised concerns among
other regimes in the Gulf States and their American ally as toppling the regime in
Bahrain would threaten the U.S. interests in the region.
In solidarity with the Bahraini people, sports figures and other athletes joined
the protest march on February 22, 2011. This "Athletes' March" was an unexpected
move by sports figures since it was the first time that they had become directly
involved in politics. The Athletes’ March was only a small part of the larger national
uprising directed against the Al-Khalifa regime The regime's reaction to the
demonstration is indicative of the kind of political repression in Bahrain.
Bahrain was the first country in the Gulf States to imprison sports figures,
athletes and sports journalists because of their political views. As a result of their
participation, a number of sports figures, sports journalists, political activists,
teachers, university students and trade unionists were detained and tortured. Some
lost their jobs or were suspended from playing for their teams. For example, Abdulla
Alawi, a Shiite sports journalist, was forced to resign from his job at Al-Bilad for his
participation in the uprising. He was then detained for more than 70 days without
trial (Reporters Without Borders 2011). His colleague Faisal Hayat, also a Shiite
sports journalist, was detained for about 84 days without trial, A'ala Hubail, a top
scorer in the 2004 Asian Cup, and his brother Mohammed Hubil were arrested whilst
training with their club following their participation in The Athletes' March (Fox
2011). Mohammed Adnan, runner-up Asian Footballer of the year in 2009, was
forced to leave the country and move to Australia after being accused of organizing
The Athletes' March (Alahrani 2011).
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The Bahrain Press Association report (2011) counted the dismissal and the arrest of
more than 12 sports journalists among 129 local journalists who were targeted for
their participation in the protests.
While the local media in Bahrain covered the uprising from the first week,
the sports coverage in newspapers and television remained focused on the sports
events themselves until these events were suspended in Bahrain in March 2011
because of the ongoing political unrest. At that point, journalists and television
presenters had to rely on international sources for sports news. The lack of explicit
acknowledgment of the impact of the protests on sport in Bahrain or commentary by
sports journalists and sports celebrities was indicative of the level of control that the
Al-Khalifa regime had on sports media and on the media in general. Consequently,
there was little opportunity for anti-regime news coverage in any media in Bahrain
since it is been controlled, funded, or monitored by pro-regime agents.
However, on April 4, 2011, Bahrain Sports channel aired a programme that
was called With the Event that explicitly discussed the uprising and its consequences.
This programme was considered a breakthrough in the sports media coverage of the
uprising because it criminalized the protesters and called for the suspension and
arrest of all those who were involved in the demonstrations. It was these sports media
events that encouraged writing this thesis, which examine the involvement of sports
media in politics by questioning how the 2011 uprising in Bahrain was framed and
what strategies were used by the Al-Khalifa regime to politicise the sports media,
particularly during the first three months of the uprising between March and May
2011.
This thesis sheds light on the political role of sports media during a critical
period in the history of Bahrain when the regime employed the sports media and proregime athletes to whip up nationalistic and patriotic sentiments in order to enhance
the political and the social standing for the benefit of the royal family. According to
Peter Beck (1982), during the 1920s and 30s, the German Nazi regime, the Italian
Fascists and even the English used sports competitions as a propaganda means to
create a sense of sporting "war" against other national teams. In Argentina, for
instance, the former military government exploited the country’s hosting of the 1978
World Cup to create a sense of patriotism to counter foreigners and domestic
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opposition; both were referred to as the enemy. The military government's sense of
patriotism was further enhanced by Argentina winning the 1978 World Cup:
For the junta it was clear: the victory articulated
the excellence of the nation and the importance of
staying together, like the national team, against
all kinds of enemy. Football was defined as a
privileged arena as far as patriotism was
concerned. (Tomlinson and Young 2006, p. 141)
The popular appeal and wide-spread cultural impact of sport are two of the main
reasons why sport attracts the interest of political regimes eager to find opportunities
to propagandize their ideology. Sport attracts private interests keen to exploit profit
margins associated with the popularity of televised and sponsored sport events. For
instance, according to the British Broadcasting Corporation, 51.9 million (90% of the
United Kingdom population), watched at least 15 minutes of coverage of the London
2012 Olympic Games (BBC 2012). This was the biggest national television event
since the beginning of the current measuring system. It also surpassed two other
major events in the United Kingdom: The Diamond Jubilee that was watched by 69%
of the population and Kate and William's Royal Wedding that was watched by 61%
of the population. In a report released by the International Olympic Committee
(2012), statistics show that the coverage of the Olympics reached 3.6 billion people
across more than 500 television channels around the world. This shows the power of
sport competitions in reaching more than half of the world's population.
Success in sporting events is often used to divert attention from national
political or economic crises. For instance, the three playoff matches between Algeria
and Egypt in the qualifying round of the World Cup in 2010 was quickly politicized
by the competing nations. Politicians, sports figures and the media from both
countries escalated the patriotic competition until it reached what was called a
"Soccer War" (Kujawsky 2009). As a journalist of the New York Times commented
in an article titled "This Time Egyptians Rioted Over Sport, Not Bread", Egypt was
swept away with nationalistic fever during the playoffs against Algeria which was
temporarily united during the games despite its internal political tensions:
From the start, the Egyptian government sought to
exploit the games with Algeria for political reasons,
3

political

analysts

said.

State

radio

broadcast

nationalist songs. Streets were filled with young men
selling Egyptian flags. The president's son Gamal
Mubarak, who is often talked about as a possible
successor to his 81-year-old father, attended the two
games with other high-ranking party members.
(Slackman 2009).
The media in Egypt and Algeria reported that several of their national team
supporters died during the "Soccer War" although this was later revealed to be false
(Montague 2009; Slackman 2009). Ambassadors from both countries were
withdrawn from embassies as a result of the "Soccer War". Even the Egyptian
president of the time, Mohammed Hosni Mubarak participated in escalating the
tensions. He insisted in a parliamentary speech that "Egypt does not tolerate those
who hurt the dignity of its sons" (BBC 2009). He went on to qualify what could
almost be interpreted to be a call for action to support the nation's football team
against the competing nation's sports fans: "We don't want to be drawn into
impulsive reactions. I am agitated too, but I restrain myself". In this speech, Mubarak
simultaneously mobilized sport as a national propaganda tool and portrayed himself
as a fellow sports fan to his people.
It is fairly common in media coverage of political disputes in Gulf States
countries to go beyond the strictly sports issue and to transform into a political issue.
The regimes of these countries do not hesitate to use sport and sports media to put
pressure on each other. For instance, as early as 2014 Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab Emirates forced their journalists to give up their positions at the Qatari
television channel, Bein Sport, after a political dispute with Qatar (Al Jazeera 2014).
This dispute which was over the Qatari support to the Muslim Brotherhood included
the withdrawal of the ambassadors of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and
Bahrain from Qatar. Evidence of official pressure can be found in a Tweet from the
Saudi columnist Mohanna Alhubail, who writes for Qatari newspapers and Al
Jazeera Arabic website: "I have received a call from the Deputy Minister of
Information Dr. Abdullah Al-Jasser informing me politely about the leadership's
decision to stop my writing in Qatar" (Alhubail 2014). In another event, Qatar was
4

also threatened of being penalized and banned from hosting regional sports
tournaments (Arabian Business 2014).

Figure 1: Tweets from the Saudi journalist Muhanna Alhubail about instructions to stop dealing with the
Qatari media

The 2011 uprising in Bahrain attracted international media attention about the
relationship between sports and politics and responsibilities regarding human rights
in sport competitions (Deedes 2012; Gibson 2014). Bahrain was supposed to host the
Grand Prix in March 2011 but the race was cancelled as a result of the political
turmoil. A year later, the question was raised once again about whether Bahrain
should host the Formula One race after its violation of human rights during the
uprising. Many observers argued that ignoring the human rights violations would
give the green light to the Bahraini regime to continue its "crackdown" on dissidents.
As British politician George Galloway stated: "There is blood on the tracks and
anyone who drives over them will never be forgiven" (The Guardian 2012).
However, in the same paper the Crown Prince of Bahrain, who had brought the
Grand Prix to Bahrain for the first time in 2004, claimed that cancelling the race
"would just empower extremists". The Crown Prince's statement showed how the AlKhalifa family dismissed anyone who opposed the political status-quo in Bahrain as
"extremists". On an international level, the British opposition leader Ed Miliband
voiced his concerns and stated that:
Sport and politics generally shouldn't mix, but ...
what kind of signal does it send to the world when
this grand prix (sic) is going ahead, given the
concerns there are, given the violence we have seen
5

in Bahrain, given the continuing issues around
human rights? (Wilkinson 2012).
Despite this event, the Grand Prix went ahead in Bahrain in April 2012. While the
regime had insisted on hosting the race in an attempt to prove to the world that the
state in Bahrain was stable, the race had the unexpected result of bringing more
international attention to the daily protests being held all over Bahrain. Since it was
believed that the Formula One management supported the Al-Khalifa's autocratic
rule, the protesters redoubled their efforts to underline the link between this major
sport event and the suppression of the uprising and any political opposition in
Bahrain.

Figure 2: Graffiti calling for boycott of the race in one of the Bahraini cities (Bahrain Watch 2014)

Figure 2 shows an example of political graffiti on a wall in Bahrain calling
for the boycott of the Grand Prix. It shows Bernie Ecclestone, the president and CEO
of Formula One Management and Formula One Administration driving a Formula
One car besides the King of Bahrain, Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa. The car spouts tear
gas on protesters instead of exhaust fumes. The tires of the car drip blood,
presumably from running over protesters, and the text underlining the drivers states
"Is not on our blood".
The use of English instead of Arabic in this graffiti indicates that the
anticipated audience was the international media rather than local protesters. The
demonstrations against the Formula One sought to raise awareness among the
Bahraini people about the way the regime's insistence on hosting the race was part of
its public relations campaign. Given the lack of opportunities to voice opposition in
the tightly controlled media of Bahrain, the walls of local cities became the
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alternative platform for protesters along with the more high-risk banners and
participation in street marches and protests. Figure 3 below shows an example of an
Arab/English language banner pitched at both local and international media
coverage. The Arabic text states " "الفورموال في البحرين تطحن أجساد الشعبcan be translated
as "Formula One crushes the Bahraini people's bodies".

Figure 3: A poster calling for boycott of the Formula One during a protest event
(The Guardian 2012)

British journalist Brian Dooley in an article titled "Bahrain Is Becoming Even More
Repressive Because of the F1 Race" highlighted the way that the Formula One
season was used by the royal family to hide the un-democratic situation:
Bahrain's

rulers

are

invested

financially

and

psychologically in the F1. It brings international
prestige to the tiny kingdom, where the ruling family
keeps tight control of power and the King's uncle has
been the unelected prime minister for over 40 years.
(Dooley 2013)
Despite the international media recognition of violations of human rights in Bahrain
and the use of Formula One for political purposes, there was no serious action taken
by the Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile (the International Automobile
Federation).
The use of sport in politics in the Gulf States countries continued. In March
2015, a coalition of several Arab countries led by Saudi Arabia and supported by the
United States launched a war on Yemen. Sport and sports figures again engaged in
the war by carrying banners, chanting national slogans during games, performing
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tifos in stadiums by crowds, or encouraging public opinion to "support the sacred
mission". In one case a Saudi air force pilot wrote an encouraging message to an
injured football player on a missile that he intended to launch on Yemen. While the
previous examples show a strong tie between sport and politics in all Gulf States
countries, is argued in this thesis that the connection is particularly strong in Bahrain,
as can be seen through targeting of sports figures and athletes and the excessive
involvement of sport and sports media during the 2011 uprising.

1.1 The 2011 uprising in Bahrain
Although anti-regime protests had been occurring for about a decade before
2011, the demonstrations during 2011 were the biggest protest events in the history
of Bahrain. In 1992, two hundred national figures signed a petition calling for
political reform and a new election, but the former Prince of Bahrain, Sheikh Isa bin
Salman Al-Khalifa (1961-1999), father of the present King, rejected the opposition's
demands. Weeks later, the Prince established a Consultative Council with thirty
members appointed by the Prince himself. The opposition strongly refused the
Prince's move. In 1994, another petition was signed by 20,000 activists and citizens.
In response to the growing movement, the regime arrested and exiled some of the
opposition leaders. This led to general unrest and there were protests in many cities.
These protests resulted in death, injury and the arrest of thousands of people
(Peterson 2004; BBC 2013).
In 1999, the ruling family announced the death of the Prince Sheikh Isa bin
Salman Al-Khalifa and his son Prince Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa took over the
throne. About a year later, the new Prince established a committee for National
Reconciliation, endorsing a new constitution and a re-election of the parliament in
2002 (Joyce 2012, pp. 109-111). The opposition rejected the new constitution and the
"manipulated election" accusing the regime of reducing the powers of the parliament
as outlined in the 2002 constitution. As a result, they boycotted the elections (Joyce
2012, p. 113).
On February 14, 2011 people from different areas organized demonstrations
that began in what was called the "Day of Rage" (Khatib and Lust 2014, p. 190).
Seven people were reportedly killed in the first few days of the uprising including
two activists, Ali Mushaima and Fadhel Al-Matrook and hundreds were injured or
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arrested (Bahrain Center for Human Rights 2011a). The death of Ali Mushaima and
Fadhel Al-Matrook ignited the protests across Bahrain which led to rallying in the
Pearl Roundabout, a public space located only a hundred meters from the Council of
Ministers' building, the Financial Harbour and the main shopping malls of the capital
city Manama. The heart of the Pearl Roundabout was a large stone monument with
six beams representing the six regional Gulf States. The beams join together to hold a
giant stone pearl that represented unity. Protesters occupied the area around the Pearl
Roundabout. They set up camps, food trucks and platforms for protest speeches with
the intention of staying until political reform was negotiated. Foreign reporters were
on site, particularly during the first weeks, perhaps because this Bahraini protest
coincided with the wave of similar pro-democratic upheavals in the region. In an
article for The New York Times, Ayesha Saldanha, described the Pearl Roundabout
sit-in as she experienced the "carnival atmosphere" during the rally:
There were electric generators, stalls with food and
tea ('freedom tea' read one sign), an area to find lost
children, a 'media center' where journalists could get
information and projections of TV feeds onto
screens and even onto the Pearl Monument."
(Saldanha 2011).
However, within three days the Bahraini Special Forces attacked the sleeping
protesters, killing four and injuring hundreds. According to the Human Rights Watch
report (2011a) of the incident which took place during the early morning of February
17, 2011, even doctors and paramedics who endeavoured to treat the wounded
protesters were targeted. After clearing the area, military forces surrounded the Pearl
Roundabout for two further days and prevented the protesters' from returning. Thus
"The Pearl Roundabout had become, after the bloodshed, a symbol of protest"
(Sharmila 2012). A television report on February 19, 2011 from the Al Jazeera
English Channel showed the protesters returning to the Roundabout chanting antiregime slogans: "With our soul and blood we will redeem you Bahrain” (Al Jazeera
English 2011a).
The ruling family began to feel its loss of control and called for urgent
military support from Saudi Arabia and other neighbouring countries. Over 1500
troops from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates were sent to Bahrain on
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March 13, 2011 to assist the local police in its crackdown of the uprising. The
assistance came once the regime declared a state of emergency. On March 15, the
Bahraini Security Forces supported by the Gulf States troops attacked the protesters
at the Pearl Roundabout for the second time. Within two days, the Bahraini forces
had taken control and expelled the protesters (Tran 2011). A day later, the regime
demolished the Roundabout and removed the Pearl Monument to prevent people
from returning to it or using it as a focal point for protests. Although a junction was
built over the site, it was not opened to public access and the area is still surrounded
(as of December 2, 2015) by security forces as a measure to prevent the Bahraini
population from rallying. According to unofficial records, more than 160 people have
been killed since February 2011 and thousands detained or injured (Shuhdaana
2014).
This Pearl Roundabout protest was the culmination of a series of protests that
the opposition movement in Bahrain had been staging for many decades. A report
from the BBC, which can be found in the BBC televisions archives, points out that
even in 1956 the pro-democracy leaders had demanded a stop to what they called
"one man rule" (Ibnkan 2012a). The movement led by the Committee of National
Union CNU negotiated with both the Al-Khalifa regime and the British who were a
colonizing presence in the region at the time to allow it to become the legitimate
voice of opposition for the Bahraini people. However, the regime and the British
refused to negotiate with the opposition (Al-Naqeeb 1989, p. 138). Subsequently,
some of the CNU leaders were arrested and three of the leaders were accused of
attempting to assassinate the Prince of Bahrain, Sheikh Salman Al-Khalifa, and were
exiled to the island of Saint Helena (Joyce 2012, p. 25).

14 Feb

Beginning of the uprising

15/16 Feb

Killing of the two activists Ali Mushaima and Fadhel Al-Matrook

17 Feb

First attack on protesters at the Pearl Roundabout

19 Feb

Return of the protesters to the Pearl Roundabout

21 Feb

Organizing The Athletes' March

13 March

Gulf States troops sent to Bahrain

15 March

National state of emergency declared

16 March

Second attack on protesters at the Pearl Roundabout
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17 March

Attack on Salmaniya Medical Complex

17 March

Arrest of opposition leaders

18 March

Demolition of the Pearl Roundabout

1 April

Demolition campaign of Shiite mosques

3 April

Closure of Al-Wasat newspaper

4 April

Broadcast of With the Event programme

5 April

Arrest of medical staff

6 April

Beginning of explicit coverage in newspapers

11 April

Broadcast of Special Event programme

31 May

The call of the king for a national dialogue

Figure 4: A table of the main events of the uprising in March, April and May 2011

1.2 Sport and the Al-Khalifa family
Bahrain has been ruled by the Al-Khalifa regime since 1783. The family
originally came from the central region of the Arabian Peninsula (Abdulla and Zain
Al-Abidin 2009) and is part of the Sunni minority. Overall, Bahrain has a population
of 1.2 million (46% Bahraini and 54% non-Bahraini) with the majority of the
population being Muslim (approximately 81%) and the rest Christian, Jewish, Hindu,
Baha'i and other religions (Central Intelligence Agency 2013). Muslims in Bahrain
are divided into a Shiite majority and a Sunni minority. While there are no official
statistics about the exact proportion of Shiites in Bahrain, reports estimate the
percentage of Shiites as being between 70% and 75% (Bahrain Center for Human
Rights 2006; Aldosari 2007; Fuller 2011; Erlich 2013).
Since the Sunnis are the minority elite, with a stranglehold on economic and
political power, the Shiites have a strong belief that there is systematic discrimination
against them. However, while the majority of the detainees arrested during the 2011
uprising were Shiite, the first person arrested was Mohammed Al-Buflasa, a Sunni
citizen who served in the Bahraini Defence Force. Al-Buflasa spoke in the Pearl
Roundabout and was arrested by his colleagues in the Bahrain Defence Force
(Human Rights Watch 2011b). Thus, as the opposition argues the conflict in Bahrain
is political rather than sectarian (Erlich 2013).
The Al-Khalifa family effectively controls the media in Bahrain. It is not
surprising that the media was biased in its coverage of the 2011 uprising. At the
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beginning of the uprising, most media coverage described the protesters in benign
terms. For instance, in a news article published in Al-Bilad (2011a), the Prime
Minister of Bahrain described two people who were killed during the demonstrations
as "our sons". Two days later, as the regime realized that the protest was gaining
momentum, the demonstrations were described in a Ministry of Interior statement
more negatively as a "riot" (Al-Bilad 2011b). The media as a whole reflected a proregime shift in attitude towards the protesters. Two years after the 2011 uprising, the
opposition continued to be described in the pro-regime media as groups who were
supported by foreign powers. For example, a columnist in Al-Watan described
protesters as "magi" who worked for the Islamic Republic of Iran (Al-Modhaki
2013)
The close relationship between the royal family and sport in Bahrain is
striking. Al-Khalifa's members not only occupy senior positions of sport in Bahrain
but their activities are closely followed by the local sports media. For example,
Sheikh Nasser bin Hammad Al-Khalia leads the Bahraini Olympic Committee and at
the same time occupies military positions. The most recognizable figure is
unquestionably Sheikh Nasser, the fourth son of the Bahraini King Hammad bin
Salman Al-Khalifa. He was born on May 8, 1987 and graduated from Sandhurst
Royal Military Academy in 2006. When he was only 23 years old, he was appointed
as Chairman of the Supreme Council for Youth and Sports.
The other significant and overlapping sport and military positions he occupies
include: leader of the Royal Endurance Horse Riding Team, Commander of the
Royal Guard, Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Royal Charity Organization and
he is a member of the Economic Development Board (Bahrain News Agency 2011;
Nasseralkhalifa 2014). For the Al-Khalifa family members, senior positions in sport
are as important as military positions.
The Al-Khalifa family is the main player in the Bahraini sport scene. The AlKhalifa family direct 18 of 26 sports federations. Figure 5 shows some of the royal
family members who are at the helm of the major federations. The influence of the
Al-Khalifa family on sport has allowed its members to use sport as a vehicle for its
own propaganda to control the nation. For instance, sporting success is generally and
deferentially attributed to "the wise leadership" of the King, the Prime Minister and
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the Crown Prince as if they were the main cause of success rather than individual
athletic prowess.
After being appointed the President of the Bahraini Olympic Committee, Sheikh
Nasser bin Hamad has been considered to be one of the main reasons for Bahrain's
sporting success. The President of the Athletics Federation Sheikh Talal bin
Mohammed, for instance, announced that the wins of Bahraini athletes in an Asian
competition were the result of the "great support" offered by Sheikh Nasser (AlWatan 2012).

Figure 5: An overview of the senior positions in sport occupied by royal family members

Al-Khalifa family members' sport activities receive special media coverage.
Sporting activities of the royal family members, particularly those who are close
relatives of the king, occupy prime place in the sports pages. For instance, Figure 6
shows an official news article that covers an Endurance Race of the Crown Prince
Cup. The article is accompanied by two photos of the king's son Sheikh Nasser bin
Hamad Al-Khalifa (left and centre) and one other photo (right) of The Crown Prince
Sheikh Salman bin Hamad with his brother Sheikh Khaled bin Hamad. Using
photographs of the same figure is normal when the news covers senior sports figures
such as Sheikh Nasser or his brother Sheikh Khaled bin Hamad Al-Khalifa. The text
of the article and pictures would have been sent to the local newspapers by the media
office of Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad Al-Khalifa and it would have been published
without editorial changes, as is typical of "official news" stories. Official news
articles that rely on official sources or pro-regime figures are also sent by sports
federations and clubs.
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Figure 6: An example of an official news article (Akhbar Al-Khaleej, April 12, 2011)

Official stories sent by the regime’s media office to be published in local
newspapers are not just about the ruling family members; they also cover sport clubs
and federations. All official news is sent to the local newspapers via email or fax.
An item about a senior figure such as Sheikh Nasser must be published in the
foreground or at the top of any local sports page in the next day's issue with its
photos and captions in exactly the same way as they were contained in the email or
in the fax. Editors are expected, given their source, to always prioritize these stories.
In contrast, the news about small sports club activities may not be published at all, or
published at the bottom of the page, because the placement of news articles depends
on the perceived importance of the sport figure. Usually, sport pages are divided into
seven to eight columns.
It is worth noting (see Figure 6) that the official news article of Sheikh Nasser
and his brothers occupied eight columns and almost three-quarters of the page. It is
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common that Al-Khalifa family members share their greetings or praise through
official stories as can be seen in the example of Sheikh Nasser in the article which
has the commentary " ناصر بن حمد يشيد باستعدادات االتحاد الملكي لسباق كأس ولي العهد برعاية درة
البحرين.. "أعرب عن تقديره لدعم سمو ولي العهد للقدرةwhich can be translated as "Expressing
his Appreciation for the Support of His Highness the Crown Prince for Endurance
Riding Sport: Nasser bin Hamad Praises the Royal Federation Preparations for the
Crown Prince Cup Race Sponsored by Durrat Al Bahrain".
While politics was normally not explicitly foregrounded in Bahraini sports
media, using sports media for political purposes during the first months of the 2011
uprising became what can be called an "official policy". Figure 7 shows a news
article covering a football match in the month after the suppression of the Pearl
Roundabout protest and when sport activities were resumed in mid-April. The
accompanying photograph shows the Al-Hidd team players holding a banner before
their match started in which is written in Arabic "ومنتسبيه والعبيه والثقافي الرياضي الحد نادي
في الرشيدة وقيادتنا لمملكتنا مخلصين أوفياء جنوداً يكونوا أن هللا يعاهدون الكرام الحد مدينة أهالي وجميع
 "والضراء السراءwhich can be translated as "Al-Hidd Cultural and Sports Club; its
Players, Members and all Distinguished People of Al-Hidd City Pledge to God to Be
Faithful and Loyal Soldiers to our Kingdom and our Leadership Through Thick and
Thin". This explicit reference to the political situation and the team's political
allegiance breaches paragraph 14 of International Federation of Association Football
FIFA (2012) Code of Ethics which states that players should "remain politically
neutral" during play and at public events. Indeed, even the lifting of political banners
and slogans by spectators breaches paragraph 67 of FIFA Disciplinary Code
(International Federation of Association Football 2011) which considers political
slogans improper conduct. Despite this explicit sanction by FIFA against players'
political interventions, this Bahraini sports team has never been formally
reprimanded for the pro-regime message. As it turns out, many of these Bahraini
players were not just involved in the political upheaval, but they also later
participated in campaigns against their colleagues who demonstrated against the
regime.
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Figure 7: A sport news article accompanied by a photograph of players carrying an anti-protesters banner (AlBilad, April 15, 2011)

1.3 The state of Bahrain
Understanding the media situation in Bahrain requires an understanding of
the social, legal and political contexts of Bahrain. Khaldon Al-Naqeeb (1989, p. 100)
has noted that the tribal families who control the five states in the Persian Gulf
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United States of Emirates) live in
"tribal blocks", or small societies, where each ruling tribe and its immediate
members share common interests that differ from the interests of the rest of the
population. This tribal blocks' superiority is enforced both socially and legally.
Article 1-A of the Bahrain Constitution of 2002, for instance, stipulates the king’s
person is inviolate and he cannot be questioned about his decisions.
Moreover, the constitution states that the regime is a hereditary constitutional
monarchy so that the throne moves from the king to his oldest son unless he decides
in his lifetime to appoint another son (Chapter 1, Article 1-B). The king has wide
authorities to appoint and dismiss not only the Crown Prince, but also the Prime
Minister and all ministers.
The Al-Khalifa Sunni family stabilizes its rule by using financial
endowments. According to Fuad I. El-Khury (1983) in his book Tribe and State in
Bahrain: The Transition of Social and Political Authority in an Arab State, the ruling
family has strong ties with some Sunni and Shiite families in which financial
interests play a significant role in the coalition. While the Al-Khalifa's allies receive
preferential treatment, Shiite opposition families are forced to pay higher taxes (p.
67). For the Al-Khalifa family loyalty is not ensured by religion or doctrine.
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Bahrain has thrived on strong diplomatic ties with the United States and the
United Kingdom. This has, according to observers, impacted negatively on the
democratic process as the governments of both the United States and the United
Kingdom continue to support the Al-Khalifa regime in order to protect their political
and military interests (Kode 2014; Wearing 2014). The United Kingdom has
remained on friendly terms with the Al-Khalifa regime since the amicable end of
British colonial rule in 1971. Although Bahrain is only a small archipelago located in
the Persian Gulf with a territory of about 717 square kilometres, it has been a "major
non-NATO ally" of the United States since 2002 (The White House 2002). Bahrain
hosts the American Fifth Fleet, a naval base that is responsible for naval forces in the
Persian Gulf, Red Sea, Arabian Sea and part of the Indian Ocean. According to
observers, the base plays an important role in protecting American interests in the
region and in turn provides support to the Bahraini regime:
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have long sought the
comfort of American security guarantees. The Arab
Gulf states have never possessed the military ability
to protect themselves from regional threats and so
depend on the U.S. (Jones 2011)
The Al-Khalifa family has enhanced its dominance on Bahrain through alliance with
local figures including Sunni tribes and Shiite figures, and through their alliance with
international powers such as the U.S.

1.4 Media in Bahrain
The newspapers currently published in Bahrain have been in print for about
40 years. The British first encouraged the establishment of media outlets in the
1930s. According to Al-Shaiji (1989), the institutionalization of the press in Bahrain
began during the First World War when traders who were exchanging letters about
the war quoted news from Reuters as well as some Egyptian and Indian newspapers.
Al-Shaiji claims that the British encouraged local publishers in Bahrain to establish
newspapers to counter the German and Italian propaganda that was targeting the
Bahraini people. In 1939 Abdullah Al-Zayed established the first print newspaper,
the weekly the Bahrain Newspaper and a year later the British authority established a
radio station called Gulf Radio. According to Al-Shaiji, during the Second World
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War, Bahrain Newspaper was inciting Bahrainis to stand against the Axis powers.
The newspaper continued to be printed for about five years before ceasing
publication due to technical problems. However, it was rumoured that the newspaper
was shut down by the local authority after publishing an article encouraging the
union of Bahrain with the United Arab Emirates (Al-Shaiji 1989, pp. 103-110). In
1950, a monthly magazine called Voice of Bahrain was established. The magazine
stood against colonialism, defended the rights of Arabs and criticized the Gulf States
regimes. The magazine was shut down by the authorities in 1954 (Al-Shaiji 1989, pp.
136-137). Another two pro-opposition magazines were also shut down between 1952
and 1955 (Ezzat 1983, pp. 352-353).
More newspapers were subjected to censorship during the 1960s until Akhbar
Al-Khaleej and Gulf Daily News were established by Mahmood Al-Mardi in 1976
and 1978 respectively (Al-Wasat 2005). Currently, there are five private daily
newspapers, published in Arabic: Akhbar Al-Khaleej, Al-Ayam, Al-Wasat, Al-Watan
and Al-Bilad and there are two daily newspapers published in English: Gulf Daily
News and Daily Tribune.
When it comes to the official media and according to official information,
Bahrain started its first radio broadcast in 1940 and its first television broadcast in
1973. The national news agency, Bahrain News Agency, was launched in 1976 under
the name Gulf News Agency (Information Affairs Authority 2015). Here Bahrain, the
oldest magazine in Bahraini media history was established by the Public Relations
Department (currently known as Information Affairs Authority) in 1957 (Ezzat 1983,
pp. 192-194).
At present, there are nine radio channels: General radio, Quran radio, Youth
radio, Bahrain FM, Songs radio, traditional music radio, English radio, Indian radio,
and Live Radio. There are also three television channels: Bahrain Television
(Arabic), Bahrain Television (English) and Bahrain Sports Channel. Television and
radio channels in Bahrain are owned and directed by the regime. The only sports
channel in Bahrain is controlled and directed by the regime. During periods of
increased sport activity, a secondary sports channel is activated to cover the sports
news, but this is a subsidiary of the main sports channel and does not offer an
alternative perspective. Overall, sports media in Bahrain is divided into two major
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categories: television and newspapers. All sport newspapers in Bahrain are liftouts in
the main newspapers.
The current ownership situation in Bahrain raises questions about the
pluralism of local media. Gillian Doyle (2002) defines pluralism within the media as
the diversity of opinions diverse voices, different political views and independence
of affiliation. Doyle indicates that pluralism grants the public access to a range of
content in terms of political opinions and cultural reflection. She argues that without
an open system of media ownership, a small group may be granted the right to
control the media (pp. 11-12). In Bahrain, the opposition voice is almost prohibited
from appearing on the national television.

1.5 The press law
Ezzat Ali Ezzat (1983) pointed out that the first press law in Bahrain and in
the Gulf States was established in 1930 by the British adviser to the government of
Bahrain. The intent behind the legislation was to monitor journalists. This was
evident in the provision that "any correspondent who works for a newspaper, or a
freelance reporter, must record his name and the newspaper he works for in the
department of the Bahraini government". The penalty for breaking this press law
could be a fine or imprisonment for a period of 6 months (pp. 111-112). The second
press law that was established in 1953, granted the local authorities the right to refuse
to provide press licenses without having to give a reason, and the power to suspend
and confiscate the property of a newspaper that broke the law. In 1954, another law
was announced before it was replaced in 1965 by a new press law that was declared
by the Prince of Bahrain, Isa bin Salman Al-Khalia to become the first law to be
announced by the royal family itself (pp. 112-114). This 1965 law granted the
manager of the Information Department the power to suspend the publication of
newspapers, or to revoke a newspaper license (pp. 116-118). A television report
produced in 1966 by BBC about the political situation in Bahrain showed that the
ruling family rejected the concept of freedom of press early (Ibnkan 2012b).
The 2002 the Press, Printing and Publishing law replaced the 1965 law. This
new legislation was ratified by the King of Bahrain, Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa, and
grants wide powers to his government as represented by its Information Affairs
Authority. Control of the media is given to the regime with the power to refuse or
19

suspend licenses for media outlets: Article 4 of the law states that "Anyone who
wishes to establish a printing press, before carrying out any business in it, shall
obtain licensure for this purpose from the Ministry." The law also closely monitors
journalists' work. For example, Article 68 paragraphs (B) and (D) states that a
journalist can be punished for criticizing the king or for instigating the overthrow of
the regime. This new level of

regulation encourages self-censorship by both

journalists and editors. As a 2014 report by the US State Department comments, the
current press law grants wide control to the regime over media in Bahrain:
The government did not own any print media, but the
Information

Affairs

Authority (IAA)

and

other

government entities exercised considerable control over
privately owned domestic print media. The government
owned and operated all domestic radio and television
stations. (U.S. Department of State 2014).
Moreover, the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (2011) that was
established by the King of Bahrain reported that the regime, through its control over
media, launched media campaigns to vilify the opposition (p. 178). A recent example
of the strict control by the regime is that a new pan-Arab news television channel Al
Arab owned by the Saudi Prince Al-Waleed bin Talal was halted by the regime hours
after it started airing live from its offices in the capital Manama. While several media
reports suggested "technical and administrative reasons", other reports cited an
"offending interview" with an opposition leader (Black 2015; Omran 2015; BBC
2015; Khalifa and Schreck 2015). With such strict control over the media, antigovernment activists have had to resort to social media to organize their activities
and to exchange news about the uprising. This use of social media is in line with the
activities of many opposition campaigns to organize demonstrations in "The Arab
Spring". However, what is somewhat unusual in the Bahrain context is that the
regime also incorporated social media into its strategies to crack down on the
uprising.
While other national governments, such as the former regime, attempted to
block satellite coverage nationally to prevent the opposition from using social media
to organize protests (Freedom House 2012a), in Bahrain the regime itself used the
online social networking service Facebook to identify protesters (Welsh 2011).
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Within days of The Athletes’ March, a Facebook page was set up to post images of
activists, or sometimes even peripheral participants photographed during the protest
marches, who were labelled as "traitors". Bahrainis were called on to look through
the images to see if they recognized their neighbours or colleagues, and then to post
information about their names, age or work place. Some of those people who were
identified were sacked from their jobs or detained.
Bahrain has one of the best levels of the Internet coverage in the Middle East
countries and there are a number of service providers including Batelco, a company
that is operated through the royal family. This, however, does not mean that all
Bahraini had access to social media or alternative political websites during the
uprising. According to the Reporters Without Borders report (2012a), the level of
Internet filtering and surveillance in Bahrain is one of the highest in the world and
Bahrain was added to the list of "Internet Enemies" in 2012. The regime also targeted
pro-opposition activists to stop online activities. The online surveillance has
increased since the 2011 uprising:
The National Safety Status (emergency law) was
initiated in March 2011 for two and a half months,
leading to an intensive punitive campaign against
bloggers and internet users (among others) that was
characterized by mass arrests, incommunicado detention,
torture, military trials, harsh imprisonment sentences,
and dismissal from work and study based on online posts
or mobile content. (Freedom House 2012b).
The screenshot presented in Figure 8 shows an example of a Facebook page that was
created to target protesters. The page was titled "Together to Unmask the Shiite
Traitors" with an image of the King, the Bahrain flag, the map of Bahrain and the
subtitle "The Kingdom remains for Al-Khalifa". The page was soon closed by the
Facebook management after reports sent by pro-opposition activists but another page
was later created titled "Together to Unmask the Shiite Traitors 2". Thousands of
pictures and large amounts of personal information about people who participated in
the demonstrations or those who attended the Pearl Roundabout were posted and
made public to facilitate arrest of the protesters who were called "betrayers".
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Figure 8: A Facebook page that included protesters' personal information. The still
taken from the Al Jazeera English documentary "Shouting in the Dark" (Welsh 2011)

The screenshot in Figure 9 shows a photograph sample of the social media
campaign launched against the protesters. It shows a protester carrying a sign in
Arabic that states: " "الشعب يريد إسقاط النظامwhich can be translated as: "The People
Want to Topple the Regime". The photograph was posted on Facebook and
eventually ticked " "تم اعتقالهwhich means "arrested" after the individual in the
screenshot was successfully identified via social media networks. The protester’s
name, his job and work place had been identified. In comments on Facebook, proregime users called for the death or imprisonment of those who participated in the
uprising or those who visited the Pearl Roundabout.

Figure 9: A photograph of a protester posted in a Facebook page and ticked "arrested". The
still taken from the Al Jazeera English documentary "Shouting in the Dark" (Welsh 2011)

Journalists were also the target of pro-regime Facebook campaigns. For
example, pro-regime Facebook users created a page titled "Nicholas D. Kristof – A
true Liar of the Media". Nicholas Kristof is an American journalist who was detained
and deported from Bahrain after reporting about the crackdown and banned from
entering the country. This page, although no longer active, was created on February
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22, 2011 only 8 days after the beginning of the uprising. It was posted on April 15,
2011. All posts were in English including the following:
Nicholas D. Kristof is a man of lies, all his news about
Bahrain is bull.... This makes me think, what about the
other so called undercover missions he did that brought
good to the society? probably was all lies as well.. I'm
glad now I know. Media can never be trusted! specially
with one as an imbecile as this one!
There are no official records of the pages that were created by the pro-regime
activists during this time; however, a pro-opposition online forum listed 106 pages
and 15 personal accounts on Facebook that were removed by the Facebook
management in the period between March and July 2011 as a result of an antigovernment activists' campaign (Fajrbh 2011). While there is no evidence to link the
regime to the publication of these Facebook pages, it was clear from the site visitors
and comments that ministries and government officials were following the posts to
gather information about their employees who had participated in the demonstrations
(Welsh 2011).
Most significantly for this present thesis, are many of the edited digital images
of sports figures and journalists that were shown in the "special" broadcast on
Bahrain Sports Channel, an official channel owned by the regime, on April 4, 2011.
Days after the broadcast of these images during a special televised event, the
identified sports figures were arrested or singled out to be subjected to an
investigation by their teams and to public prosecution.

Figure 10: A still from the Bahrain Sports Channel With the Event broadcast on
April 4, 2011 (Bahrain Sports Channel 2011)
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After the Pearl Roundabout crackdown, some official figures of the AlKhalifa regime appeared in public in the company of those who were believed to be
the online activists who launched internet campaigns against pro-opposition activists.
For instance, the Prime Minister of Bahrain, the Prince Khalifa bin Salman AlKhalifa, on June 23, 2014 met with Sheikh Mohammed bin Salman, one of the royal
family members who is believed to be "Mnarfezhom" (the one who jitters them) and
a Twitter user who led a campaign against the protesters by circling their faces and
publishing private information about them (Bahrain Mirror 2014). In fact,
"Mnarfezhom" and other users such as "Hareghum" (the one who burns them),
"Grandchildren of Omar" and "Grandchildren of Al-Waleed" are anonymous online
social networking users believed to be answerable to the regime. The real
personalities of "Mnarfezhom", "Grandchildren of Omar" and "Grandchildren of AlWaleed" were revealed after Sheikh Mohammed bin Salman alongside others were
interrogated for their online activities against some pro-regime figures.
While he was not asked about his activities against regime opponents, some
pro-regime figures sued "Mnarfezhom" for accusing them of planning secret
activities against the regime (Al-Watan 2014; Al-Wasat 2014; Manama Voice 2014).

Figure 11: The Prime Minister of Bahrain Prince Khalifa bin
Salman (left) meets Mohammed bin Salman who is believed to be
Mnarfezhom (Bahrain News Agency 2014a)
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The regime in Bahrain has also been accused of using social media to spy,
identify and monitor pro-opposition users by sending malicious spy links. As Bahrain
Watch reported in 2013:
Since September 2011 or earlier, Bahrain’s Government
has been targeting anonymous social media accounts,
apparently in an effort to identify their operators. The
Government targets accounts using malicious links and
social engineering. It appears that the Ministry of
Interior's Cyber Crime Unit is orchestrating the attack.
(Bahrain Watch 2013).
Reports from non-governmental organizations have raised concerns about the use of
special software to crack down on online activists in regional countries such as Saudi
Arabia. With the increase of protests against the Saudi regime, Human Rights Watch
has investigated whether surveillance software was used to identify Shiite online
activists in this country.
According to the Human rights Watch, independent security researchers
reported on June 24, 2014 that the Saudi government has been hacking into mobile
phones by creating a malicious application that provides access to the Al-Qatif AlYoum (Al-Qatif Today), an Arabic language news and information network of the
Eastern Province town of Al-Qatif. The report indicates that the spyware enables the
government to access the phone’s files of applications such as Facebook, Whatsapp
or Skype, messages, contacts and call history, the phone's email. The report also
suggest that the spyware can operate the phone's camera or its microphone to take
pictures or record conversations without the holder being aware (Human Rights
Watch 2014). This shows that the regimes in both Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are
monitoring, not just the mainstream media, but also online media. While the troops
of both regimes' were involved in the crackdown on the opposition in Bahrain, the
human rights organizations reports show that both regimes have used the same
methods to identify online opposition.

1.6 Significance of this study
While there is a large body of scholarly works about the role of social media
during The Arab Spring (Wolfsfeld et al. 2012; Campbell and Hawk 2012; Aday et
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al. 2012), this thesis focuses on mainstream media, and the sports media in particular
which has been generally overlooked. Given the importance of sport and sports
media in Bahrain, this thesis sheds new light on Bahrain’s mainstream sports media
engagement with The Arab Spring. It does not aim to examine the impact of
propaganda in its various forms on the people of Bahrain, nor does it examine how
journalists individually responded to the pressure of politicization of media. Instead,
this project examines the use of the sports media in Bahrain by the ruling family to
manipulate public opinion and to stay in power. It is argued that the Al-Khalifa
regime has used the sports media to suppress the demonstrations by framing them as
"illegal movements" that aimed to target the country and its people and to frame
protesters as unpatriotic citizens. Meanwhile, the Al-Khalifa family was framed as
the only legitimate authorities in Bahrain and their supporters as loyal citizens. This
project highlights the significance of sports media to the royal family in Bahrain.
Given the repressive reaction by the regime to the participation of sports
figures and sports media in the political protest, this thesis examines the link between
the ruling Al-Khalifa family and sports media in Bahrain, particularly during the first
three months of the uprising between March and May in 2011. It investigates how
the uprising was framed by sports media then examines the strategies used by the AlKhalifa regime to politicize the sports media during this period of social unrest.
Content analysis is used to examine sports sections of two mainstream Bahraini
newspapers, Akhbar Al-Khaleej and Al-Bilad and two pivotal television programmes
which were broadcast on Bahrain Sports Channel, With the Event aired on April 4,
2011 and Special Event aired on April 11, 2011, in order to identify how the protests,
the Al-Khalifa family, the protesters and the supporters of the ruling family were
referred to in the sports sections of the printed media and the two television
programmes.
I am Bahraini, a native Arabic speaker. I am now a research student in exile
in Australia with no possibility of returning to Bahrain. As a journalist newspapers in
Bahrain such as Al-Wasat (from 2002 to 2004), Al-Meethaq (from 2004 to 2006), AlWatan (from 2007 to 2008) and Al-Bilad (from 2008 to 2010), as well as numerous
other print, radio and online media outlets in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the
United Arab Emirates. I have a detailed understanding of Bahraini culture and
society, customs, traditions, language nuances, religious beliefs, political parties, the
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history of the Shiite /Sunni conflict and the role of the royal family within this
context. It is hoped that the findings of this thesis will provide future media scholars
and political scientists with useful primary information in understanding the link
between sports and politics in Bahrain, and the broad political influences of sports
media in Gulf State countries.
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Chapter 2: Literature review
This chapter reviews the literature that informs examination of the impact of
politics on sports media, with a particular focus on the political uprising of 2011 in
Bahrain. Studies that examine the link between legacy media, social media, politics
and uprisings in the Arab World are discussed. The review includes scholarly
publications, conferences papers, reports, legislations, media reports and a
documentary. This chapter focuses on six main themes that have a bearing on the
role of sports media in the Bahrain uprising. The six themes are: the state-controlled
media and The Arab Spring; social media and The Arab Spring; Arab states regimes
and the use of social media; sports media and public opinion; sport, human rights and
politics; and the uprising and foreign influence.

2.1 State-controlled media and The Arab Spring
The role of mainstream media during The Arab Spring has received little
critical attention compared with the role of social media, although some scholars
have examined the mainstream media modus operandi and how it is affected by the
relationship between Arab regimes and the nation's media. Chiba Yushi (2012)
points out that the Arab media have been dominated by its regimes. Tourya
Guaaybess (2013) notes this relationship, pointing out the importance of analysing
the coverage of Arab media during The Arab Spring. Djankov et al. (2003) argue that
countries with state-controlled media are more likely to have less freedom and fewer
rights for its citizens. As Carlos Lauria (2012) points out in his article titled "StateOwned Media and the Public Interest", state-owned media outlets are not just
controlled, but also manipulated by regimes in order to impose their own agendas on
the public. In this way, Lauria contends, the media end up serving the interests of the
regimes instead of the public.
The uprisings that swept the Arab World have highlighted the role that
mainstream media can play. Simon Cottle’s (2011) paper written at the beginning of
The Arab Spring assumed that studying the modus operandi of mass media would
elucidate the causes for The Arab Spring (p. 650). He offers ten different ways in
which media and communications networks were involved in The Arab Spring and
makes some suggestions about how these might be more closely examined. These
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suggestions include the need to consider the absence of critical media in The Arab
Spring countries (p. 650), through study of the increasingly complex relationship
between mainstream media and social media (p. 651), by examination of the use of
social media to censor and suppress oppositions (p. 653), and by considering how
social media was used by activists in other countries in similar circumstances (p.
654). Cottle's essay highlights the complicated relationship between mass media and
social media and how this relationship contributed in the demonstrations.
Omair Anas (2012) suggests that state control of media in the Arab World is
coming to an end because of the proliferations of satellite channels, industry
competition, and the proliferation of social media and new communication
technologies that have helped the emergence of citizen journalism. While Anas cites
the amendments of the press laws in Gulf State countries as an effort by the regimes
to engage with media rather than control it, he raises concerns about the future of
media in the Gulf States countries (where most of what he calls "critical media" are
based) as the "Arab Spring has not yet touched the political climate" (p. 43).
The study by Khalil Rinnawi (2012) explored the use of dominant television
channels and its impact on the Arab society during The Arab Spring and focused on
the role of the Al Jazeera channel during the Egyptian uprising. As an Arab native
speaker, Rinnawi had a full understanding of the language and the social and cultural
contexts of the situation in Egypt. His article "Cyber Uprising: Al-Jazeera TV
Channel and the Egyptian Uprising" covers the main evening newscasts in the
channel and other programmes related to the Egyptian uprising from January 25 to
February 11, 2011. Following analysis of the narrative and visual features of the
selected samples, Rinnawi argues that Al Jazeera played a crucial role in
overthrowing Hosni Mubarak's regime. He points out that Al Jazeera deliberately
directed in one way or another the protesters toward toppling the former Egyptian
regime.
Studies completed prior to The Arab Spring, particularly those that discuss
Bahrain's neighbours Egypt (Amin 2009), Jordan (Abu Arja 2000) and Morroco
(Arab Center for the Development and the Rule of Law and Integrity 2009) indicate
that the mainstream media in these three countries are controlled by the state through
a range of different mechanisms including legislation, state ownership of major
shares in media outlets and publishing houses, and the political appointment of
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editors-in-chief. Hussein Amin in his Report on the State Media in Egypt (2009)
points out that prior to the 2011 uprising in Egypt, the nation's regime had a
stranglehold on communication lines to the Egyptian people through the national
mainstream media of radio, television and newspapers. It was this media
exploitation, Amin argues, that allowed the former Egyptian regime to mobilize
public support for the regime's political agenda (pp. 6-7). While Amin acknowledges
that anti-regime media enjoyed some freedom prior to 2011, he also points out that
the mainstream state-controlled media were successful in distracting the public's
attention to marginal topics and away from significant political or social issues (pp.
9-10). Amin ends his report with a number of recommendations for a free media in
Egypt including eliminating state control of media and reducing censorship on the
Internet.
Amin's recommendations may be usefully applied to nations like Jordan
where the government's intervention is even more pronounced than it was in Egypt.
Tayseer Abu Arja (2000) discusses the way in which the regime in Jordan has
enforced its own agenda on the local print media (pp. 58-60). When their licenses
were revoked in 1967, the local newspapers were forced to merge into two major
newspapers that were partially owned by quasi-governmental companies (pp. 65-66).
This, according to Abu Arja, granted the regime in Jordan the opportunity to control
the local newspapers. Some ensuing changes to the Jordanian press law in the 1980s
and the 1990s guaranteed greater freedom to new newspapers, however, according to
Abu Arja the regime maintained its control of the print media.
The Report on the State Media of Morocco (Arab Center for the Development
and the Rule of Law and Integrity 2009) highlights the importance of developing
legislations to protect freedom of the media and to improve the media modus
operandi by fostering the relationship between journalists and media outlets by
modifying working conditions of journalists, and by improving their training
programmes. State-controlled media, therefore, has been exploited by the Arab States
regimes to impose the state agenda on the people and to direct them toward marginal
issues. It is worth noting that the Arab Center for the Development and the Rule of
Law and Integrity ACRLI sponsored both the Egyptian and Moroccan media reports
discussed above, but while the author of the Egyptian report was acknowledged by
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name, the Moroccan report was issued without an author's name which may indicate
the author's fear of being targeted for repercussions.
Despite the development of new technologies, the media's role as a
mouthpiece for the Gulf State regimes has not significantly changed. Marwan M.
Kraidy (2013) points out that the Saudi regime understands the important role that
media plays as a "key instrument to hold on to power". Muhammad I. Ayish (2013)
believes that the media in the United Arab Emirates has contributed to an economic
and social shift. However, he argues that media in this country still represents the
regime's views both locally and internationally (p. 14). Matt J. Duﬀy (2013)
disagrees with Ayish's point of view and argues that the lack of free media in the
Gulf States has exacerbated social, economic and political problems. Duffy argues
that media is overlooking essential economic and political issues and points out that
with independent media, issues such as corruption, discrimination and a lack of jobs
are more likely to be addressed and redressed (p. 8). Duffy believes that freeing mass
media would help Arab countries solve economic and social problems as the people's
voice would be part of social movement.
To date there are a very few studies that examine the situation of mainstream
media, including journalism, in Bahrain. Two in-depth studies of print media in
Bahrain have focused on the nation's history of journalism since the early 20th
century and both were conducted in the 1980s. The first looked at the rise of print
media in Bahrain through a larger study by Ezzat A. Ezzat (1983). The Press in the
Arabic Gulf States and the other was the book by Helal Al-Shaiji (1989) The Press in
Kuwait and Bahrain From its Inception to the Era of Independence. Both studies
discuss the technical and legal obstacles for newspapers and magazines that were
considered the mother of the modern press in Bahrain. However, the studies paid
little attention to the adversarial relationship between pro-opposition journalism and
the Bahraini authorities, or to the development of laws that would control the print
media. Neither Ezzat, nor Al-Shaiji clearly explained the factors that led to the shutdown of opposition newspapers in the 1940s and 1950s. Ezzat claimed that most
newspapers in the Gulf States were partially financed by the regimes, including
newspapers that were considered anti-regime, but she provided no empirical
evidence to support this claim (pp. 92-94).
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In his book Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio, and Television in Arab
Politics, William A. Rugh (2004) describes newspapers in Bahrain as "loyalist press"
(p. 59). Rugh argues that while newspapers in Bahrain are privately owned, they are
loyal and supportive of the regime. Despite the multiplicity of newspapers in
Bahrain, Rugh points out that the content is exceedingly similar (p. 66). While there
is a focus on the role of political media, this present thesis fills the gap about the
political role of sports media particularly during the protests that swept the Arab
countries.

2.2 Social media and The Arab Spring
Recent scholarly debates have focused on the increasingly political role of
social media during The Arab Spring as these new non-mainstream platforms have
become a public sphere in their own right and are at least partially out of the regimes'
control. While social media are generally seen to have had an impact on mobilizing
the masses during the unrests, researchers differ in their assessment of the level of
this influence. Some argue that social media played a significant role (Storck 2011;
Faris 2012; Breuer et al. 2015), while others argue that its influence is overstated
(Wolfsfeld et al. 2012; Campbell and Hawk 2012; Aday et al. 2012).
In her dissertation, The Role of Social Media in Political Mobilization (2011),
Madeline Storck focused on the 2011 uprising in Egypt as a case study to examine
how social media was used to organize and mobilize political protests. She focused
on three identifiable trends in the use of social media: as an organizational tool, as a
road to citizen journalism and as a means to generate awareness of the uprising
locally and internationally. While Storck acknowledges that the protests that brought
down the former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak had actually been ongoing for
years (p. 19), she does not explain in detail the factors such as poverty and the
absence of social justice that facilitated the rise of people's anger against the regime
before the 2011 uprising. David M. Faris (2012) argues that social media
significantly facilitated the organization of protests against the regimes in Egypt and
Tunisia. Although Faris notes that there was less internet censorship in Egypt than in
Tunisia, he argues that social media and blogs raised the awareness of democratic
and human rights in both societies as well as paving the way for the uprising because
it was used to share political aspirations and organize the oppositional activities.
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Faris points out that the impact of social media on the uprisings was due to
the work of pioneering digital activists over several years (2012, p. 6). On the other
hand, Wolfsfeld et al. (2012) insist that social media was not the cause of the protests
that spread across the Arab World in 2011. They point out that there were other
principles related to collective action that should be taken into account and suggest
that the political environment in which social media operate and the increased use of
social media is more likely to be a reflection of the increase of opposition activities
than to precede them. Similarly, Campbell and Hawk (2012) argue that the role of
social media during the uprising in Egypt was exaggerated. In their analysis of the Al
Jazeera Arabic channel coverage of the Tahrir Square protest in the three week
period between January, 25 and February 18, 2011, they found that the role of the
social media was not only simply described as a facilitator element, but was
represented as "the advent of an Internet revolution". Aday et al. (2012) suggest that
social media did not play a major role in collective action or regional diffusion
during The Arab Spring (p. 3). Instead, they argue that social media was used as a
tool to spread information to the international community more than it was used to
communicate locally inside the region which made it less important to the actual
protest. However, Cottle’s (2011) study indicates that social media alongside online
bloggers and mobile telephony played an important role in bypassing state-controlled
media (p. 648).
Counter to the point of view that plays down the role of social media during
The Arab Spring, an article by Breuer et al. (2015) argue that social media was an
important resource for mass mobilizations against the rule of Zine El-Abidine Ben
Ali in Tunisia. Based on "background talks" with 16 Tunisian digital activists and a
survey of 437 Tunisian internet users conducted in early 2012, the article argues that
social media activities allowed a "digital elite" to break the national media blackout,
provided a medium for protesting groups, enhanced the sensation of the success of
the revolution and provided "emotional mobilization" by showing the regime's
violent crackdown against the protesters. The use of social media was also a case
study for Henk Huijser and Janine Little (2012) who compared the approaches to the
use of social media in the different political contexts of Australia and Bahrain.
Huijser and Little point out that while social media facilitated the mass
political mobilization in The Arab Spring countries, the use of social media for
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political purposes is reduced to "special interest groups", or political campaigns in
Australia. Huijser and Little point out that while social media play a significant role
in the political life in Bahrain, it is diminished to limited political events in Australia.
The significant role of social media has led to it being exploited by regimes in order
to confront the democratic demands of the people.

2.3 The regime's use of social media
There is a growing concern that social media is used by regimes to control
citizens. For instance, in an interview with Russia Today (2011) WikiLeaks founder
Julian Assange argues that social media and Facebook in particular is "the most
appalling spying machine that has ever been invented". Assange points out that
Facebook and other social media are "the world's most comprehensive database
about people, their relationships, their names, their addresses, their locations and the
communications". Studies have found that users of social network sites like
Facebook are aware of the potential risk of their private data being tracked and used
by strangers. For instance, David J. Houghton and Adam N. Joinson’s (2011) study
found that users are conscious of the privacy issues even as they share information
with friends. Similarly, Alyson Leigh Young and Anabel Quan-Haase’s (2013) study
based on surveys and in-depth interviews with university students in Canada, found
that the majority of participants took some steps to protect their personal information.
These two studies emphasize findings of an earlier study by Hoadleya et al. (2010)
which found that the news-feed or mini feed established by Facebook management in
2006, actually facilitated access to users' information by others. The risk of private
information being violated by other parties during using the Internet was addressed
early. Herman T. Tavani's (1999) articles titled "Informational privacy, data mining,
and the internet" discussed issues related to user's private information and monitoring
of users' activities on the Internet. Tavani pointed out early that the Internet was
considered to be at the time a surveillance medium.
Recently, scholars have studied how social media has been used by both
oppositions and regimes during political uprisings. However, there are only a small
number of studies that have investigated the use of social media to suppress the
uprising in the Middle East and North Africa region by the regimes themselves. For
instance, Alex Comninos (2011) study during the first wave of the Arab Spring
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uprisings, draws attention to the way that governments quickly filtered online content
or blocked Internet access. Comninos' reports on how governments and their
intelligence agencies used social media to identify and locate protesters. Comninos
explains that activists in Sudan were duped and then arrested by intelligence through
a fake protesting event that was organized by agents employed by the government (p.
10). He also discusses how in Tunisia, the regime hacked citizen's social media
accounts, while in Egypt Hosni Mubarak's regime shut down the Internet for three
nights to prevent protesters from contacting each other. Comninos argues that the use
of mobile technologies and social media actually enhances surveillance capabilities
where there is a link between the mobile operator and the regime (p. 12). In a similar
vein, Ian Gallagher (2011) claims that the Egyptian police tracked down activists
through Facebook and Twitter by identifying their names (p. 11). Christopher
Soghoian, the privacy researcher, suggests in an interview with The Wall Street
Journal, that Internet users could be stalked or subjected to torture or arrest as a
result of their data being disclosed by governments (Angwin 2011).
In Bahrain, the use of social media to crack down on the uprising was even
more explicit and effective. According to the documentary Shouting in The Dark by
May Ying Welsh (2011), Bahraini pro-regime activists used Facebook, among other
social media platforms to identify and penalize protesters. For instance, Facebook
pages were created to post images and the personal information about protesters. The
information was then used by the regime and other ministries to arrest or penalize
anti-regime protesters. The article of Marc Owen Jones (2012) is significant to an
understanding about how social media was used to crackdown opponents in Bahrain.
The article addresses the negative use of social media during the 2011 uprising.
Jones, whose PhD research project is on the history of suppression and social control
in Bahrain, points out that social media networks such as Twitter and Facebook were
used by the Bahraini regime and its supporters as a means of surveillance, censorship
and propaganda.
Jones interviewed online activists from February 2011 to December 2011 and
found that social media was used to crackdown on anti-regime protesters by trolling,
naming and shaming, passive observation, intelligence gathering and offline factors.
Sanja Kelly and Sarah Cook (2012) note, also, that the Bahraini authorities have
employed trolls to attack websites users who criticize the regime. This shows how
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social media can be used as a double edged sword. While it is a means to overcome
state-controlled media, it is also taken advantage of by regimes.
The way that government's track Internet use and violate the privacy of
individual users in the name of circumventing potential terrorist acts has raised the
concern of human rights organizations as they question the methods used to monitor
and exchange the personal information of individuals. While agreeing that regimes
have the right to protect their citizens, they insist that protecting the public interest
should not be at the expense of an individual's privacy. For instance, the Australian
Human Rights Law Resources Centre's (2010) policy paper addresses the steps that
should be taken by the Australian government to protect the public's interests. It
recommends that security monitor laws should be reviewed to ensure that they are
precise and proportionate to the security threat as well as provide appropriate
safeguards against abuse. The report insists that civil society organizations play an
important role in monitoring governments. However, but such organizations are not
allowed in autocratic countries.
The regimes in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have been accused of unregulated
tracking of Internet users. Reports show that the regime in Bahrain has been using
software to spy on dissenters and to collect personal information. Media reports
indicate that private European companies from England and Germany have helped
the Bahraini regime to violate personal privacy of dissenters (Perlroth 2012; Bahrain
Watch 2012a; Doward 2013; Clark 2014). These allegations have never been
discussed openly in the national media of Bahrain although this invasion of privacy
breaches Article 26 of the Bahrain constitution that guarantees the secrecy of postal,
telegraphic, telephonic, and electronic communications.

2.4 Sports media and public opinion
Sports media is, in the context of manipulation of citizens by dominant
political entities, a particularly useful subset of mainstream media for distracting the
public. Toby Miller (2010) points out that live sport is essential to television since
the early coverage of competitions in the 1930s. Miller indicates that "sport is an
intensely emotional program-type, but without recourse to close-ups or personal
verbalization in quite the same way as drama" (p. 94). John Sugden and Alan
Tomlinson (2007) argue that sports media is not immune to being manipulated to
36

serve the elites who control sport activities in their sphere of influence. Sugden and
Tomlinson point out that the focus on sport stars and the celebration of sport events
overlooks the economic and political context in which the sport occurs, and that this
can be advantageous to those who would manipulate public opinions (pp. 58-59).
The impact of sports media on its audience is a relatively overlooked topic. One case
study of the impact of sports media on implicit racial stereotypes is offered by
Matthew J. Kobach and Robert F. Potter (2013) who explored the connection
between mediated sports programming and implicit racial stereotypes in the U.S.
They compared the media portrayal of the achievements of black athletes as "natural"
to those of white athletes, whose success is more likely to be reported as the result of
"hard work and intelligence" (p. 1414). This reporting has an influence on the public
perception of both groups. Kobach and Potter claim that the more a person views
sports programmes in an average week, the stronger their belief in the stereotypes of
black athletes as "natural" athletes and white athletes as "clever" athletes becomes (p.
1422).
Similarly, Nereshnee Govender (2010) examined how print media influences
the public perception of women in sport in her analysis of the South African
newspaper The Independent on Saturday. Govender analysed the media framing of
women in the choice of words and visual imagery in sports news reports, finding that
sport women are regularly infantilized and portrayed in emotional terms. Govender
concludes that print media lacks objectivity and that this has a potent impact on
women's socialization into sport (p. 128). According to David Rowe (2003), the
perception of sports journalism has changed in recent decades from being
entertainment-oriented to having a social responsibility. Rowe discusses the
professionalism of sports journalism as it moved beyond the cliché that was the "toy
department" of the mainstream news media.
Rowe explored the other roles for sport journalism, such as engaging in
investigation, analysis and criticism. He concludes that sports journalism should not
be excluded from professional standards for media and journalism more broadly, as it
operates in very similar ways to political, business and economic media departments.
For Rowe, the main question is not whether sports journalism is the toy department
but whether sports media editors and journalists are "content to operate within the
self-imposed and isolating limits that leave it continually open to professional
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challenge and even contempt" (p. 401). This points to the responsibility of sports
media practitioners.
Mahmood Abo Drees' (2004) master's dissertation is one of a few studies that
examined sports media in Bahrain. This study of sport departments in Akhbar AlKhaleej and Al-Ayam, the only newspapers existed at that time. The study focused on
the technical and professional obstacles that faced sports newspapers in the period
between 1997 and 2001. However, the study overlooked the regime's manipulation
of sports media. Another study of Saudi Arabia sports newspapers indicates that over
than 26% of the sport columnists are not expert in sports and 63% of them have
never engaged with sport before practising journalism (Al-Ghiamah 2014). This
study analysed columns in four popular newspapers for 35 days, finding that less
than 30% of the columns addressed local sport issues in an objective manner, while
about 70% used emotional discourse. The findings suggest that sports media is being
used to manipulate the audience.
The shifting perception of sports media raises questions about the use and
impact of sports media as a political tool during The Arab Spring. Khir Eldeen Awis
and Atta Hassan Abdulrahim (1998) addressed the potential for political impact of
sports media in one of the few Arabic studies that discuss the relationship between
sports media and its audiences. They focused on sports media in Egypt over two
decades prior The Arab Spring and the advent of social media. Similar to Rowe
(2003), they argue that sports media is not just for entertainment as it is capable of
affecting or directing public thoughts and attitudes (1998, pp. 51-52). They found
that sports media has a significant impact on audience's opinions and their capacity
to assess information. In other words, the psychological influence of sports media is
evident as it presents ideas as objective "truth". However, Awis and Abdulrahim did
not precisely define what this "truth" might be.

2.5 Sport, human rights and politics
The uprising in Bahrain has provoked debate about the relationship between
sport and human rights on the one hand, and politics on the other. Following the
crackdown and then the Bahraini insistence on hosting the Grand Prix in 2012,
opinion columns and politicians alike have asked the question, should sport mix with
human rights or politics? Laurie Whitwell (2013) argues that sport has been used for
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political and nation-building purposes, since the establishment of the Olympic
Games in ancient Greece. Whitwell argues that the impact of politics on sport should
not be denied. On the other hand, it is common practice for sports officials to insist
on the separation of sport and politics. Bernie Ecclestone, the president and CEO of
Formula One Management and Formula One Administration, made public statements
rejecting the politicization of his sport, insisting that Formula One did not implicitly
support or influence the on the national politics of the hosting country (Yoon 2012).
Michel Platini, the former French football player and the current President of the
Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) also argues that football should be
distanced from politics (Rainbow 2013).
Scholars have discussed the consequences of the involvement of politics in
sport (Tomlinson and Young 2006; Dousti et al. 2013; Bravo and Silva 2014; Merkel
2014). Historically, sport has regularly been exploited for the benefit of political
regimes. For instance, Miller (2010) points out that sport was part and parcel of the
German Nazi regime's television propaganda (p. 94). Also, Alan Tomlinson and
Christopher Young (2006, p. 141) examined how sporting success was considered
because of administrative prowess of the military regime in Argentina, where,
according to Bravo and Silva (2014, pp. 130-131) achievements in sport were
explicitly paralleled to the war in Chile. Similarly, Dousti et al. (2013) argue that
until 1979 in Iran, during Pahlavi’s regime, sport reflected the dynastic ideology.
They claim that the Iranian government and politicians are still involved in sport to
achieve a wide variety of their political and cultural objectives through this
connection (p. 165).
The relationship between sport and national identity has also been widely
discussed. Udo Merkel (2014) examined the multidimensional relationship between
sport and national identity in the divided Korean Peninsula. Merkel analysed the
North Korean regime's identity management and discourses in three different
contexts: the daily life in the capital Pyongyang, the local sports events, and
international sports events. Merkel found that sport can enhance the harmony, the
unity and the celebration of a common cultural denominator between the people of
two countries which are otherwise at conflict (in this case, North and South Korea)
(p. 386). Merkel points to the example of the North Korean athletes who credited
their sporting success in the 2012 London Olympic Games to the love, support and
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inspiration of their leader Kim Jong-un, and his father and grandfather (pp. 386-387).
Similarly, athletes and sports figures in Bahrain regularly credit their sporting
success to the "wise leadership" of the Al-Khalifa regime (Al-Bilad 2012; Akhbar AlKhaleej 2012; Al-Watan 2013a and Bahrain News Agency 2014b).
A number of scholars have discussed the specific sport of football (soccer)
and politics, arguing that football stadiums are effectively a political forum. Dag
Tuastad (2014) examined the capacity of football to make an impact on the political
situation in Egypt and Jordan. Tuastad notes that the main protests in Egypt's Tahrir
Square in 2011 against the rule of then the president Hosni Mubarak were organized
by Al-Ahli Club ultras who are a group of loyal football supporters (p. 378). Tuastad
points out that tens of thousands members of the Al-Ahli ultras played a fundamental
role in the success of the revolution. In Jordan, Tuastad indicates that football is an
arena for breaking political taboos such as criticizing the king. He cites football
matches where Jordanian club supporters chanted political slogans and raised public
debate about the limits of the king’s powers (pp. 383). In the Egyptian case, Tuastad
assumes that the protesters represented their sport identity, while it could be argued
that they participated in protests as Egyptian citizens rather than as football
supporters. However, Matthew Guschwan (2014) extends Tuastad's argument about
the political role of football by arguing that the public forum offered by football
stadiums is a vital political space. Guschwan points out that football is inextricably
entangled with everyday Italian social and political life, and that stadiums in Italy are
a space for political expression. Nevertheless, Guschwan acknowledges that there are
limitations to the stadiums as a political forum because they are not designed for
group discussion. Therefore, the term "political expression" can only refer to banners
or "vulgar" chants (pp. 893-894).
While the scholars referred to above focused on different roles of sport in
politics, other scholars have explored the link between sport and diplomacy. For
example, Steven J. Jackson and Stephan Haigh (2008) examined the relationship
between sport and foreign policy, pointing out that sport plays a strategic role in
international relationships. They also note that sport has become an important aspect
of global tourism and what they called the "branding" of cities and nations (p. 335).
Arguing that the relationship between diplomacy and sport is still relatively undertheorized, Stuart Murray and Geoffrey Allen Pigman (2014) agree that regimes use
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international sport events as instruments of diplomacy. They go further to argue that
sport plays a significant role in diplomatic missions because of the opportunities for
communication and negotiation that take place during international sport events (p.
1098). Murry and Pigman argue that understanding the relationship between
diplomacy and international sport will not only help governments use sport for
diplomacy more efficiently, but it will also be a significant factor in understanding the
impact of sport on society (p. 1115).
In his article "When the Arab World Was Mobilized Around the FIFA 2006
World Cup" (2007) Mahfoud Amara discusses the elites' agenda to keep their citizens
locked to their broadcasting domain and market share. Amara argues that the regimes
sought to slow down the establishment of new television channels that threatened
their interest. Amara examined the public's reaction to the Arab Radio and Television
Network (ART) exclusive rights to broadcast the 2006 World Cup Finals in North
Africa and the Middle East. Amara noted the mass focus by people, media, political
parties and Arab governments on World Cup while the Arab nations were going into
a period of social, economic and political crises. This indicated, according to Amara,
the use of sport and sports media by Arab states to impose regimes' agenda on public
opinion (pp. 420-421). The argument about using sports media as a political means
and as a tool of distraction can be linked to the present thesis as it indicates the role
that sports media plays in politics where the status quo exploit media to mobilize
public opinion toward their private agenda.

2.6 The 2011 uprising and foreign influences
Fuad I. El-Khury's Tribe and State in Bahrain: The Transition of Social and
Political Authority in an Arab State (1983) is one of few books that examine Bahrain
under the rule of Al-Khalifa family. The book explores the transformation of the AlKhalifa family from a tribe to a "modern state". Aiming to understand the social and
political situation in Bahrain, El-Khury explores the relationship between Al-Khalifa
members and the conflicts between them about resources, the relationship between
the Al-Khalifa family and other tribes in Bahrain and the relationship between the
ruling family and the opposition and the people. El-Khury examined the political,
social and economic shifts of Bahrain from the 18th Century to the 20th century. He
discusses the causes of the previous unrests in Bahrain such as the pearl divers'
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movement in 1932, civil unrest in 1934, 1935 and 1938, and the Bahrain Petroleum
Company (Bapco) unrest in 1942, 1948 and 1965. El-Khury indicated that the
sequential unrests in Bahrain called for political, judicature and economic reforms
(pp. 320-323). Despite the importance of the study to researchers who aim to
examine the history of Bahrain, there is a concern about the book. El-Khury
acknowledges that he was provided logistical assistance from Al-Khalifa family's
members to write it (p. 7).
There are as yet relatively few scholarly publications that examine the protest
movement, the political context, or the role of mainstream social media and its
impact in Bahrain. Alfred Stepan et al. (2014) study the uprising in Bahrain and other
uprisings by offering a three-part ideal-type typology to distinguish between "ruling
monarchy",

"constitutional monarchy"

and

what

they called

"democratic

parliamentary monarchy". The aim of their article is to help researchers who focus on
boundary changes between different types of monarchies. They point out that the
rulers in Bahrain, sectarian factors and the royal family's allies, all combined to
thwart the transfer to democratic parliamentary monarchy (p. 47). The study of the
Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad by Tooba Khurshid (2011) draws attention to
the sectarian reasons for the uprising in Bahrain and Syria. Khurshid argues that
there were strong economic and social circumstances that led Bahraini and Syrian
people to protest against their rulers, noting that in Bahrain specifically freedom of
expression is restricted and private print media are constrained by the 2002 press law
(p. 45).
Miriam Joyce's recent book, Bahrain from the Twentieth Century to the Arab
Spring (2012), is one of the few studies to explain the reason behind the unrest by
reviewing the historical context of the regime in Bahrain, including the British
colonization and the influence of the United States. She discusses the relationship
between the regime and people of Bahrain by focusing on the political reasons for
demonstrations that have occurred since the 1970s. What is missing from this study,
however, is a consideration of the influence of media in Bahrain or, in particular, a
closer understanding of the contribution of sports media to the current political
events.
On the other hand, a number of scholars have discussed the Saudi's
intervention in the Bahraini uprising, and America's role and its fear of a democratic
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regime that may conflict with its interest in the Persian Gulf. For instance, the Saudiborn social anthropology scholar Madawi Al-Rasheed (2001), argues that the other
scholars often ignore sectarian strategies used by the House of Saud as a counterrevolution to create a rift between the Sunni majority and the Shiite minority in Saudi
Arabia. This strategy was also used, according to Al-Rasheed, by the Saudi regime to
halt to the democratic movement in Bahrain. However, following the publication of
Al-Rasheed's article, more commentators have noticed the sectarian factor in the
Saudi intervention. Brandon Friedman (2012) is one of the earliest scholars to point
to the Gulf State's fear of the uprising in Bahrain while protesters were still going on
the Bahraini streets. He believes that the regimes in the Persian Gulf responded to
what they considered to be an Iranian attempt to exploit the uprising led by the
majority Shiite in Bahrain. Similarly, Simon Mabon (2012) points out that the
Bahrain uprising is a conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. According to Mabon,
the conflict between the Sunni ruler Al-Khalifa and the Shiite opposition in Bahrain
epitomizes the tussle between the Sunni regime in Saudi Arabia and the Shiite
regime in Iran. Besides this sectarian factor, Mabon claims that Bahrain is considered
to be of paramount importance because its geostrategic significance in the Persian
Gulf (p. 95).
Other studies have pointed to the strong relationship between the rulers in
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and the influence of this relationship on the uprising.
Mohammed Nuruzzaman (2013) argues that the Saudi's intervention was not only for
political and strategic reasons, but also for economic reasons. Nuruzzaman, a lecturer
in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, at the Gulf University for
Science and Technology in Kuwait, goes beyond the political and economic reasons
of the intervention to link it with interior Saudi religious reasons. Nuruzzaman points
out that the Wahhabi would not allow the Bahraini Shiites to rule the country (p.
376). Also, the author of Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to Arab
Uprising, Frederic Wahrey (2013) notes that the regime in Bahrain and Saudi backed
the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists to stand up against Shiite MPs in the
parliament prior the 2011 uprising in Bahrain.
On the other hand, Stephen Zunes (2013), as a specialist in Middle Eastern
politics, has identified three factors for the failure of the uprising in Bahrain: the
ruthless crackdown on the street movement, the Saudi's intervention, and the U.S.
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refusal to support the democratic movement. Zunes, who is known for his criticisms
of the U.S foreign policy argues that, if successful, the uprising in Bahrain could
have established a promising democratic state. Zunes believes this democracy would
not necessarily have been anti-American (p. 162). Thomas Ambrosio's (2014) article
"Democratic States and Authoritarian Firewalls: America as a Black Knight in the
Uprising in Bahrain" discusses the hidden role of democratic states to effectively
underpin autocratic regimes. Ambrosio draws attention to the U.S. government's
diplomatic and political support for the Bahraini regime's crackdown of the uprising
arguing that the U.S. patronized the Bahraini autocrat regime to protect its own
interests (p. 5).
While scholars have linked the Saudi fear of the uprising in Bahrain with
sectarian factors, Toby Matthiesen (2012) gives more depth to the discussion of the
connection between the 2011-12 protests of the Eastern Saudi Province in Saudi
Arabia with the uprising in Bahrain. He outlines the historical, family and religious
ties between Saudi and Bahraini's Shiite populations. Matthiesen, a research fellow at
University of Cambridge, argues that The Arab Spring and the demonstrations in
Bahrain clearly contributed to the Saudi Shiite's movement or what he called the
"Saudi Spring" (p. 629). While Matthiesen acknowledges the benefit of new media
and its impact on the "Saudi Spring", he argues that personal networks such as
religious' gatherings were more significant in facilitating the political protest
movement in Saudi Arabia.
Amal Khalaf (2013) focuses on the local angle of the conflict, drawing
attention to the symbol of Bahrain's Pearl Roundabout protest in terms of a "war of
ideas" between the regime and the protesters. Khalaf examined the conflict between
the reality that is controlled by the regime and the virtual reality represented by
social media where protesters have a greater freedom. While the Bahraini regime
strongly controls mainstream media, protesters bypass censorship to confront the
official propaganda by using social media. In this context, the demolition of the pearl
monument was considered by the regime as removing "a bad memory" (p. 273),
whereas the flood of videos, images and 'baptizing' the logo of the Pearl Roundabout
was the protesters' response. Khalaf calls for review of the relationship between "the
image and the visual's conditions of the existence in the digital universe" (p. 279) as
she points out that images have become an integral part of any political struggle.
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Khalaf's article points to the tussle between regimes and protesters in the era of the
Internet where cyberspace is less-controlled by the regimes.
In conclusion, this review of the literature highlights the role that mainstream
media and, particularly, state-controlled media played during The Arab Uprising
(Rinnawi 2012; Anas 2012). The review shows that state-controlled media is
exploited for the benefit of regimes (Amin 2009; Guaaybess 2013). It also discussed
the scholarly debate about the role of social media during The Arab Spring, whether
it was significant, and how social media has become a battlefield between regimes
and protesters (Storck 2011; Faris 2012; Wolfsfeld et al. 2012; Campbell and Hawk
2012; Aday et al. 2012). The review also shows there was a research focus on the
role of social media and political media during The Arab Spring, while the role of
sports media particularly is overlooked during this era. Scholars argue that sports and
sports media play several political roles (Tomlinson and Young 2006; Whitwell
2013; Tuastad 2014) and they are not immune to manipulation and exploitation for
political purposes.
Scholars and journalists have examined the political situation in Bahrain in
light of the uprising, pointing out that Bahrain's allies have had a strong influence on
the political process (Khurshid 2011; Joyce 2012). While Khalaf (2013) examines
the uprising in Bahrain from a local angle as a conflict between the regime and the
protesters in the virtual reality of the Internet, Al-Rasheed (2001), Mabon (2012) and
Nuruzzaman (2013) focus more on the regional impact in the conflict that
symbolizes the regional conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran. While the argument
about the foreign factors that have helped the Al-Khalifa family to confront the
protesters is substantial, the ruling family has also employed local power elements
such as sports media to maintain power. The reliance on sports media as a means to
repel the political movement in Bahrain shows the significant importance of this type
of media during social movements.
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Chapter 3: Theoretical framework and news framing
This chapter introduces Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky’s
Propaganda Model (2008) as a theoretical framework. It discusses the five filters of
the Propaganda Model (PM) and applies them to the Bahraini sports media context in
order to examine the Bahraini media situation during the 2011 uprising. This chapter
also discusses the use of news framing by the media and explains the techniques used
in covering the protest. The chapter then examines the relationship between news
framing and propaganda and language choice to understand how these techniques are
employed to serve the elites' agenda.

3.1 Theoretical framework
Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky's propaganda model (2008) was
developed in the 1980s to explain how media institutions are structured to serve the
political and economic interests of dominant elites. The five main elements of
Herman and Chomsky's PM are "ownership" of media, "funding", "sourcing", "flak"
and "ideology".
The first filter in the PM is "ownership" of mass media. Herman and
Chomsky (2008, p. 2) argue that mainstream media outlets are either conglomerates
or corporations where media work for their proprietors' interests. Thus, the content
that is broadcast to the public by media outlets may serve the proprietors' agenda.
When the interests of shareholders of media outlets are compatible with politicians'
interests, media content that imperils these shared interests could be subjected to
censorship. This can result in the cover up of information that is in the public interest
and can also grant corporations the power to shape the public agenda.
In their critique of the PM, Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang (2004, p. 109)
explain that the American media are not fully even-handed in their reporting on other
countries, pointing out that neither the government nor any party in the United States
fully controls the news. On the other hand, Sheldon Rampton (2007) argues that
while propaganda remains alive in the Internet era, ownership works differently with
social media platforms such as Facebook, Twitter or blogs. Rampton points out that
media content is not as strongly controlled as it has previously been with mainstream
media when the PM was introduces for the first time whereas Lang and Lang
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indicate that there is no one party that controls the media and this invalidates the
"ownership" filter in the PM. Nonetheless, in the Bahraini case, ownership and
therefore control of media is clearly observable even in the Internet era. According to
a report by Freedom House )2013a(, online content is censored under Bahrain's
Press, Printing and Publishing Law 2002. For instance, the report indicates that since
2010, the authorities have banned the BlackBerry news bulletin service and blocked
more than 1,000 pro-opposition online forums and news websites.
Indicating just how much the Al-Khalifa family controls the mass media, all
television and radio channels in Bahrain are owned and directed by the regime.
Additionally, the Press, Printing and Publishing Law 2002 grants the Ministry of
Information (now known as Information Affairs Authority) the right to reject licenses
for press houses and newspapers. Rejected press license applicants have the right to
appeal in the High Civil Court; however, the Information Affairs Authority (IAA)
that represents the regime retains the power to grant a printing license or reject an
application even at higher level. The Bahraini authority's moves to control the media
have drawn criticism from human rights organizations such as Article19 that accused
the regime of not only controlling media but also systematically attacking activists
and dissidents. In a 2011 report, Article19 describes how until 2002 Bahrain had only
two newspapers that were controlled by the Ministry of Information and the
establishment of Al-Wasat allowed the opposition to run the first independent
newspaper in the country. Despite allowing for a potentially pro-opposition
newspaper, independent media and journalists in Bahrain are, according to Article19,
persistently vilified in the official media as traitors with the accusation that they are
"receiving funds and instructions from foreign powers" (Article19 2011).
Article19 notes that the regime has restricted television broadcasting from
abroad. For instance, the Bahraini channel LuaLua TV that airs from London was
repeatedly denied permission to broadcast in Bahrain and its satellite was jammed
within four hours of the launch the channel on July 17, 2011. The channel website
where viewers could stream the programmes online, was also blocked within Bahrain
(Beyer 2013). Similarly, film production is also closely monitored by the authorities
and films cannot be produced without a license.
As the Press, Printing and Publishing Law of 2002 notes:
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No movie, reference to a movie or commercial ad shall be displayed
on a cinematic poster at cinemas unless a license is obtained from the
cinematic movies and recorded publications control committee
pointed to in the following article. Recorded publications shall not be
circulated either before a written permission is obtained from the
directorate beforehand. The directorate can place the recorded
publication before the afore-mentioned committee before licensing its
circulation. (Article 23 of the Press, Printing and Publishing Law
2002)
It is clear that the authorities in Bahrain have well established systems in place to
control or monitor the mainstream media, the Internet and film production which
allow the authorities to own the media outlets in Bahrain, or control the content.
The Propaganda Model's second filter "funding" stems from the reliance of
media on advertising licenses. Media rely on advertising revenue to cover the costs
of their production. Hence, the news eventually becomes a commodity to serve the
advertiser. As advertisers target their goods and services to specific consumers, they
are inclined to advertise during television programs that are compatible with their
own commercial interests. Herman and Chomsky argue that corporations will rarely
sponsor programs that are critical of commercial activities that impact on problems
of environmental degradation, the working of military-industrial complexes, or
corporate support of Third World authoritarian states (2008, pp. 13-15). As
mainstream media serve their advertisers' interests, these may conflict with the public
interest.
In an interview with Andrew Mullen in 2010, Herman and Chomsky argued
that the impact of advertising was an even more important force in 2008 than it was
in 1988 because of the increased competition among traditional media outlets on the
one hand and between media outlets and the Internet on the other hand. In his review
of the PM, Joan Pedro (2011) points out that the influence of advertisers may occur
directly and indirectly. "Media content must conform as much as possible to what
sponsors are looking for in an outlet to advertise their products" (p. 1881). Statistics
released by The Arab Media Outlook in 2013 show that more than 65% of Arab print
media revenue, including newspapers in Bahrain, rely on advertising. The report
shows that less than 35% of the revenue comes from newspaper circulation (p. 32).
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Another report shows that the 2012 advertising market in the Gulf States countries
reached about 5 billion US dollars. The two biggest markets were the United Arab
Emirates and Saudi Arabia with USD1.5 billion and USD1.42 billion respectively,
whereas the market in Bahrain reached about USD90 million, including over USD16
million governmental or semi-government advertising (Salman 2013). These
statistics show that the Bahraini regime directly controls about 20% of the
advertising market. They also show that the newspapers in Bahrain take about 70%
of the total advertising market compared with other media outlets.
According to Abdullatif Hamza (1960), Salama Mossa (1963) and Awatif
Abdulrahman (2002) the reliance of Arab media on advertising has led to situation
where journalists are bribed and the media outlets that are considered pro-opposition
are penalized by the autocrat regimes. According to Freedom House and Article19,
media outlets in Bahrain therefore engage in self-censorship to avoid being framed
by the official media as being anti-regime. Freedom House (2013b) online report
explains that this self-censorship is a deliberate strategy "to avoid offending
advertisers that do not want their businesses associated with critical reporting".
The third filter of the PM is "sourcing" as "the mass media are drawn into a
symbiotic relationship with powerful sources of information by economic necessity
and reciprocity of interest" (Herman and Chomsky 2008, p. 17). According to
Herman and Chomsky, mass media outlets have demanding news schedules that
need to be met. However, in the 1980s media outlets could only afford reporters at
significant events or where press conferences were held, such as at the White House
and the Pentagon. Regular news bulletins from these sources filled the news demands
which led to growing dependence by the media on the official line.
Another reason for the dependence of media outlets on "official" sources was
to avoid criticism of being biased or to protect themselves from the threat of libel
suits. In this way, according to Herman and Chomsky, mass media outlets needed
material that could be portrayed as being presumptively accurate to maintain the
image of impartiality (p. 18). Of course, media outlets may also be manipulated into
following the agenda of "powerful sources" (pp. 22-23). Problematising sourcing as a
filter, Rampton (2007) argues that in the Internet era there are an increasing number
of sources other than the "official" line. Rampton gives, as an example, the
controversial first photograph of flag-draped coffins of American soldiers returning
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from the recent Iraq war that was taken by a cargo worker in Kuwait. The picture
was published in the Seattle Times, despite an official sanction against images of
coffins that would remind the American public of the cost of war. Even more
challenging to the official sourcing of news, the recent Abu Ghraib photos of
prisoners were taken by the abusers themselves before being reproduced by news
media in the public domain. While Rampton believes that the sourcing filter of the
PM should be reconsidered, he does acknowledge that Tami Silicio, the cargo worker
in Kuwait, was sacked from her job as a result of the pictures. Thus, although official
sources may not have the same stranglehold on the news as they did before the
Internet era, the dominant elites still have power to influence the media content.
While Rampton considers the control of the source of news as a slightly
outmoded filter for the Propaganda Model for the USA, this control continues to be
strong in the Bahraini context. Newspapers continue to receive daily news updates
from the Royal Court, the Crown Prince's Court, the Prime Minister's Court and
other ministries. In an unwritten understanding, newspapers in Bahrain are not
allowed to publish any other news related to the King, the Crown Prince or the Prime
Minister without permission. During the uprising in 2011, sports news was also
expected to follow the official line and they did so by publishing official sport news
about the involvement of many sports figures and athletes in the uprising.
The fourth filter of the PM is "flak", which involves the negative responses to
media reporting on television or radio programs. Flak may occur directly or
indirectly and may take the form of complaints, threats, lawsuits, and penalties.
According to Herman and Chomsky (2008, p. 24), flak increases "in close parallel
with business's growing resentment of media criticism and the corporate offensive of
the 1970s and 1980s". Oliver Boyd-Barrett (2004) has expanded flak to include fear
of top editors and voices in the right-wing media. Boyd-Barrett also adds the impact
of powerful voices, such as those of President, Vice-President or the Secretary of
Defence, on the choice of questions or specific journalists during press conferences.
He points out that using privileged voices to embarrass journalists who ask "wrong"
questions or adopt the "wrong" tone is just another form of flak (p. 446).
While most manifestations of "flak" in the Propaganda Model as envisaged
by Herman and Chomsky remains at the level of non-physical threats, some aspects
of flak in Bahrain go beyond this to physical abuse, torture and even death. Bahrain
50

has one of the world's worst records of press freedom, according to the Committee to
Protect Journalists (2011) report. It cites statistics from 2011 when two Bahraini
journalists were killed, about 110 journalists were arrested or threatened and twenty
foreign reporters from media outlets including the BBC, CNN, McClatchy
Newspaper and CBS were denied entry into the country to cover the uprising.
Other human rights organizations, such as Reporters Without Borders,
Human Rights Watch and the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, have similarly
accused the Bahraini authorities of violating human rights and press freedom during
the uprising in 2011. These organizations registered hundreds of cases of press
violations where journalists and bloggers were killed, detained, tortured or sacked
from their jobs as a result of covering the uprising. Violations against journalists, in
general and sports journalists in particular have included physical and psychological
torture, sexual harassment, dismissal from their job and threats to their families.
Faisal Hayat is one of the Bahraini sports journalists who was jailed and
tortured for his journalistic activities during the 2011 uprising. He recounted his
experience to the Bahrain Center for Human Rights:
…they dragged me to the torture room again, and there they resumed
beating me on my feet by a hose. Then the executioner asked me:
"Which hand you write with?" I said to myself: "I won't sacrifice one
hand, so my both hands should share what will strike them of
punishment for the act of writing". I replied: "I write with both hands".
He rushed beating both of them until I felt that I had lost feeling my
hands. (Bahrain Center for Human Rights 2011b).
The way that Faisal Hayat and other journalists were treated shows how the Bahraini
regime responded to criticism by the media. Clearly "flak", the fourth filter of the
PM, is an ongoing concern in Bahrain where it is aimed at penalizing journalists who
were involved in the uprising.
The fifth filter in the PM was presented by Herman and Chomsky as the
control of mechanism of "anticommunism". While this term was topical in the 1980s,
it was more recently revised to encompass the broader term "ideology". While the
PM was originally developed during the Cold War period examined the ideological
fear of Communism as a clear antagonist to the U.S pro-democratic government,
Herman and Chomsky did point out that the dominant elites of any nation, through
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their control of mass media outlets, mobilize a sense of fear towards "enemies" or
those that threaten their status quo:
It's the idea that grave enemies are about to attack us and we need to
huddle under the protection of domestic power. You need something to
frighten people with, to prevent them from paying attention to what’s
really happening to them. You have to somehow engender fear and
hatred, to channel the kind of fear and rage – or even just discontent –
that’s being aroused by social and economic conditions. (Chomsky et
al. 1998, p. 42).
Thus, according to Herman and Chomsky, fear can be used to mobilize the populace
against an enemy. As the concept is "fuzzy", the ideology can also be used against
those who threaten the dominant elites' interests (pp. 27-29). In his retrospective of
the PM, Herman (2000) explains that propaganda campaigns occur only when the
interests of those controlling and managing the filter are consistent with the
campaigns.
The fifth filter of the PM can be seen in operation in Bahrain, as propaganda
campaigns are used by the Al-Khalifa family regime to manipulate public opinion
against democracy that would threaten their interests and autocratic control. Proregime figures and journalists routinely attack opposition leaders and protesters,
calling for the death penalty, imprisonment or exile. For example, a former member
of the Bahraini parliament Tweeted on August 10, 2012 "teargas will not help with
the terrorist Iran slaves who want to kill security men ... Shotgun, live bullets and
deportation is the medicine they deserve" (Bahrain Center for Human Rights 2013).
Overall, the Propaganda Model provides an appropriate framework to
understand how mass media serves political and economic power brokers in a
particular national context. The PM, however, has its limitations. As Herman and
Chomsky acknowledged, the PM does not study the effects of the media on the
public. In their introduction to the recent reprint of the book Manufacturing Consent
(2008, p. xii) they indicate that the PM does not imply that any propaganda
emanating from the media is always effective. In addition, in his critical review and
assessment of the PM, Jeffery Klaehn (2002) points out that the PM does not
presume that newsroom journalists routinely take mindful decisions that are
consistent with the interest of dominant elites: "Rather, it assumes that elite media
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recruit right-minded personnel to fill staff positions. Its overarching concern with the
broader issue of social class firmly distinguishes the PM from the gate-keeper
model" (p. 151).
Other scholars have criticised several aspects of the PM. For instance, BoydBarrett (2004) accepts the basic premises of the PM but believes that it does not
pinpoint methodologies for determining the relative weight of independent filters in
different contexts which would be beneficial to developing the model in the future.
Boyd-Barrett adds that there is a lack of precision in the characterization of some of
the filters, so that "the model privileges the structural factors that determine
propagandized news selection, and therefore eschews or marginalizes intentionality"
(p. 435).
In light of this, Boyd-Barrett proposed intentionality as a sixth filter for the
PM, arguing that Herman and Chomsky seemed to avoid what he called direct
purchase of media, or "buying out" of individual journalists or their media by the
intelligence agencies or related authorities. To illustrate his point, Boyd-Barrett
refers to revelations in the 1970s that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
published hundreds of books in order to undermine both the Soviet Union and
communism and Boyd-Barrett also refers to the Rolling Stone article by Carl
Bernstein on October 20, 1977 which disclosed that the CIA worked closely with
400 journalists from a range of media outlets such as Associated Press, ABC, CBS,
Hearst Newspapers, NBC, The New York Times, Reuters, United Press International
and others (p. 436).
Annabelle Lukin (2012) criticises the absence of a consideration of language
or discourse in the PM. Although Chomsky is considered "the father of modern
linguistics" (p. 100), Lukin points out the use of language was essentially ignored by
the PM. Lukin indicates that while language is indisputably the carrier of the PM,
Herman and Chomsky's analysis does not recruit a single theoretical method from the
discipline most directly engaged in understanding and describing the nature of the
language used in propaganda, and its relationship to notions such as ideology (p.
100). The use of language in propaganda has an important role in confronting the
protesters in Bahrain. Since the uprising started in 2011, the opposition and
protesters have been described in the pro-regime media as traitors, insurrectionists,
terrorists and killers. For instance, a news article that was published in Al-Watan
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(2013b) headlined " خونة الوطن يُنسقون لحلقات التآمر الخارجي على البحرين: "تجمع الوحدةwhich
translates to "The Unity Gathering: Traitors Coordinating a Conspiracy against
Bahrain". While Herman and Chomsky ignored the use of language, this example
evidences how, in Bahrain, the PM fifth filter of ideology is clearly at work as the
pro-regime media uses extreme language as propaganda and as a weapon to resist
political reform. This will be analysed in Chapters 4 and 5.
Herman and Chomsky's propaganda model to "manufacture consent"
provides a useful theoretical framework to understand how the media in Bahrain
including sports media has been politicized to serve the dominant interests of the
elites. The PM points to the use of framing in news agenda. Herman and Chomsky
discuss how victims of humanitarian catastrophes were "worthy" and sometimes
"unworthy". Chomsky points to the performance of media outlets as "they determine,
they select, they shape, they control, they restrict in order to serve the interests of
dominant, elite groups in the society" (cited in Wintonick and Achbar 1994, p. 55).
It is believed that the PM has strength to be applied in different ways:
The model’s general argument, then, is that how victims and
events are portrayed within mainstream media discourses will
largely be dependent upon the interests of power within specific
time/place contexts. This area of focus could also be significantly
broadened and expanded to include events, issues and other
groups of actors (beyond victims). (Klaehn 2009, p. 49).
Eric Herring and Piers Robinson (2003) point out that the Propaganda Model explains
why framing news reports about US foreign policy is often consistent with the agenda
of U.S corporate and political elites. Also, Andrew Mullen and Jeffery Klaehn (2010)
argue that the PM could be bolstered and its analytical capability could be enriched
by other theories such as framing and agenda-setting (p. 223). The structure of the
PM can be seen in action in the Bahrain context, where the control and the use of
media as a political means of propaganda is explicit. It is therefore important to
closely examine framing and how it operates within media.

3.2 Use of framing in media
Framing has been applied as a research methodology in a range of disciplines
(Benford and Snow 2000), including politics and political psychology (Iyengar 1990;
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Nelson et al. 1997), economic psychology (Gonzalez et al. 2005); communication
and media studies (Entman 1991; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007; Cissel 2012),
sociology (Al-Rawi 2014), and linguistics and discourse analysis (ed. Tennen 1993;
Hope 2010; Mahfouz 2013).
The founding of framing theory has been attributed to the sociologist Erving
Goffman (1974) who pointed out in Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization
of Experience, that framing is a "schemata of interpretation" used by individuals or
groups to interpret or understand events (p. 21). Shanto Iyengar's (1990) study of
poverty as a political issue showed how people's perspective about an issue depended
on the way the issue was framed by media. Poverty, according to Iyengar, was not
considered a private problem when it was framed as a social problem. Thus, framing,
according to Robert M. Entman (1993), presents a way to illustrate the power of a
communication text (p. 51) and it involves manipulating the text for the benefit of the
medium or the message sender (p. 52).
Framing has developed as a particularly useful theory in media over the last
three decades. While early studies that examined the concept of framing concentrated
more on the power of a media text and how it was shaped and presented (Iyengar
1990; Entman1991), scholars in the 2000s have paid more attention to the impact of
framing on audiences (Brewer et al. 2003; Gonzalez et al. 2005; Scheufele and
Tewksbury 2007). Some scholars have argued that framing is a two-sided
relationship where media outlets frame messages focusing on certain aspects, while
the audience interpret the message by using their educational and cultural
background and experiences (Baresch et al. 2011; Van Gorp and Vercruysse 2012).
It is worth noting that scholars have generally agreed that framing has the power to
influence an audience's beliefs (Scheufele and Iyengar 2011; Lecheler and Vreese
2012; Arvizu 2013). However, while they agree that framing affect people's
perceptions, they differ about the level of effectiveness of framing.
Scholars and journalists agree that all news stories are framed and it is a
crucial process for journalists to choose how to frame their stories. For instance,
Seow Ting Lee and Crispin C. Maslog (2005) explain that news framing is the way
that a news story is organized "thematically, stylistically, and factually, to convey a
specific story line" (p. 313). Steve Smith (1997) argues that framing stories could be
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"the most important" issue in newsrooms. Smith indicates that choosing the story
frame is "the most powerful" decision that any journalist makes.
Andrew C. Billings (2004) points out that media has the power to frame a
story positively or negatively (p. 203). In their article "The Future of Public
Engagement", Matthew C. Nisbet and Dietram A. Scheufele (2007) argue that
framing involves shaping an issue as a problem, what or who is responsible for it,
and what should be done about it. While Baldwin Van Gorp and Tom Vercruysse
(2012) believe that framing appears to be to some extent manipulative, Margaret
Cissel (2012) argues that framing is set to meet the goals of the providing source (p.
67). This argument brings the discussion back to the early study of Entman (1991)
who showed how media content could be framed and presented to the audience for
the benefit of the news makers, corporations or dominant powers. Entman compared
the coverage by the U.S. media of the shoot-down of the Korean Air Lines KAL
Flight 007 in 1983 by a Soviet fighter plane, and the shoot-down of Iran Air Flight
655 in 1988 by a U.S. Navy ship.
Entman's analysis of the framing of these two very similar stories in the
coverage of the Times, Newsweek, CBS Evening News, The New York Times and the
Washington Post showed that the KAL incident was portrayed by American media as
more important than the Iranian Air incident as it occupied more space in the print
media and was given more time in the CBS evening news show telecast. While his
analysis relied rather simply on how much material on the event was available and
how prominently it was displayed, Entman argues that this frame data helps to
determine the political importance of a news event (p. 10). The coverage of the two
events also showed different uses of words, images, graphics, naming of victims and
publication of their pictures. Overall, Entman found that the KAL incident was
framed by a moral discourse about a deliberate/ premeditated incident, while the Iran
Air incident was framed by technical discourse as an accident.
Entman's study shows that the use of news framing aims to focus the
audience's attention on a particular event by using various methods; for instance, by
occupying more space in print media or by giving more time to television coverage.
The way that media outlets edit and place news is determined by the importance
given to particular news stories by the media outlet. Entman's study of media framing
is helpful to understand the use of framing during the 2011 uprising in Bahrain. As
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Entman has indicated, media uses a specific language to describe events for
particular purposes. Media outlets also focus their coverage on particular issues and
overlook others. Entman showed how narrative text can be framed and produced for
the audience. In his case study of the media coverage of the two airplane accidents,
Entman modelled how framing news narratives can be identified by studying
keywords, metaphors, concepts, symbols and visual images. Entman illustrated how
frames "work to make some ideas more salient in the text, others less so- (sic) and
other entirely invisible" (p. 7).
This thesis argues that sports media in Bahrain has used specific key phrases
to vilify the demonstrations and the protesters on the one hand and to glorify the AlKhalifa family and their supporters on the other. It also examines techniques
including the use of symbols and visual images in the television coverage of the 2011
uprising in Bahrain to inspect the official propaganda during the uprising.

3.2.1 Framing and social movements
The relationship between social movements and news framing has been
discussed by scholars who examine how protests, protesters and their demands are
framed in media coverage. Murray Edelman (1993) discussed the role of framing in
the social world where dominant elites have the power and the ability to shape public
perceptions in order to serve their own agenda. Tim Baylor (1996) agrees with
Edelman as he indicates that social movements being framed by media outlets is a
"fact beyond dispute" (p. 242) and he believes that some events are deliberately
selected, covered and timed. Understanding how framing techniques are employed
by elites to achieve their goals and to influence public opinion is important according
to Matthew C. Nisbet (2011) because it informs efforts to hold those in power
accountable.
According to Sydney G. Tarrow (2011) in his book Power in Movement:
Social Movements and Contentious Politics, there are three mechanisms to portray
social movements: framing, identity construction, and emotional work (pp. 142-143).
Tarrow argues that framing in a movement's structure of conflict and alliances
distinguishes between identities and defines 'us' from 'them' in order to determine the
enemy (p. 31). Tarrow's argument explains why, for example, a group frames itself
as a "legitimate authority" and its opponents as "outlaws".
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There are several techniques employed by media to target protests such as to
focus on marginal issues or the nuisance made by protests, to emphasise violence,
require reliance on official sources, and to speak of a lack of patriotism of the
protesters and a lack of effectiveness of the protests (Ashley and Olson 1998; Brasted
2006; Boykoff 2006; Jha 2007; Di Cicco 2010; Boyle 2014). Laura Ashley and Beth
Olson (1998) who examined how the New York Times, Time, and Newsweek framed
the women's movement between 1966 and 1986, found that the U.S. media tended to
delegitimize the movement and its objectives. Monica Brasted (2005) agrees with
Ashley and Olsen as she explains that media outlets focus on marginal issues such as
the protesters' appearance rather than on their motivation and demands. This
technique presents protesters to the audience as outsiders.
Jules Boykoff's (2006) content analysis of the news coverage of the World
Trade Organization protests in Seattle in the 1999 and the World Bank/IMF protests
in Washington, DC in 2000, shows other techniques used by the U.S. media to
undermine social movements. Beside the use of the violence frame, the disruption
frame was used to portray the movements as not only disrupting the two meetings,
but also disrupting the lives of the local people (p. 214). Damon T. Di Cicco's (2010)
study of the newspapers coverage of protests between 1967 and 2007 supports
Boykoff's findings as the media coverage of protests framed the movements as an
"irritation" and a "hindrance" to daily life (p. 137). Di Cicco points to framing
protests as unpatriotic as another techniques used by media when covers protests (p.
138). He notes that the authorities' voice in coverage is louder than the protesters'
voice and sometimes the protesters' voice is neglected.
The use of official sources in protest coverage was an issue discussed by
Sonora Jha (2007) who examined the difference in reliance on official sources for
coverage of the anti-WTO protests in 1999 and the anti-Vietnam War protests in
1967. Jha's study shows that journalists who covered the 1999 protests relied more on
official sources compared with the 1967 protests despite the availability of the
Internet that grants access to a variety of sources. Donohue et al. (1995) explains that
during protests, controlled media outlets align themselves with elites and the status
quo (p. 116). Michael P. Boyle (2014) agrees with Donohue et al. and argues that the
more protesters threaten the status quo, the more likely they are framed as outsiders in
order alienate the public from the protesters' demands.
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Another important study that discusses the 2011 uprising in Bahrain but that
disagrees with the literature presented above suggests that protest coverage relies on
unofficial sources and neglects pro-regime sources. Brian J. Bowe and Jennifer
Hoewe's (2011) content analysis of the three large newspapers, the New York Times,
Los Angeles Times and Washington Post from January 1, 2011 to March 10, 2011,
found that the U.S. newspapers relied on non-official sources more than on official
sources to cover the 2011 uprising. Bowe and Hoewe argue that the coverage of the
U.S media was biased to the protesters. Their study identifies five frames used to
cover the protests: slightly against the government of Bahrain, strongly against the
government of Bahrain, strongly in favour of the government of Bahrain, slightly
against the United States' involvement in Bahrain and slightly in favour of the United
States' involvement in Bahrain. Bowe and Hoewe suggest that the statistics show that
the frames that are against the government of Bahrain and in favour of the protest
appeared more than the frames that are in favour of the Bahraini government and
shows a "lack of fairness in news coverage of the conflict in Bahrain" (p. 33).
Counterpoint to Bowe and Hoewe's argument, it has been pointed out that
media outlets do occasionally criticize those in power in favour of their opponents
(McLeod and Detenber 1999, p. 5). Moreover, Brasted (2005) raises an interesting
point that counters Bowe and Hoewe's view by suggesting that balanced reporting
leads to biased coverage in favour of elites as they are well-known to the public and
their challengers need more time to explain their views to the public (p. 384). In
addition, Bowe and Hoewe's study may have overlooked the fact that several foreign
journalists, including those who had intended to cover sports events that coincided
with the uprising were prevented from entering Bahrain by the authorities during the
first months of the 2011 uprising (Associated Press 2012; Reporters Without Borders
2013). There were 221 cases including 22 media organizations, of people who were
denied entry to Bahrain in 2011 and 2012 without being given a reason. Journalists
who worked for the New York Times, the Wall Street Journal, CNN and Reuters
were prevented from covering the uprising or targeted as a result of their journalistic
activities (Gutman 2011; Human Rights Watch 2011c; Bahrain Watch 2012b;
Bahrain Center for Human Rights 2012). Not having reporters when and where the
major events of the 2011 uprising occurred may have resulted in the U.S. newspapers
relying on non-official or pro-protesters sources.
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Similarly, Naila Hamdy and Ehab H. Gomaa (2012) studied framing
techniques used by semi-official and independent Egyptian newspapers and social
media platforms during the coverage of the 2011 Egyptian uprising in order to
undermine the protests. Hamdy and Gomaa coded their data into four main framing
categories: "conflict", "responsibility", "economic consequences", and "human
interest". They found that the "conflict frame" was used by semi-official newspapers
to portray the 2011 Egyptian protests as a "harmful catastrophe" that had an
enormous negative consequence on the economy whereas the independent
newspapers framed the uprising more squarely through using the four frames
mentioned above. Hamdy and Gomaa point out that while the independent
newspapers covered the protests from the beginning, the semi-official newspapers
hesitated to clearly explain what was happening (pp. 207-208). Their study indicates
that the Egyptian semi-official media countered the demonstrations by framing it as a
movement "harmful" to the economy and the country's stability. In a related study,
Refaat Mahfouz (2013) examines the coverage of the Egyptian police news prior to
2011 uprising. Mahfouz's study compared how events involving clashes between
protesters and policemen were portrayed in the state-controlled newspaper AlGomhuria and the independent newspaper Al-Dostour. For instance, an event
between Egyptian policemen and Bedouins was framed in the pro-regime newspaper
Al-Gomhuria as "riots", whereas the same event was framed in the pro-opposition
newspaper Al-Dostour as a "confrontation" (pp. 316-318).

3.2.2 Framing and propaganda
There is a strong relationship between news framing and language choices,
phrases, words and connotations. According to Teenie Matlock (2010), the way the
message is worded can set up very specific "interpretations" and "inferences".
George Lakoff agrees in an interview with Bonnie Azab Powell (2003) that language
and framing are correlative:
Every word is defined relative to a conceptual
framework. If you have something like "revolt," that
implies a population that is being ruled unfairly, or
assumes it is being ruled unfairly, and that they are
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throwing off their rulers, which would be considered a
good thing. That's a frame. (Powell 2003).
Matlock and Lakoff believe that the role of language in framing news stories is to
encourage the audience or the public to interpret the message in a certain way. Ray
Eldon Hiebert (2003) believes audiences do not think about facts as our minds
"switch to the way those facts are framed" (p. 242) and this shows, according to
Hiebert, that framing influences our thoughts about an issue. In his discussion of the
propaganda at the beginning of the Iraq war, Hiebert links propaganda with framing
arguing that the U.S. government portrayed the war in Iraq in a way that served its
goals (p. 244). Hiebert discusses the way that issues, story lines, slogans and phrases
were framed. For instance, he notes how the U.S. army characterized the Iraqi
resistance as "Saddam's Fedayeen" before changing "Fedayeen" (that gives a positive
connotation in Arabic to "paramilitaries") to "terror-like death squads" (p. 245).
In addition, Brian Baresch et al. (2011) raise an interesting point about the
use of the term "The Arab Spring" in Western and Arabic media. They point out that
the uprisings that swept the Arab World were labelled in a "favourable and
democratic light" (p. 637). The term is meant to evoke the season of rebirth and the
Prague Spring of 1968 and reflects a social value of the Western culture which is the
struggle for self-determination in the face of subjugation:
That is the sort of thing news frames do: They highlight
some aspects of the events behind a story and downplay
others, often with the effect of supporting a certain way
of looking at the world. This is accomplished by word
choice (e.g. using language of “awakening” rather than
“chaos” to describe the Middle East uprisings) and by
source selection (e.g. quoting more democracy activists
than state security officers). (Baresch et al. 2011, p. 637).
According to Joshua Keating (2011), the term "The Arab Spring" was used in 2005
for the first time when referring to the democracy movements in the Arab World,
including elections and woman's rights, by the columnist Charles Krauthammer
(2005). The term then was used by the Professor of Political Science and Director of
Institute for Middle East Studies Marc Lynch (2011) in an article published in the
Foreign Policy magazine who called it somewhat dismissively as "Obama's Arab
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Spring?". Not surprisingly, many Arab politicians and journalists rejected the use of
"The Arab Spring", some going as far as to call the demonstrations a "bloody and
sectarian winter" (CNN 2014), "The Alleged Arab Spring" (Mohi Al-Deen 2012),
"Arab Autumn" (Nafei 2013), and "Bloody Spring" (Al-Qudat 2014).
The politicians and journalists who used the negative connotations in the
examples listed above were all against the demonstrations in the Arab World and
accused the protests of being planned and led by the U.S. and Israel. The study of
Susan Dente Ross (2003) is also worth considering in this context. Ross analysed the
framing of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in New York Times editorials after 11
September 2011. In a 30 months period after the attack, Ross analysed 34 editorials
that discussed or engaged with Israel, Israel and Palestine, the Saudis or the Arabs.
She concluded that Palestinians were likely to be famed as "aggressors" rather than
"victims" and while Arabs and Palestinians were portrayed as "terrorist criminals
intent on undermining calm" while others such as the former Palestinian president
Yasser Arafat, Arabs, and the Saudi were "legitimate brokers of peace" (p. 6).
Following this argument, it is interesting to compare phrases used by a statecontrolled media outlet and a foreign media outlet to frame an event of the 2011
Bahrain uprising. For instance, in a news article published on the Bahrain News
Agency (2011) website on March 16, 2011 about the removal of the protesters' camps
from the Pearl Roundabout, the protesters were described as "outlaws who terrorize
the citizens and the residents and harmed the national economy", whereas a France24
(2011) news article published on the same day more neutrally described the
participants as "protesters majority Shiite demanding reforms". The removal process
was portrayed by the Bahrain News Agency as " "تطهيرwhich can be translated as
"disinfection" while it was portrayed by France24 as " "إخالءwhich can be translated
as "evacuation". These two examples show the use of different key phrases to frame
the same event. While the use of " "إخالءin Arabic or "evacuation" does not have a
negative meaning, the use of " "تطهيرor "disinfection" suggests bacteria or a group of
intruders and is clearly negative.
It is clear that the use of language in framing such as an "illegal movement" to
indicate to a protest or "unpatriotic citizens" to indicate to protesters is in fact
propaganda that reflects an ideology. While Noshina Saleem (2007) asserts that
media frames reflect a specific ideology, George Lakoff (2004) has a clearer grasp for
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the relationship between framing and propaganda. In the book Don't Think of An
Elephant! Know Your Values and Frame the Debate, Lakoff states:
Propaganda is another manipulative use of framing.
Propaganda is an attempt to get the public to adopt a
frame that is not true and is known not to be true, for the
purpose of gaining or maintaining political control.
(Lakoff 2004, p. 100).
Lakoff believes that propaganda is not a frame; rather it is an endeavour to build a
perception of an event in the public mind to achieve specific objectives. This
argument partially corresponds with David Barnhizer's (2013) view that propaganda
experts frame everything "into thematic propaganda 'missiles' that we launch to 'sell'
our positions or sabotage those of our opponents" (p. 1). John B. Parrott (2009)
believes that framing and propaganda seek to "instil a politically relevant disposition
into an audience" (p. 419). Raluca Cozma (2014) agrees with Barnhizer and Parrott,
indicating that there are several devices involved in propaganda including "name
calling" which is the technique of labelling ideas or people, for example, as "fascist",
"radical", or "terrorist" in order to make the audience rebuff or denounce them
without examining any evidence (p. 435). Maria Bondes and Sandra Heep (2012)
argue that framing is used as a foundation of regime legitimacy as "the ruling elites in
authoritarian regimes propagate official frames in a continuous effort to reproduce the
belief of the populace in the elites' leadership qualities and their determination to
serve the common interest" (p. 4).
In summary, elites who control media tend to target social movements that
threaten their interests. There are several strategies that are used by media to
undermine social movements in the coverage of protests including: portraying
protests as illegal or illegitimate movements, framing the consequences of a
movement negatively, portraying the status quo as legitimate while labelling
protesters as outlaws. While framing protesters as deviant aims to protect the elite and
to separate protesters from the public, Baresch et al. (2011) believe that media content
reflects social meanings through the selection of words, news sources and metaphors.
In light of the relationship between framing and propaganda that has been outlined
above, this thesis will investigate just how news framing was employed by sports
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media in Bahrain to serve the regime's propaganda and in order to maintain status
quo.
While acknowledging that a range of frames were used by media outlets to
cover protests, this present thesis focused on three main frames to examine how the
2011 uprising in Bahrain was covered and the strategies were used during the
coverage. The three frames are: the characterization frame, the consequences frame,
and the unpatriotic frame. These frames help answer the thesis' research questions as
they cover the four major elements of the uprising: the demonstrations, the AlKhalifa family, the protesters and the supporters of the ruling family. According to
Sanda Kaufman et al. 2013, the characterization frame is linked to the identity of the
rivals and it is used by them, either positively to justify the party/person's actions
against others, or negatively to undermine the legality of the opponent cast doubt on
their motive. It is important for a movement to select its own framing before its
enemies do so. As George Lakoff (2011) suggests that unless a movement frames
itself "others will frame you -- the media, your enemies, your competitors, your wellmeaning friends". Lakoff believes that framing has major positive or negative
consequences on a movement as it tells the character of a movement. In light of this,
this thesis uses the characterization frame to examine the key phrases used to frame
the 2011 uprising in Bahrain. This frame was also used to investigate how the AlKhalifa family was framed by the local sports media.
This thesis also examines how the consequences of the 2011 uprising were
framed. Patti M. Valkenburg et al. (1999) point out that media outlets present an
issue to the audience in terms of the consequences that may occur as a result of the
issue. They suggest that the consequences frame is used to make an issue relevant to
the audience (p. 552). In light of this, the present thesis investigates how the
consequences of the uprising were framed. For instance, did the consequences of the
uprising 'unite the country or encourage political reforms', or did it 'destabilize the
security and the national's unity'?
This thesis also uses the unpatriotic frame to examine how the protesters were
framed. While Di Cicco (2010) applies the unpatriotic frame to political movements,
the present thesis applies it to the protesters in Bahrain. Douglas M. McLeod and
James K. Hertog (1992) stated that "one of the keys to whether a protest group is
'isolated' or 'accepted' by the larger society is the mass media's treatment of the
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protesters" (p. 260). Thus, through analysis of the unpatriotic frame, this thesis
examines whether the protesters were framed as "loyal to their country", or
"disloyal". This frame was also applied to the Al-Khalifa family supporters to enable
a comparison with its use when applied to the protesters.
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Chapter 4: Newspaper data analysis: methods and findings
This chapter explains the reasons behind the selection of the two newspapers
Akhbar Al-Khaleej and Al-Bilad. A content analysis provides quantitative and
qualitative descriptions of the selected sports news articles of the two newspapers to
examine how the 2011 uprising in Bahrain was framed by the sports media and to
assess the strategies used to politicize the sports news.
The data collected from Akhbar Al-Khaleej and Al-Bilad covers the period
from March 2011 to May 2011. Because a literal translation to English of Arabic text
might lead to some misrepresentation, considerable effort has been made to translate
the meanings of words, terms and sentences. For instance, the word ' 'اإلساءةin the
sentence ' 'اإلساءة إلى الرموز الوطنيةcan be translated as "insult". In this sentence, the
term frames the consequences of the protests as an insult to the Bahraini figureheads
and leadership. This translation keeps the intended meaning of the sentence. More
examples of translations from Arabic to English used in this thesis can be found in
Appendix 1.

4.1 Rationale for selecting Akhbar Al-Khaleej and Al-Bilad
There are currently seven daily newspapers in Bahrain with five published in
Arabic and two in English. They are: Akhbar Al-Khaleej, Gulf Daily News (in
English), Al-Ayam, Daily Tribune (in English), Al-Wasat, Al-Watan and Al-Bilad.
Newspapers of Bahrain are privately owned. However, except for Al-Wasat which is
considered a pro-opposition newspaper, they are directly controlled by the regime
(Reporters Without Borders 2012a; Freedom House 2013b; Kafai 2014; Front Line
Defenders 2014). The table presented in Figure 12 provides an overview of the daily
newspapers including the year they were first published, their publication language,
distribution, political stance, number of the issue and sports pages. It should be noted
that the newspaper pages increase or decrease according to occasion (such as public
holidays) and the numbers stated in the table gives an average number of pages in
each of the six newspapers.
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Figure 12: Daily newspapers in Bahrain in order of first publication

As for Al-Wasat, a pro-opposition newspaper was excluded from the analysis
because it was forced to shut down by the regime for one day on April 3, 2011 after its
editorial board including the editor-in-chief Mansoor Al-Jamri were sacked. Al-Wasat
was then allowed by the Information Affairs Authority (IAA) to publish again after
another editor-in-chief was appointed (Al-Ayam 2011). This editor-in-chief was
considered a pro-regime figure, which raised concerns at that time that Al-Wasat was
being influenced by the official line as with other pro-regime newspapers. From the proregime Arabic newspapers, Akhbar Al-Khaleej and Al-Bilad were chosen for this thesis
for several reasons. Akhbar Al-Khaleej is the oldest newspaper in Bahrain and it was
established in 1976 by Mahmood Al-Mardi. The newspaper claims to circulate a daily
average of 42,000 copies to reach a readership of 170,000 that makes about 28% of the
population of Bahrain (Akhbar Al-Khaleej 2014). Also, the newspaper claims to be a
market leader in print production in the country through Dar Akhbar Al-Khaleej Printing
& Publishing House (Dar Akhbar Al-Khaleej 2014). Al-Bilad was chosen because it was
the most recent (in 2008) newspaper to be established. It was started by several
businessmen including Moanes Al-Mardi son of Mahmood Al-Mardi, the establisher of
Akhbar Al-Khaleej. Moanes Al-Mardi is also the current editor-in chief of the
newspaper. The online archive of Al-Bilad for the period of study was available on the
newspaper's website. Although the Chairman of the Board of the newspaper Abdulnabi
Al-Shoala is a former Cabinet Minister of State and Minister of Labour and Social
Affairs (Nabialshoala 2014), the newspaper claims that it is not subject to censorship
and protects free speech (Al-Bilad 2014). In addition, the regime praises the efforts of
the newspaper. During an official meeting with the Al-Bilad editor-in-chief, the former
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President of the Information Affairs Authority (IAA) Sheikh Fawaz bin Mohammed AlKhalifa acknowledged the "crucial role played by Al-Bilad in highlighting the
kingdom's landmark achievement at all gatherings" (Bahrain News Agency 2010).
While the readership figure of Akhbar Al-Khaleej is known, there is no official figure
for the Al-Bilad readership. Additionally, the two newspapers are controlled by the
regime and this present and so they are appropriate for study of the performance of the
state-controlled sports media.
Both Akhbar Al-Khaleej and Al-Bilad have a supplement of sports news with
8 to 12 pages depending on the scheduled sports activities that day. For instance, when
Bahrain host an international sports event such as the Bahrain Grand Prix the number of
pages increased to 20, but they can be also be as few as four pages on public holidays.
Sports pages are divided into two sections: 'local news' and 'international news'. On
ordinary days the two sections share equal numbers of pages but when a local event
occurs such as the King's Cup Football Final, local sports news occupy most of the
sports section. However, in the days immediately after the 2011 uprising, sports
activities were suspended and the sports pages in the two newspapers were cut to about
four pages each. For instance, the Akhbar Al-Khaleej sports section supplement issued
12 sports pages in the first eight days of March 2011, later dropped to eight sports pages
in the second week of March, and then dropped again to three pages inside the main
newspaper issue until the end of May 2011.

4.2 Collecting newspaper data
The newspaper data were collected from several sources. Portable Document
Format (PDF) versions of the hardcopy of Al-Bilad issues cover the period of March 1,
2011

to

May

31,

2011

were

downloaded

from

the

newspaper

website

http://www.albiladpress.com. Issues of Al-Bilad of March 11, 16, 17, 18, 21, 24, 26 and
May 3, 2011 were not uploaded on the newspaper website and were not available in the
newspaper archives. For Akhbar Al-Khaleej, the PDF version of the hardcopy archive
was not available online at the newspaper website; therefore the issues were
downloaded from a temporary website http://influx.bh/resources/jazeeri/ that was
established by an activist who has been archiving the newspaper issues for her private
project. It should be noted that http://influx.bh/resources/jazeeri/ is not working
anymore. Issues of Akhbar Al-Khaleej of March 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22 were not
68

available at the website http://influx.bh/resources/jazeeri/. The missing issues were sent
by a journalist colleague who lives in Bahrain and has access to the newspapers archives
(Figure 13). To verify the validity of the data, two issues of every week of the 14 weeks
that cover the period of the study were sent to the colleague to confirm it matched with
the issues in the newspaper archive. Although the colleague had access to the newspaper
archives, he had difficulty to sending all issues from March to May 2011 as it could
have put him in trouble with the newspaper's management.
Despite the difficulty accessing the archives and collecting the full issues of
Al-Bilad, only 3.8% of the data is missing, and according to Yiran Dong and ChaoYing Joanne Peng (2013), this percentage is insignificant. The PDF version of the
hardcopy of the newspaper issues are essential for this project for several reasons.
Firstly, the PDF version show the size of the news article relative to other articles on
the same page. Secondly, they show the photograph/s that accompanied the news
article. Thirdly, they show where on the page the news article was placed (top,
middle or bottom). Fourthly, they show how the news article was placed that is,
foregrounded on the first pages above the fold or hidden on the second page and so
on. In the sports supplements that were examined, articles made up about 97% of the
material and 3% were opinion columns that did not cover the uprising. It should be
noted that there were very few opinion columns during the period of the study that
discussed unrelated issues.
No. Newspaper

Date

Note

1

Akhbar Al-Khaleej

1 March 2011 to All hard copy issues have been saved in
PDF files
31 May 2011

2

Al-Bilad

1 March 2011 to All hard copy issues have been saved in
PDF files except issues of 11th, 16th, 17th,
31 May 2011
18th, 21st, 26th, March and the 3rd of May

Figure 13: Newspaper material: Data collection summary

4.3 Sports sections and types of articles
The total pages in the collected sports section supplements from Akhbar AlKhaleej and Al-Bilad was calculated and categorized into either local sports pages or
international sports pages (the newspapers organises the sports sections). Local
sports pages covered local sports events and international sports pages covered
international sports events. However, occasionally both sports sections published
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local and international news on the same page. For instance, the activities of the
Bahrain sports teams and figures abroad were categorized as local news. The page
was considered 'local' when it had more local news than international news and vice
versa. The first page of the sports section in both sports sections supplements was
always considered a local page even when it included more international news
articles. With the exception of special events, the first page is often published local
news. Although sports pages were numbered by the newspaper, every sports page
was recounted to confirm the overall numbers of pages in the sports section of the
two newspaper newspapers. Every published sports article was read. International
sports articles were excluded from the study whereas local sports articles were
classified into four main categories: explicitly about the uprising, implicitly about the
uprising, explicitly about the regime, and unrelated sports news articles that did not
belong to any of the other three categories.

4.3.1 Explicit coverage of the uprising
This category included sports news articles that explicitly covered the
uprising and its consequences for the local sports events (for instance, articles that
covered events such as The Athletes' March, other protests or reported on the
uprising such as sanctions that were applied on the athletes and sports figures). These
news articles pointed to the uprising by using explicit political terms such as
"demonstrations", "The Athletes' March", "the unlicensed marches", "the political
crisis", or "the illegal gatherings". Figure 14 is an example of a sports news article
that explicitly covered the uprising titled "Commission of Inquiry Decides to
Suspend 150 Athletes Who Participated in the Abusive Acts to the nation". The news
article announced the suspension of 150 athletes and sports figures by the
commission of inquiry for participating in "مسيرة الرياضيين غير و المسيرات غير المرخصة
 "المرخصةthat can be translated as "The unlicensed marches and the unlicensed
Athletes' March". These protests, according to the news article, offended "The wise
leadership and the nation". The news article also announced that there would be more
athletes to be suspended in the following days.
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Figure 14: Sample of a sports news article that explicitly covers the uprising (Al-Bilad, April 5, 2011)

4.3.2 Implicit coverage of the uprising
This category included sports news articles that implicitly covered the
uprising and its consequences on the local sports activities without using explicit or
direct political terms such as "demonstrations", "uprising", "protests", "protesting",
or "The Athletes' March". It included sports news articles that used indirect terms
such as "the events" to describe the uprising without indicating to the nature of these
events. For instance, a news article published in Akhbar Al-Khaleej on March 6,
2011, covered the impact of the suspension of the local football league on the
athletes' fitness and used the term "emergency circumstances" to describe the
protests. The nature of these circumstances was not clarified. Most of these articles
were published before the broadcast of the television sports programme With the
Event on April 4, 2011.
The news article titled "  اإلسكافي تعليق المسابقات يفرض نفسه:صعوبة إيجاد حلول ناجعة
 "على اتحاد اليدwhich can be translated as "The Handball Federation Has no Choice
than Suspending the Competitions" (see Figure 15) is an example of an article that
implicitly covered the uprising. It discussed the possible return of the handball
competitions after " "الوقفة االضطرارايةwhich can be translated as the "compulsory
suspension". The article does not explain why the handball competitions were
suspended in the first place. Reading this article as a discrete stand-alone piece does
not explain the political conditions of Bahrain at the time.
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Figure 15: Sample of a sports news article that implicitly the uprising (Al-Bilad 5, April 2011)

4.3.3 Explicit coverage of the regime
This category included sports news articles that explicitly covered the AlKhalifa family members' sports events. It covered sports news articles that were
accompanied by Al-Khalifa family members' photos or photos with Al-Khalifa
family members' in the background, or with their names in the headline or the text. It
should be noted that the news articles that covered the uprising explicitly were
categorized into "explicitly about the uprising" not "explicitly about the regime" even
when they were accompanied with an Al-Khalifa family member's name or photo.
The majority of this category included official news articles that were usually
unedited news sent by official offices, ministries, or clubs via email or fax to the
newspapers accompanied by particular photos and their captions. Official sports
news articles are not limited to an unedited story as they are occasionally written or
edited by journalists who follow the official line including addressing the Al-Khalifa
family member "His Highness", presenting Al-Khalifa members' names as they are
presented in official news and accompanying the news article with official photos
which are usually sourced from the Bahrain New Agency website or drawn from the
newspaper archive.
Figure 16 shows an example of a news article that covered the king's sons
Nasser bin Hamad Al-Khalifa and Khalid bin Hamad Al-Khalifa's event in an
Endurance Riding competition. The news article was accompanied by three photos
and occupied three-quarters of the page. The headline and the two sub-headlines
contained 31 words in total " ناصر بن حمد يشيد بجهود رئيس االتحاد الملكي للفروسية واالستعداد
 "لسباق السبتthat can be translated as "Nasser bin Hamad Commends the President of
the Royal Equestrian Federation Efforts in Preparing for the Saturday Race". The by72

line was "covered by media office of Sheik Nasser bin Hamad" which meant that this
article was written and sent by Sheikh Nasser's office to be published in the
newspapers and it usually has priority over other local sports news. This category
does not refer to the uprising or the political events at the time. This type of article is
published in the local newspapers on a daily basis and is exploited in favour of the
regime. However, these articles were not be analysed because they are published in
the local newspapers on a daily basis and because they avoided covering the uprising
and the related events, this thesis only examined the regime's propaganda that is
linked to the 2011 uprising. In addition, while the number of the articles that
explicitly covered the uprising rose, the number of articles that covered the sports
activities of the Al-Khalifa family fell during the suspension of the sports activities
which shows that they were not used to vilify the demonstrations or the protesters.

Figure 16: A sample of an official sports news article (Akhbar Al-Khaleej March 1, 2011)

4.3.4 Unrelated news articles
This category included news articles of local sports events unrelated to the
uprising or that do not belong to the other three categories (such as articles that
covered local football or volleyball news and were not accompanied by any of the
Al-Khalifa family members' photos or names). This category was excluded from the
analysis as it is not related to the study. Figure 17 is an example of a news article that
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covered the 2012 Youth Asian Nations Cup football qualifiers titled " األحمر الشاب في
 "المجموعة الثانية لتصفيات كأس العالمwhich can be translated as "The Young Red in Group
Two of the Asian Cup Qualifiers". The headline consisted of eight words only and
the news article was written by an Al-Bilad journalist, Ahmad Jaffar.

Figure 17: Sample of a sports news article that covers a local sports event (Al-Bilad March 31, 2011)

4.4 Method of analysing newspaper data
The sports pages of the sports sections of the two newspapers were
categorized as either local sports pages or international sports pages. The news read
the news articles were then read and classified into the four categories: explicitly
about the uprising, implicitly about the uprising, explicitly about the regime, and
unrelated sports news articles. Subsequently, one sports article from every newspaper
in each day of the period of the study was selected from the category "explicitly
about the uprising" to answer the research questions:
RQ1: How did sports media frame the 2011 uprising?
RQ2: What strategies were used to politicize pro-regime sports media during
the uprising?
In total, 46 sports news articles (19 from Akhbar Al-Khaleej and 27 from Al-Bilad)
were selected. An article from each day of the period of the study and from each
newspaper was selected. When there was no article that explicitly covered the
uprising in an issue, an article was selected from the next day's issue. The articles
that covered the period from March 1 to May 31, 2011 were selected from the upper
right side of the first sports page as Arabic is written and read from right to left.
When there was no article in the upper right side of the page, the priority was to the
article that occupied more space in the first page. When there was no explicit article
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about the uprising on the first page, this method of selection was applied to the
second page and so on. The 46 selected articles accounted for 58.9% of the total
published articles that explicitly covered the uprising.
A quantitative and qualitative content analysis was used to analyse the data
(Macnamara 2005; Bhattacherjee 2012). The analysis identified the use of the three
frames: the first was the characterization frame (Lakoff 2011; Kaufman et al. 2013)
that examined how the uprising and the Al-Khalifa family were framed by the sports
coverage. The second frame was the consequences frame (Valkenburg et al. 1999)
that identified how the consequences of the uprising were framed. The third frame
was the unpatriotic frame (Di Cicco 2010) that identified how the protesters and the
pro-regime supporters were framed. Analysis of these three frames helps in an
understanding of the propaganda of the Bahraini regime. The analysis also
investigated the use of official, pro-regime, and pro-protesters sources to cover the
uprising and the use of the protesters' photographs.
The reliability of coding was tested with the Ole Holsti (1969) intracoder
reliability formula. To ensure that the process was not subject to bias and to ensure
objectivity of the results, all of

the total of 46 articles (100% of the selected

newspaper data) were coded and analysed twice on separate occasions. The
intracoder reliability agreement was 0.93 (where 1.0 shows a total agreement in the
coding on different occasions).

4.4.1 Newspaper coverage: Akhbar Al-Khaleej and Al-Bilad
Each page of each sports section was counted and categorized and then each
article of the local news pages was counted and categorized. The next section shows
the number and the type of the two newspapers pages and articles published in
March, April, and May 2011.

4.4.2 Akhabr Al-Khaleej sports section: March 2011
Statistics presented in Figure 18 show the number and the types of the Akhbar
Al-Khaleej pages in March 2011. In March, Akhbar Al-Khaleej published 936 pages
of which 199 (21.2%) were sports pages. The pages split into 108 local sports pages
(11.5%) and 91 international sports pages (9.7%). While the beginning of March
witnessed publication of an average of 40 pages per newspaper issue, the average
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dropped in the second half of March to 24 pages per issue after the suspension of the
local sports events which had an impact on the sports section of the newspaper that
decreased from 12 pages to 3 pages.
Akhbar Al-Khaleej (March 2011)
Number of pages

Sports section

Local sports

International

including sports pages

pages

pages

sports pages

936

199 (21.2%)

108 (11.5%)

91 (9.7%)

Figure 18: Akhbar Al-Khaleej: March 2011: Number of pages and types of sports news coverage

4.4.3 Akhbar Al-Khaleej sports section: April 2011
Statistics presented in Figure 19 show the number and the types of the Akhbar
Al-Khaleej pages in April 2011. During this month, Akhbar Al-Khaleej published 812
pages which included 116 (14.2%). The sports section split into 60 local sports pages
(7.3%) and 56 international sports pages (6.8%). The total number of pages of
Akhbar Al-Khaleej published dropped from 936 pages in March to 812 pages in
April.
Akhbar Al-Khaleej (April 2011)
Number of pages

Sports section

Local sports

International

including sports pages

pages

pages

sports pages

812

116 (14.2%)

60 (7.3%)

56 (6.8%)

Figure 19: Akhbar Al-Khaleej: April 2011: Number of pages and type of sports news coverage

4.4.4 Akhbar Al-Khaleej sports section: May 2011
Statistics presented in Figure 20 show the number and the types of Akhbar AlKhaleej pages published in May 2011. In May, the newspaper published 972 pages
of which 124 pages (12.7%) were for the sports section. The content of the sports
pages split into 91 (9.3%) local sports pages and 33 (3.3%) international sports
pages. The number of Akhbar Al-Khaleej pages increased by 160 pages in May. In
addition, there was an increase in the number of the sports section pages from 116
pages in April to 124 pages in May. While international sports decreased from 56
pages in April to 33 pages in May, local sports increased from 60 pages to 90 pages
after the resumption of the local sports activities.
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Akhbar Al-Khaleej (May 2011)
Number of pages

Sports section

Local sports

International

including sports pages

pages

pages

sports pages

972

124 (12.7%)

91 (9.3%)

33 (3.3%)

Figure 20: Akhbar Al-Khaleej: May 2011: Number of pages and type of sports news coverage

4.4.5 Akhbar Al-Khaleej sports section: March to May 2011
Statistics presented in Figure 21 show the total amount and the type of sports
coverage of Akhbar Al-Khaleej during March, April and May 2011. Considering the
suspension of the local sports events for several weeks, Akhbar Al-Khaleej published
439 sports pages (16.1%) with 259 pages (9.5%) for local sports activities and 180
pages (6.6%) of international sports activities. The remaining percentage of the
newspaper content (83.9%) was shared by daily pages and sections including the first
and the last pages, the local news section, the investigation section, the financial
section, the opinions section, the international politics news section, the drama
section and the readers' page.
Akhbar Al-Khaleej (March to May 2011)
Number of pages

Sports section

Local sports

International

including sports section

pages

pages

sports pages

2720

439 (16.1%)

259 (9.5%)

180 (6.6%)

Figure 21: Akhbar Al-Khaleej: March to May 2011: Total number of pages and type of sports news coverage

4.4.6 Akhbar Al-Khaleej: Types of sports news articles: March 2011
Statistics presented in Figure 22 show the types and the total number of
published sports news articles in Akhbar Al-Khaleej in March 2011. The newspaper
published 397 sports news articles including 46 (11.5%) news articles that implicitly
covered the uprising, 105 (26.4%) news articles that covered the sports activities of
the Al-Khalifa family members and 246 (61.9%) news articles that were not related
to any of the other three categories. There were no articles that covered the uprising
explicitly published during this month.

77

Akhbar Al-Khaleej (March 2011)
Explicitly about the

Implicitly about the Explicitly about the Unrelated

uprising

uprising

0 articles (0%)

regime

46 articles (11.5%)

105 articles (26.4%)

246 articles (61.9%)

Total: 397 sports news articles in March 2011
Figure 22: Akhbar Al-Khaleej: March 2011: Types of sports news articles

4.4.7 Akhbar Al-Khaleej: Types of sports news articles: April 2011
Statistics presented in Figure 23 show the types and the total number of the
published sports news articles in Akhbar Al-Khaleej in April 2011. The newspaper
published 392 sports news articles. The explicit coverage of the uprising began on
April 6, 2011. Akhbar Al-Khaleej published 43 (10.9%) that explicitly covered the
uprising, 46 articles (11.7%) that implicitly covered the uprising. This month
witnessed a slight decrease in the articles that covered the Al-Khalifa family
members' sports activities with 95 articles (24.2%) compared with 105 articles
(26.4%) in March. Additionally, there was a slight drop in the unrelated sports news
articles from 246 articles (61.9%) to 208 articles (53%) following the drop in the
total number of published pages.
Akhbar Al-Khaleej (April 2011)
Explicitly about

Implicitly about the Explicitly about the Unrelated

the uprising

uprising

43 articles (10.9%)

regime

46 articles (11.7%)

95 articles (24.2%)

208 articles (53%)

Total: 392 sports news articles in April 2011
Figure 23: Akhbar Al-Khaleej: April 2011: Types of sports news articles

4.4.8 Akhbar Al-Khaleej: Types of sports news articles: May 2011
Statistics presented in Figure 24 show the types and the total number of the
published sports news articles in Akhbar Al-Khaleej in May 2011. The newspaper
published 477 sports news articles during this month with no articles (0%) that
covered the uprising explicitly (compared with 43 articles (10.9%) that covered the
uprising explicitly in April). Also, the sports news articles that implicitly covered the
uprising dropped from 46 articles to 4 articles (0.8%) in this month. The number of
articles that covered the Al-Khalifa's sports activities fell from 95 in April to 85
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sports articles (17.8%) in May. In contrast, the unrelated news articles increased from
208 articles (53%) in March to 388 articles (81.3%) in April.
Akhbar Al-Khaleej (May 2011)
Explicitly

about Implicitly about Explicitly about the Unrelated

the uprising
0 articles (0%)

the uprising

regime

4 articles (0.8%)

85 articles (17.8%)

388 articles (81.3%)

Total: 477 sports news articles in May 2011
Figure 24: Akhbar Al-Khaleej: May 2011: Types of sports news articles

4.4.9 Akhbar Al-Khaleej: Types of sports news articles: March to May 2011
Statistics presented in Figure 25 show the types and the number of the
published sports news articles published in Akhbar Al-Khaleej from March to May
2011. The newspaper published 1262 news articles including 43 sports news articles
(3.3%) that explicitly covered the uprising, 94 news articles (8.3%) that implicitly
covered the uprising, 285 sports news articles (21.3%) that covered the Al-Khalifa
family members' sports events, and 842 unrelated sports news articles (65.9%).
Akhbar Al-Khaleej (March to May 2011)
Explicitly about

Implicitly about the Explicitly about the

the uprising

uprising

43 articles (3.3%)

Unrelated

regime

106 articles (8.3%)

285 articles (22.3%)

842 (65.9%)

Total: 1276 sports news articles in May 2011
Figure 25: Akhbar Al-Khaleej: March to May 2011: Total types of sports news articles

4.4.10 Al-Bilad sports section: March 2011
Statistics presented in Figure 26 show number and the types of Al-Bilad
pages in March 2011. Al-Bilad published 712 pages including 148 pages (20.7%) for
the sports section split into 70 local sports pages (9.8%) and 78 international sports
pages (10.9%). The newspaper pages of Al-Bilad dropped from 32 pages for an issue
in the beginning of March to 24 pages for an issue by the end of the month. As a
result, the sports section decreased from 8 pages to 4 pages and then to as little as
two pages for several days. It should be noticed that there were seven issues (11, 16,
17, 18, 21, 24 and 26) missing from this month that were not included in the
statistics.
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Al-Bilad (March 2011)
Number of pages

Sports section

Local sports

International

including sports section

pages

pages

sports pages

712

148 (20.7%)

70 (9.8%)

78 (10.9%)

Figure 26: Al-Bilad: March 2011: Number of pages and type of sports news coverage

4.4.11 Al-Bilad sports section: April 2011
Statistics presented in Figure 27 show the number and the types of Al-Bilad
pages in April 2011. Al-Bilad published 796 pages including 120 pages (15%) for the
sports section which was split equally into 60 local sports pages (7.5%) and 60
international sports pages (7.5%). Number of pages published increased from 712
pages in March to 796 pages in April. This was due to the seven missing issues in the
previous. On the other hand, the sports section decreased from 148 pages in March to
120 pages in April due to the suspension of the local sports activities.
Al-Bilad (April 2011)
Number of pages including

Sports section

Local sports

International

sports section

pages

pages

sports pages

796

120 (15%)

60 (7.5%)

60 (7.5%)

Figure 27: Al-Bilad: April 2011: Number of pages and type of sports news coverage

4.4.12 Al-Bilad sports section: May 2011
Statistics presented in Figure 28 show the number and the types of the AlBilad pages in May 2011. The newspaper published 960 pages including 172 sports
pages (17.9%) split into 89 local sports pages (9.2%) and 83 international sports
pages (8.6%). The sports section of Al-Bilad increased from 120 pages in April to
172 pages in May after resumption of the local sports activities. The issue of May 3,
2011 was missing and it was not included in the statistics.
Al-Bilad (May 2011)
Number of pages including

Sports section

Local sports

International

sports section

pages

pages

sports pages

960

172 (17.9%)

89 (9.2%)

Figure 28: Al-Bilad: May 2011: Number of pages and type of sports news coverage
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83 (8.6%)

4.4.13 Al-Bilad sports section: March to May 2011
Statistics presented in Figure 29 show the amount and the types of sports
coverage of Al-Bilad during March, April and May 2011. In this period, Al-Bilad
published 2468 pages excluding the missing issues. The sports coverage of Al-Bilad
included 440 pages (17.8%) spilt into 220 local sports pages (8.9%) and 220
international sports pages or (8.9%) of the newspaper content.
Al-Bilad (March to May 2011)
Number of pages

Sports section

Local sports

International

including sports section

pages

pages

sports pages

2468

440 (17.8%)

220 (8.9%)

220 (8.9%)

Figure 29: Al-Bilad: March to May 2011: Total number of pages and types of sports news coverage

4.4.14 Al-Bilad: Types of sports news articles: March 2011
Statistics presented in Figure 30 show the types and the total number of
published sports news articles in Al-Bilad in March 2011. Al-Bilad published 237
sports news articles during March including 10 sports news articles (4.2%) that
explicitly covered the uprising, 25 sports news articles (10.5%) that implicitly
covered the uprising, 77 sports news articles (32.4%) that covered the Al-Khalifa
family members' sports activities and 125 unrelated sports articles (52.7%).
Al-Bilad (March 2011)
Explicitly about

Implicitly about

Explicitly about

the uprising

the uprising

the regime

10 articles (4.2%)

Unrelated

25 articles

77 articles

125 articles

(10.5%)

(32.4%)

(52.7%)

Total: 237 sports news articles in March 2011
Figure 30: Al-Bilad: March 2011: Types of sports news articles

4.4.15 Al-Bilad: Types of sports news articles: April 2011
Statistics presented in Figure 31 show the types and the total number of
published sports news articles in Al-Bilad in April 2011. The newspaper published
259 sports news articles including 24 articles (9.2%) that explicitly covered the
uprising, 30 articles (11.5%) that implicitly covered the uprising, 68 articles (26.2%)
that covered the Al-Khalifa family members' sports activities, and 137 unrelated
articles (52.8%).
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Al-Bilad (April 2011)
Explicitly about

Implicitly about

Explicitly about

the uprising

the uprising

the regime

24 articles (9.2%)

30 articles

Unrelated

68 articles (26.2%)

137 articles (52.8%)

(11.5%)
Total: 259 sports news articles in April 2011
Figure 31: Al-Bilad: April 2011: Types of sports news articles

4.4.16 Al-Bilad: Types of sports news articles: May 2011
Statistics presented in Figure 32 show the types and the total number of
published sports news articles in Al-Bilad in May 2011. The newspaper published
343 articles during this month including one article (0.2%) that explicitly covered the
uprising, five articles (1.4%) that implicitly covered the uprising, 96 articles (27.9%)
that covered the Al-Khalifa family members' sports activities, and 241 unrelated
articles (70.2%). The articles that covered the Al-Khalifa family members' sports
activities increased from 68 news articles (26.2%) in April to 96 news articles
(27.9%) in May. The unrelated news articles jumped from 137 articles (52.8%) in
April to 241 articles (70.2%) in May after the resumption of the local sports
activities.
Al-Bilad (May 2011)
Explicitly about the Implicitly about Explicitly about the Unrelated
uprising

the uprising

1 article (0.2%)

regime

5 articles (1.4%)

96 articles (27.9%)

241 articles (70.2%)

Total: 343 sports news articles in May 2011
Figure 32: Al-Bilad: May 2011: Types of sports news articles

4.4.17 Al-Bilad: Types of sports news articles: March to May 2011
Statistics presented in Figure 33 show the types and the total number of
published sports news articles in Al-Bilad in March, April and May 2011. The
newspaper published 878 articles including 35 articles (3.9%) that covered the
uprising explicitly, 56 articles (6.8%) that covered the uprising implicitly, 241
articles (27.4%) that covered the Al-Khalifa family members' sports activities and
542 unrelated news articles (61.7%).
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Al-Bilad (March to May 2011)
Explicitly about the Implicitly about Explicitly about the Unrelated
uprising
35 article (3.9%)

the uprising

regime

60 articles (6.8%)

241 articles (27.4%)

542 articles (61.7%)

Total: 878 sports news articles in May 2011
Figure 33: Al-Bilad: March to May 2011: Total types of sports news articles

4.4.18 Total sports coverage of the two selected newspapers
Statistics presented in Figure 34 show the number and type of Akhbar AlKhaleej and Al-Bilad pages in March, April and May 2011. Together, the two
newspapers published 5188 pages including 879 sports pages (16.9%) split into 479
local sports pages (9.2%) and 400 international sports pages or (7.7%) of newspaper
content.
Akhbar Al-Khaleej and Al-Bilad (March to May 2011)
Number

of

pages Sports section pages

including sports pages
5188

Local

sports

Unrelated

pages
879 (16.9%)

479 (9.2%)

400 (7.7%)

Figure 34: Newspaper coverage: March to May 2011: Total number of pages and types of sports news
coverage

4.4.19 Total types of sports news articles in the two selected newspapers
Statistics presented in Figure 35 show the types and the total number of
published sports news articles in Akbar Al-Khaleej and Al-Bilad in March, April and
May 2011. The two newspapers published 2155 local sports news articles including
79 articles (3.6%) that explicitly covered the uprising, 166 articles (7.7%) that
implicitly covered the uprising, 526 articles (24.4%) that covered the Al-Khalifa
members' sports activities and 1384 unrelated articles (64.2%).
Akhbar Al-Khaleej and Al-Bilad (March to May 2011)
Explicitly

about Implicitly

the uprising
78 articles (3.6%)

about Explicitly about the Unrelated

the uprising

regime

166 articles (7.7%)

526 articles (24.4%)

1384 articles (64.2%)

Total: 2155 sports news articles in May 2011
Figure 35: Newspaper coverage: March to May 2011: Total number and of sports news articles
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4.5 Data analysis and findings
After classifying the newspaper data, 19 articles of Akhbar Al-Khaleej and 27
articles from Al-Bilad were selected from the category "explicitly about the
uprising". In the selected 19 articles of Akhbar Al-Khaleej, each frame was used at
least eight times (Figure 36). The characterization frame was used 19 times (100%)
in the 19 articles of Akhbar Al-Khaleej. The second most used frame was the
unpatriotic frame that was used in 13 articles (68.4%) and the consequences frame
was used in eight articles (42.1%).

Frame

Articles Percentage of total articles

Characterization frame

19

100%

Consequences frame

8

42.1%

Unpatriotic frame

13

68.4%

Figure 36: Akhbar Al-Khaleej: Number and percentage of the use of the three frames

In the selected 27 articles of Al-Bilad, each individual frame was used at least
in 10 articles (Figure 37). The characterization frame appeared in 26 articles (96.2%).
The consequences frame was the second most used frame in the coverage as it
appeared in 11 articles (44.7%), and then the unpatriotic frame that was used in 10
articles or (37%). Unlike Akhbar Al-Khaleej, the coverage of Al-Bilad began on
March 4, 2011 as several articles referred to "political events", "political
circumstances", "political activities" and occasionally "political crisis" in the sports
news coverage that discussed the suspension of the local sports activities. It is noted
that key phrases such as "protests", "marches", "demonstrations", and The Athletes'
March" were not used by Al-Bilad until the broadcast of the With the Event television
programme on April 4, 2011 when explicit key phrases that referred to the uprising
were used by the newspapers.

Frame

Article Percentage to total articles

Characterization frame

26

96.2%

Consequences frame

11

40.7%

Unpatriotic frame

10

37%

Figure 37: Al-Bilad: Number and percentage of the use of the three frames
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In the total of 46 articles (19 articles for Akhbar Al-Khaleej and 27 articles for
Al-Bilad), the characterization frame was used in 45 articles that made up 97.8% of
the total, the unpatriotic frame was used in 23 articles (50%), and the consequences
frame was used in 19 articles (41.0%) (Figure 38). The coverage delegitimized the
uprising by framing it as "illegal marches", "unlicensed gatherings", or "the
unlicensed Athletes' March". Articles that used neutral key phrases to portray the
protests were mostly published by Al-Bilad in March 2011 when the protests were
portrayed as "political events" or "political circumstances". The consequences frame
was used in eight articles (42%) of the Akhbar Al-Khaleej coverage and 11 articles
(40.7%) of the Al-Bilad coverage (a total of 19 times (41.3%) of the coverage of the
two newspapers). In addition, the unpatriotic frame frequented 13 articles (68.4%) of
the Akhbar Al-Khaleej coverage compared to 10 articles that made up (37%) of the
Al-Bilad coverage. A total of 23 articles (50%) in the two newspapers used the
unpatriotic frame. The protesters were framed as unpatriotic citizens who offended
the nation and the wise leadership as the political movement aimed to harm the
country and divide the society.

Akhbar Al-Khaleej
Frame

Al-Bilad

Total

Articles

%

Articles

%

Articles

%

Characterization

19

100%

26

96.2%

45

97%

Consequences

8

42.1%

11

40.7%

19

41.3%

Unpatriotic

13

68.4%

10

37%

23

50%

Figure 38: Newspaper coverage: Frequency of the three frames by number and percentage

4.5.1 Use of the characterization frame for the protests
The coverage of the uprising by Akhbar Al-Khaleej and Al-Bilad portrayed
the protests negatively by focusing on the legal framework of the movement (Figure
39). The three key phrases of the characterization frame of the uprising "unlicensed
gatherings" or "illegal gatherings" or "illegal marches" were used 25 times (33.3%)
while the phrases "unfortunate events" or "security events" were used 11 times
(14.6%). Additionally, the phrase "crisis" was used

9 times (12%) and

"disturbances" was used 8 times (10.6%). The coverage targeted The Athletes' March
by using key phrases such as "the wretched Athletes' March" or "what is called The
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Athletes' March" 5 times (6.6%). In contrast, neutral key phrases such as "political
event", "political activities", "political circumstances", and "political march" were
used 11 times (14.6%). However, these neutral key phrases were often preceded or
followed by a negative term each time. For example, while "the recent events" is
considered a neutral key phrase, it was preceded once by "the abuses" to become "the
abuses in the recent events" which showed that the recent events were harmful to the
people and the country. Overall, the demonstrations were framed as "distressful acts"
that breached the security of the country.
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Key phrase of framing the uprising
The unlicensed marches

Akhbar Al-Khaleej

Al-Bilad

Coverage

%

14

11

25

33.3%

4

7

11

14.6%

4

7

11

14.6%

3

5

8

10.6%

3

6

9

12%

3

4

7

9.3%

3

1

4

5.3%

34

41

75

99.7%

"The unlicensed Athletes' March"
"The unlicensed protests"
"Illegal marches"
"Illegal gatherings"

The unfortunate events
"The recent security events"

The political events
"The recent events"
"The political activities"
"The political circumstances"
"The political march"

The sit-in
"Disgraceful acts"
"Security disturbances"
"Marches that breached security"
"Marches demand regime overthrow"

The political crisis
"The political unrest"
"The crisis"
"The security crisis"
"The recent crisis"

The Athletes' March
"The wretched Athlete's March"
"What is called The Athletes' March"

Irregularities and abuses
"The sports abuses"
"Sports irregularities"

Total

Figure 39: Newspaper coverage: Key phrases and frequency of the characterization frame of the uprising
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4.5.2 Use of the characterization frame for the Al-Khalifa family
Key phrases to frame Al-Khalifa as a family or individuals were used 82
times (pointing to the Al-Khalifa family members within the selected articles with
their real names or positions such as: the King, Prime Minister, or Crown Prince
excluded from the analysis). There was a concentration on the sagacity and the
nobility of the Al-Khalifa family (Figure 40). The key phrases of this frame included
"the wise leadership", "the wise government", "the noble leadership", and "the noble
Al-Khalifa" which were used 43 times (53%). The phrase "the leadership" was used
16 times (19.7%), "the regime" was used 12 times (14.8%) and "the nation's
figureheads", and "the national figureheads" were used 10 times (14.8%). The
newspaper coverage endeavoured to present the Al-Khalifa family as the sacred
figureheads and the legitimate authorities that should not be challenged; targeting the
family is targeting the legitimacy and civil peace. The frame, overall, was employed
to protect the royal family and its members. It is noticed that the frame did not just
focus on the strong figures of the royal family, but also the royal family as a whole.
The protests criticized policies of the royal family, which justified the domination of
the key phrase "the wise leadership or government".

Kay Phrase of Framing Al-Khalifa

Akhbar Al-Khaleej

Al-Bilad

Coverage

%

20

23

43

53%

The leadership

2

14

16

19.7%

The nation's figureheads / The national's

2

8

10

12.3%

The regime

4

8

12

14.8%

Total

28

53

81

99.8%

The wise leadership or government/ The
noble Al-Khalifa or leadership

figureheads

Figure 40: Newspaper coverage: Kay phrases and frequency of the use of the characterization frame for the Al-Khalifa
family

4.5.3 Use of the consequences frame for the protests
The consequences of the uprising were labelled negatively 19 times (100%).
The coverage ignored the protesters' demands and framed the consequences of the
uprising as "sabotage" and "inciting sectarian strife" (Figure 41). The two key
phrases "destabilization of the security and the stability" and "breaching the
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national's unity" were used 13 times (68.4%). The uprising was accused of causing
the suspension of sports activities three times (15.7%), influencing the local economy
negatively two times (10.5%), and infringement the national's sovereignty once
(5.2%). Overall, the uprising was framed as a movement that targeted civil peace.
Overall, the frame aimed to stir people's fear of the immediate consequences of the
uprising that "destabilized" the stability of the country and the society. This frame
overlooked the consequences of actions taken by the regime to confront the protests.
The message that purported to be sent was that the uprising targeted the social and
economic interests of the people of Bahrain and that the uprising would negatively
affect the daily life of Bahrainis.
.
Kay Phrase of the consequences Akhbar Al-khaleej

Al-Bilad

Coverage

%

6

7

13

68.4%

0

2

2

10.5%

0

3

3

15.7%

Infringement the national sovereignty

0

1

1

5.2%

Total frequency of the key phrases

6

13

19

99.8%

frame
Destabilize the security and stability
"Destabilizing the nation's unity"
"Clashes between people"
"Acts of sabotage"
"Breach the nation's security"
"Threat to the nation's security"
"Targeting civil peace"
"Inciting sectarian strife"

Economic losses
"Financial losses"
"Wages of referees not being paid"

Suspension of the sports activities
"Players not attending trainings"

Figure 41: Newspaper coverage: Key phrases and frequency of the use of the consequences frame

4.5.4 Use of the unpatriotic frame for the protesters and the supporters
The protesters were framed as unpatriotic citizens who insulted the nation and
the leadership. The unpatriotic frame was used in 23 articles (50%) of the newspaper
coverage; 13 articles (56.5%) published in Akhbar Al-Khaleej and 10 articles
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(43.4%) published in Al-Bilad. The demonstrations, including The Athletes' March,
were framed as protests that offended the nation and the "wise leadership". "AlKhalifa and the nation", "Al-Khalifa and Bahrain", "Al-Khalifa and the kingdom", or
Al-Khalifa and the dear land" were used in 43.4% of the newspaper coverage. Each
time, the protesters were framed as unpatriotic citizens not only for "offending" the
nation only, but also for "offending" the wise leadership or "the figureheads of the
nation". It should be noted that while a key phrase such as "offending the figureheads
of the nation" can be considered a consequence of the uprising, this key phrase, for
example, was actually used in Arabic in what is considered as a noun to become
"those who offended the nation" or "those who are disloyal to the nation and the
leadership". On the other hand, the newspaper coverage did not focus on the
supporters of the Al-Khalifa family or their roles during the uprising except for two
articles where they were praised for attending training sessions during the general
strike.

Key phrase of the unpatriotic frame

Akhbar Al-

Al-Bilad

Coverage

%

Khaleej
Offending the figureheads of the nation

1

2

3

13%

Offending the nation/ the wise leadership

5

4

9

39.1%

Offending our figureheads/ the wise leadership

1

1

2

8.6%

Overthrowing the regime

1

0

1

4.3%

Offending the figureheads/ the political leadership

3

0

3

13%

Offending the wise leadership/ the dear nation

1

2

3

13%

Offending the regime

1

0

1

4.3%

Disloyal to the nation and its wise leadership

0

1

1

4.3%

Total

13

10

23

99.6%

Figure 42: Newspaper coverage: Key phrases and frequency of the use of the unpatriotic frame

4.5.5 Use of sources
The 46 sports news articles (100%) relied on official and pro-regime sources
including Al-Khalifa family members, local clubs, sports federations, and
commission of inquiry (Figure 43). Neither newspaper interviewed any of the
protesters or the athletes involved in the demonstrations, even those who were
accused of offending the nation and the leadership. The coverage of the protests
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adopted the point of view of the regime. The findings show that only 4 articles (21%)
from Akhbar Al-Khaleej and 13 articles (50%) from Al-Bilad were accompanied by
by-line. It should be noticed that 8 of 13 articles that were accompanied by by-line
were published in Al-Bilad before April 6, 2011. After this date, Al-Bilad changed
the tone of the coverage from using key phrase such as "political circumstances" or
"emergency circumstance" to using key phrases such as "illegal gatherings/marches".

Articles

Articles with

%

by-line

Official and pro-

%

regime sources

Akhbar Al-Khaleej

19

4

21%

19

100

Al-Bilad

27

13

48.1%

27

100

Total

46

17

36.9%

46

100

Figure 43: Newspaper coverage: The use of official and pro-regime sources

4.5.6 Use of images of the protesters
The Al-Bilad newspaper coverage included five photos that accompanied
several articles whereas Akhbar Al-Khaleej did not publish any of the protesters
photos. One photo among the five was published three times. As shown in Figure 44,
angry sports figures appeared holding a banner that states " ً مسيرة جميع الرياضيين تضامنا
 "مع الشعبwhich is translated as "All Athletes March In Solidarity with the People".
The other small banner states " "لن نرحل حتى تتحقق مطالبناwhich can be translated as
"We Will not Leave Until our Demands Are Met". Another of the five published
photos was not from anti-regime protests. The photo was taken before one of the
local football league games and after the resumption of the local activities for players
holding a banner. They vowed to be "loyal soldiers" to the leadership and to stick to
them in thick and thin. The players framed themselves as "soldiers" who are "loyal"
to the leadership and in response to the uprising that was framed as a movement that
targeted the Al-Khalifa family.
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Figure 44: One of The Athletes' March photos published in Al-Bilad on April 12, 2011

The findings presented in this chapter show that the characterization frame
was used to undermine the protests by portraying the movement as "disgraceful
acts", "security disturbances" and "unlicensed marches". Overall, more key phrases
were used to portray the protests as having negative consequences. Furthermore, the
characterization frame was used positively to frame the Al-Khalifa family as the
representative of the legitimate authority and the figureheads for the nation so that
the newspaper coverage associated the security and the stability of the country with
the Al-Khalifa family. The unpatriotic frame was used to disparage the protesters
who were framed as unpatriotic citizens. On the other hand, the Al-Khalifa family
supporters were praised for their political stance and for standing against the protests.
The newspaper coverage relied heavily on official and pro-regime sources and
ignored the pro-opposition's view of the events. Given that the two newspapers are
directed by the regime, it is not surprising then that the sports coverage of the
uprising adopted the official line.
Overall, the newspaper coverage endeavoured to create a national identity
that encouraged the people to stand up by the regime and to repudiate any attempt by
the protesters to change status quo. The protesters were accused of harming Bahraini
society, threatening national security and inciting sectarian strife. In directing the
people toward its agenda, the Al-Khalifa regime offered the people two choices:
stability or chaos. Supporting the royal family meant supporting a prosperous future
where is no fear or suffering, while supporting the protesters meant slipping into
national chaos.
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Chapter 5: Television data analysis: Methods and findings
This chapter explains how the television data was collected and the methods
that were used to analyse this data in order to investigate how the sports media
framed the 2011 uprising in Bahrain and to investigate the strategies used to
politicize sports media. The chapter starts with a description of the television data
and the rationale for the selection of the data of two sports programmes With the
Event and Special Event that were broadcast on Bahrain Sports Channel on April 4
and April 11, 2011.
Careful attention was paid to select the right words and terms that is as close
as possible to the English language. For example, a strong Bedouin expression was
used during the two programmes by Al-Khalifa family supporters " ابشر بعزك يا بوسلمان
 "حنا عيالك وعصاك اللي ما تعصاكwhich are here translated as "At Your Own Sweet Will".
This expression signifies that we are your men who strike your enemy and we will go
with you to the end. More examples of television data translation from Arabic to
English can be found in Appendix 3.
5.1 Description of television data
There is only one sports channel in Bahrain and it is controlled and directed
by the regime. Bahrain Sports Channel, however, has an alternative channel that airs
only when two events coincide. For example, when two important football matches
are played at the same time, the main channel and the alternative channel air the two
matches. The main focus of the channel is broadcasting sports events, mostly local
matches, and covering pre and post-match, results and analyses. During the period of
the study, Bahrain Sports Channel continued screening old archived programmes as
the local sports activities were suspended due to the uprising. Besides the old
programmes, two programmes that explicitly covered the uprising and mainly The
Athletes' March were aired to discuss the involvement of athletes and sports figures
in the demonstrations. The two programmes displayed images and personal
information of individuals who participated in The Athletes' March with the
panellists calling their clubs and the regime to take action against them.
With the Event programme was aired on April 4, 2011 about 21:00 and
finished after 00:00 the next day. The length of the programme was two hours, 59
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minutes and 30 seconds. The picture and the sound were clear except for a short cut
in the picture for a few seconds in minute 1:45:10 and another a cut in the first few
seconds of the show. In addition, there was a jam in the picture for 14 seconds in
minute 02:53:30 before it resumed where it started. Additionally, the sound did not
match the picture for the first six minutes (Figure 45). The programme was aired in
Bahrain Sports Channel and Bahrain Channel (the main channel) at the same time
except for the last 6 minutes when Bahrain Channel cut the transmission to broadcast
the midnight news bulletin while Bahrain Sports channel continued airing the
programme live. With the Event was aired about 45 days after The Athletes' March
was organized on February 21, 2011.
The second programme Special Event was aired on April 11, 2011. It
commenced about 22:00 and finished about 01:00 the next day. The length of the
programme was two hours, 55 minutes and 27 seconds. The picture was clear,
however, there was a cut for about 3 seconds at the beginning of the programme. As
well, the sound does not match the picture until minute 00:06:25 of the programme
as the sound was late for a few seconds.
Bahrain Sports Channel: Television data
Data and source

Aired on April 4, 2011 and uploaded
to YouTube in April 4, 2011

The programme

With the Event

Aired in April 11, 2011 and uploaded Special Event
to YouTube in April 14, 2011

Notes
- Duration: 2:59:30
- Picture and sound: clear
- A short cut in the first few seconds
- A short cut in 01:45:10 for 3 seconds
- A short cut in 02:53:30 for 14 seconds
- The sound does not match the picture from
minute 00:00:00 to minute 00:06:20
- Duration: 02:55:26
- Picture and sound: clear
- A short for 3 seconds during the first minute of
the programme
- The sound does not match the picture from
minute 00:01:00 to minute 00:06:25

Figure 45: Television material: Data collection summary

Both programmes were aired live on Bahrain Sports Channel. The two
programmes started with a wide-shot of the studio. The host was facing the guests
who were seated in armchairs and separated by a small brown coffee table. Proregime sports figures guests were in the studio while others were interviewed on the
phone. Three guests were in the studio of With the Event and four gests were in the
94

studio of Special Event; two in the first part and two in the second part of the
programme. Between the programme breaks Special Event displayed a black
background with yellow rings and Arabic writing carrying the programme title. The
two programmes displayed "news ticker" and "crawler" bars on the screen. The news
ticker announced news tips while the crawler showed messages sent by pro-regime
supporters. While the panelists were addressing the audience, both bars were sending
different types of messages dispraising the uprising and anti-regime protesters. The
panelists and the two bars were meant to encourage the pro-regime audience to adopt
the messages sent by the two programmes.
5.2 Collecting television data
Bahrain Sports Channel has an archive of television programs but as a
research student in exile, I have no access to With the Event and Special Event. Thus,
the two programmes were downloaded from a YouTube user called "B4HRAIN".
The user joined YouTube on October 27, 2008 and their last video was uploaded on
April 10, 2012. B4HRAIN has 215 videos, 986 subscribers and their videos recorded
1,094, 422 views. B4HRAIN has picked a profile picture of the King and the Crown
Prince praying. It is notable that the user's videos included: speeches and interviews
of the regime's figures including the King of Bahrain Hamad bin Isa Al-Khalifa,
military orders of the Bahraini Defence Force during the period of martial law,
"patriotic songs" about Bahrain and the Al-Khalifa family, and news bulletins from
Bahrain Channel and other pro-regime channels. With the Event was uploaded on
April 4, 2011 and titled on YouTube "BTV Show on Sports Violations برنامج مع الحدث
"تجاوزات الرياضيين. The Arabic text is translated as "With the Event Show: Athletes
Violation"

and

the

programme

can

be

found

on:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HXd6UQ5MAds. Special Event was uploaded on
April 14, 2011 titled " "برنامج حدث خاص عن تجاوزات الرياضيينwhich is translated to
"Special Event programme about Athletes' Irregularities" and it can be found on:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F-SH9oqgl84. Both YouTube clips were last
accessed online on November 15, 2015.

95

5.3 Rationale for selection of the two programmes
The two programmes were significant as newspapers did not report on the
uprising overtly until April 6, 2011 and after the King's son who was also the
President of the Bahrain Olympic Committee Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad was
interviewed in With the Event. Nasser bin Hamad threatened those who were
involved in the uprising would be punished. The establishment of commission of
inquiry was announced during With the Event and those whose images appeared in
the programme were suspended or arrested. In addition, several of sports news
articles that covered the uprising pointed to the two programmes. For example, a
news article published in Akhbar Al-Khaleej on April 7, 2011, stated that Al-Hala
Sports Club Board of Directors had an immediate meeting to discuss what was
displayed in With the Event including photos of the participants of "The paltry
Athletes' March".
5.4 With the Event television Sports programme
The opening sequence of With the Event started with a report about the king
who confronted the protesters and saved Bahrain. The audience saw at the first
glance of the programme a wide-shot showing the panellists while pictures of the
King (right) and the Prime Ministers (left) displayed on a digital screen at the back of
the studio behind the seated panellists (referred to here as the background set for the
studio) beside another picture that had an unclear meaning of a person who came out
of the dark and went back again (Figure 46). The programme hosted three guests.
From left to right were Faiz Al-Sada (the host) who usually hosts social and sports
programmes, Majid Sultan (a sports journalist), Abdullah Bo Nofil (a sports
journalist) and Faisal Al-Sheikh (a sports journalist). The three guests wore Thawb
and only Faisal Al-Sheikh wore a business suit. The guests were familiar to the
audience and appear in different sports programmes. Faisal Al-Sheikh writes political
columns in local and regional newspapers and he also appeared in political
programmes in Bahrain Channel during the uprising. The Thawb and business suit
are formal dress that people in Bahrain wear at weddings, funerals, television
programmes, or formal parties. Many Bahraini wear Thawb or business suit
whenever it is more comfortable as it is a personal decision that does not signify the
person's academic or social background. In this context, the Thawb and business suit
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do not symbolize or indicate any point linked with the study. The blue bar in the
bottom of the screen stated in Arabic " للمشاركة في برنامج حدث خاص أرسل رسالة نصية على
 "األرwhich can be translated as "To participate in the With the Event programme,
send an SMS on the numbers". The news ticker in red stated " تم التمديد ليومين وذلك رغبة
 "من الرياضيينwhich can be translated as "(out of frame) Has Been Extended at the
Request of the Athletes". As for the two programmes, in the top right corner of the
monitor the word " "مباشرor "Live" as the programme was broadcasted live and in the
top left corner of the monitor appeared the channel logo. "Zain" that appeared in the
bottom left corner is a telecommunication company that operates in Bahrain and
"94194" was the number that the messages should be sent to by Zain users. There
were two more numbers of "VIVA 88082" and "Batelco 92345", but they do not
appear in Figure 46. "VIVA" and "Batelco" are other telecommunication companies
that also operate in Bahrain. In minute 00:04:10 of With the Event a red bar was
displayed showing a phone line number with the international code for Bahrain
calling on the audience to participate in the programme ("To participate:
0097317681058"). However, the phone line was limited in With the Event to sports
figures and Al-Khalifa family members.
The host of With the Event interviewed three sports figures who participated
in the Athletes' March over the phone: the National Football Team player Mohamed
Sayed Adnan, the National Football Team Player A'ala Hubail, and Al-Ahli Club
Manager Faisal Alali. The host of the programme also interviewed pro-regime sports
figures, including Secretary-General of the Football Federation of Bahrain
Abdulrahman Sayar, the National Handball Team player Saeed Joher and the
National Handball Player Ahmed Abdulnabi over the phone.

Figure 46: With the Event: Screenshot of the panel of the programme (Bahrain Sports Channel, April
4, 2011)
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During With the Event, edited digital images of The Athletes' March were
displayed. The faces of the participants were circled and their names and/or sport
were identified. Figure 47 shows an edited digital image of The Athlete's March from
minute 01:36:38 of With the Event. Four sports figures' faces were circled and
identified as from left to right Mubark Al-Haiki (a volleyball player), Hussain AlHaiki (a volleyball player), Nader Abduljalil (a Manger in Al-Ahli Club) and Mirza
Abdullah (a volleyball player).

Figure 47: With the Event: Screenshot from minute 01:36:38 identifying sports
figures in The Athletes' March (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 4, 2011)

5.5 Special Event television sports programme
Special Event started with a report about the feedback following With the
Event that was aired a week earlier. Special Event was divided into two parts. The
first part was about the legal aspect of the participation of the sports figures in the
uprising and the legitimacy of the sanctions that would be applied to them. This part
involved the host Faiz Al-Sada and two guests in the studio (Sheikh Rashed bin
Abdulrahman (the Vice President of Al-Muharraq Club) and Mohammed Al-Mogbil
(a counsellor)). The second part of the programme that started from minute 00:52:53
discussed the role of sport and sports media in the uprising and hosted Fouad Fahd (a
sports critic) and Abdullah Ashour (a sports journalist). The guests often appeared in
Bahrain Sports Channel prior the uprising. The programme also interviewed the proregime figures and the Al-Khalifa family members Mubarak Al-Sulaiti (FIFA
Members), Sheikh Khalifa bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa (an Honorary Member of Al-Riffa
Club), Majid Sultan (a sports journalist) and Sheikh Abdulla bin Khalid (the Al-Riffa
Club President) over the phone. The phone line to the programme was available for
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the audience in the second part of the programme. This was unlike With the Event in
which the phone line was limited to sports figures and Al-Khalifa family members.
A wide-shot of the programme studio in Figure 48 shows from left to right
Faiz Al-Sada (the host), Sheikh Rashed bin Abdulrahman (Vice President of AlMuharraq Club) and Mohammed Al-Mogbil (a counsellor). A three dimensional
digital waving flag of Bahrain was displayed in the background. The message in the
crawler (top) stated in Arabic ""اللهم احفظ البحرين وآل خليفة من صغيرهم إلى كبيرهم ويحفظ شعبها
which can be translated as "May God protects Bahrain and the Al-Khalifa Family
young and old and protect the Bahraini people". The news ticker (bottom) stated
" "بتوجيهات من سمو الشيخ ناصر بن حمد آل خليفة تم تمديد برنامجwhich can be translated as
"Under the guidance of His Highness Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad, the event Has Been
extended (cut in the sentence)".

Figure 48: Special Event: Screenshot from minute 00:23:00 shows the
panel of the programme (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 11, 2011)

Edited digital images of The Athletes' March were displayed during the
Special Event. A film clip of a "patriotic song" was also played as the song praised
the Crown Prince and his personal qualities from minute 00:47:50 to minute
00:52:45. The song was performed during a festival of Independence Day that was
held in Bahrain Stadium months before the programme was broadcast. Figure 49
shows an Iraqi artist called Majid Al-Muhandis wearing a black suit standing beside
dancers wearing traditional clothes with open red waistcoats while they were
performing a traditional dance. According to the authorities, songs and poetry that
praise the Al-Khalifa family are considered "patriotic" and they are played in public
spaces. For instance, during Independence Day, songs about the King and the Al99

Khalifa family are played on national television and broadest in schools, universities,
and shopping malls.

Figure 49: Special Event: Screenshot from minute 00:49:39 of the song
played in the programme (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 11, 2011)

The festival was under the patronage of the Crown Prince. He appeared in
Figure 50 wearing Thawb and holding Misbaha (prayer beads). He was smiling while
listening to the song that sang in colloquial Arabic " ،حيا من جانا يا حيا نور الحفل بحضوره
 ذا ولي العهد ساكن قلبنا، مرحبا مليون وأكثر باللي نتغنى بحبه..من كبر حبه انرسمه بعين كل بحريني صورة
 "واحنا في قلبهwhich can be translated as: "Oh Welcome Who honoured Us, the Party
Brightens by His Presence, Who Is Beloved and His Image Is Drawn in Every
Bahraini's Eye, Oh a Million Welcome to Who We Are Warbling Love For, He Is
the Crown Prince Who Lives in Our Hearts and We Live in His Heart".

Figure 50: Special Event: Screenshot from minute 00:49:39 of the song
played in the programme (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 11, 2011)

Additionally, scenes of a visit of the Prime Minister Khalifa bin Salman to
the Salmaniya Medical Complex were showed during the programme (Figure 51).
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During a phone call made by the host, the sports journalist Majid Sultan was asked to
comment on scenes from minute 01:37:27 to minute 01:38:36 of the Prime Minister
shaking hands with the hospital officials while some of them kissed his hand. Sultan
said that "This is very beautiful to see and not just the Prime Minister's hand deserves
to be kissed. Khalifa bin Salman was reborn in this crisis. These are the men of
Bahrain. Khalifa bin Salamn fears no one but the Lord of the worlds". Majid Sultan,
also, called for the protesters to be punished saying that "We are not one people
anymore".

Figure 51: Special Event: Screenshot from minute 01:37:28 of a scene of the Prime
Minister that was displayed in the programme (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 11, 2011)

5.6 Method of analysing television data
The unit of analysis for the television data was a period of five minutes for
every half an hour of each programme. To ensure that the data was not subjected to
any selection bias, the selection covered the elements of the two programmes
including the opening and the closing sequences, the panel discussion, the crawler,
the news ticker, the background, the use of The Athletes' March edited images, the
use of music, the phone interviews of the pro-regime sports figures and the
participants in The Athletes March sports and phone calls from the audience. In total,
35 minutes of With the Event and 35 minutes of Special Event including the first and
the last five minutes were analysed. This approach to selection and reduction of
television data for analysis purposes was adapted from Jewitt (2012, pp. 18-19) and
Miles and Huberman (1994, p. 10). It should be noted that The Athletes' March
edited images were displayed in Special Event during the opening sequence and none
of the images of the march were displayed during the other selected minutes of the
programme. Additionally, the last five minutes of With the Event were dedicated to
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the phone call of Sheikh Nasser and a song about the king and was analysed as an
individual closing sequence. This is unlike the last five minutes of Special Event that
was dedicated to the panellists and was analysed within the stated elements.
Quantitative and qualitative content analyses were used to analyse the data
(Macnamara 2005; Bhattacherjee 2012). The television data was analysed in light of
three frames. The characterization frame (Lakoff 2011; Kaufman et al. 2013) was
used to examine how the uprising and the Al-Khalifa family were framed. The
consequences frame was not used explicitly during the two programmes and thus it
was not included in the analysis as an individual frame. However, this does not
downplay the importance of this frame as the two programmes were broadcast in
response to the uprising in order to vilify the demonstrations and its consequences.
The use of the unpatriotic frame (Di Cicco 2010) was used to identify how the
protesters and the pro-regime supporters were framed. Additionally, the use of the
crawlers and news ticker during the broadcast of the two programmes was examined.
Local and international news headlines that were not related to the uprising were
excluded and only those related to the uprising were analysed. For the crawler, the
message sender's name or nickname was removed (although not all messages were
accompanied with a name). The visual elements that distinguish television from
other mediums (Kepplinger 1989, pp. 179-180), such as the use of the images of the
Al-Khalifa family and The Athletes' March, the use of the background set, and the
use of music during a key period of the two programmes, were also examined.
The reliability of my coding was tested with the Ole Holsti (1969) intracoder
reliability formula and considerable effort went into ensuring that the coding and the
analysis process were not subject to bias. The selected television data that totalled 70
minutes of the two programmes. The selected minutes of the television data was
coded and analysed on two separate occasions. The intracoder reliability between the
two occasions was 0.94 (where 1.0 shows a total agreement in the coding).

5.7 Findings: With the Event: Use of the characterization frame for the protests
The analysis examined the use of the characterization frame by the panellists,
the sports figures, and the report of the opening sequences during the selected time of
Special Event (35 minutes). Key phrases of the characterization frame were used 17
times including 16 times (94.1%) negatively and 1 time (5.8%) neutrally. During the
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programme several key phrases of the characterization frame including "an act of
treachery", "malice", "greed" and "betrayed and perfidy" were used to portray the
uprising. The uprising was also framed as a "fright", "sadness", "chaos", "a tense
atmosphere" and "tough days". The key phrase "The Athletes' March" was used only
one time during the selected time (Figure 52).
Minute 00:00:00 to minute 00:05:00
00:00:24

The security events

00:00:29

The treachery

00:00:44

Clouds of fear

00:00:51

Malice and greed

00:01:22

Treachery and thanklessness

00:01:25

Sadness

00:01:47

The big challenge

00:02:31

Betrayed and perfidy

00:04:57

The crisis
Minute 00:30:00 to minute 00:35:00

00:30:27

Chaos

00:31:57

Harsh lesson
Minute 01:00:00 to minute 01:05:00

01:03:57

The crisis
Minute 01:30:00 to minute 01:35:00

01:31:06

The Athletes' March
Minute 02:00:00 to minute 02:05:00

02:03:01

The security circumstances

02:03:26

The crisis
Minute 02:30:00 to minute 02:35:00

02:33:34

Sadness and tense atmosphere
Minute 02:54:29 to minute 02:59:29

02:57:17

Tough days
Total

No. and percentage of frequency

17 times: (16 times negative: 94.1%), (1
time neutral 5.8%)

Figure 52: With the Event: Key phrases of the characterization frame of the uprising
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5.7.1 With the Event: Use of the characterization frame for the Al-Khalifa family
Key phrases of the characterization frame of the Al-Khalifa family were used
36 times by the panellists, the sports figures during the phone interviews, the opening
and the closing sequences reports (calling the family members by their real names or
positions were excluded). The king was framed individually 23 times (63.8%), while
the Al-Khalifa family including the king was framed 13 times (36.1%). The king was
frame individually 22 times (95.6%) in the first five minutes when a film clip about
him was played in the opening sequence. The king was praised for his personal
qualities such as his "kindness", "gorgeousness", "compassion" and his "big heart"
(Figure 53).
Minute 00:00:00 to minute 00:05:00
00:00:42

The wise leadership

00:01:40

The most honest man (the king)

00:01:47

The great Bo Salman (the king's agnomen)

00:02:52

The king who has the best personal qualities

00:02:55

Kind

00:02:57

Gorgeous

00:02:58

Eminent

00:02:59

Sweetheart

00:03:00

Compassionate

00:03:01

Hamad who has a big heart (4 times)

00:03:07

The king who has the best personal qualities

00:03:10

Kind

00:03:12

Gorgeous

00:03:13

Eminent

00:03:14

Sweetheart

00:03:15

Compassionate

00:03:16

Hamad who has a big heart (4 times)
Minute 00:30:00 to minute 00:35:00

00:32:02

Our leadership

00:34:02

The regime
Minute 01:00:00 to minute 01:05:00
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01:00:06

The regime

01:00:26

Our Sheikhs

01:02:13

The regime

01:03:16

The compassionate father (the king)

01:03:43

The figureheads

01:04:19

The nation's leadership
Minute 01:30:00 to minute 01:35:00

01:30:16

The royal family

01:33:15

The nation's figureheads

01:33:18

The royal family
Minute 02:00:00 to minute 02:05:00
/

/
Minute 02:30:00 to minute 02:35:00

02:31:14

The leadership of Bahrain

02:32:50

The regime
Minute 02:54:29 to minute 02:59:29

02:54:58

The regime

02:56:31

A man son of a man

02:56:50

O long life

02:58:00

The regime

02:58:05

The regime that has manner and ethics
Total

No. of and percentage of 36 times: The king (23 times 63.8%); the Al-Khalifa
frequency

family including the king (13 times 36.1%)

Figure 53: With the Event: Key phrases of the characterization frame of the Al-Khalifa family. (/)= no
key phrase of frame was used.

5.7.2 With the Event: Use of the unpatriotic frame for the protesters and the
supporters
During With the Event, the host, the guests and pro-regime figures, and the
opening and the closing sequences used the key phrases of the unpatriotic frame 39
times. Pro-regime supporters framed themselves as "us" or good citizens and they
framed their opponents as "them" or the outsiders. "Us" recurred 17 times, whereas
"them" recurred 22 times (Figure 54). While key phrases of the frame of the pro105

regime supporter were "white", "loyal", "faithful", "honourable soldiers", or
"patriotic", the protesters were portrayed as "spiteful and ungrateful people",
"hypocrites", "against the regime", or "unpatriotic people".
00:00:00 to 00:05:00
The Al-Khalifa family's supporters

The protesters

00:01:51

The king's honourable soldiers

/

00:02:15

Bahrain's lovers

/

00:02:25

/

Spiteful people

00:30:00 to 00:35:00
00:31:48

Patriotic people

/

00:32:04

/

00:33:06

Hypocrites

With us

Against us

00:33:51

/

00:34:01

Hypocrites

With the regime

Against the regime

00:34:06

/

Hypocrites

01:00:00 to 01:05:00
01:02:00

/

01:02:09

Ungrateful people

White

Black

01:02:25

/

Unpatriotic people

01:03:51

People with patriotic attitudes

/

01:04:16

Patriotic people

/

01:04:32

Honest men and loyal to Bahrain

/

01:04:45

Sports role models

/

01:04:45

Youth's role models/loyal and faithful

/

01:30:00 to 01:35:00
/

/

/

02:00:00 to 02:05:00
/

/

/

02:30:00 to 02:35:00
02:31:13

Loyal to Bahrain and its leadership

/

02:54:29 to 02:59:29
02:55:00

Well

done/loyal/love

Bahrain,
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its May a wall fall on him

leadership and people
02:55:15

/

They lost love of their fans

02:55:19

/

They lost their way

02:55:29

/

They will be held accountable

02:55:36

/

They will be held accountable

02:55:57

/

They will be held accountable

02:56:03

/

They will be held accountable

02:56:11

/

They will be held accountable

02:56:14

They will be awarded

02:56:22

With us

02:56:41

/
Against us

/

Offended Bahrain

02:56:48

Thanks you/well done

/

02:57:23

Honourable people who love this

/

country
02:57:27

/

Traitors/do not wish good to
Bahrain

02:58:17

/

They will be held accountable

02:58:24

/

They will fallout
Total

No. and percentage

17 times (100% Positive)

22 times (100% Negative)

of frequency
Figure 54: With the Event: Key phrases of the unpatriotic frame. (/)= no key phrase of frame was used.

5.7.3 With the Event: The opening sequence report
With the Event started by presenting the guests and then a report of 3 minutes
and 35 seconds that was titled "Bahrain is Healing". The king and the royal family
members' scenes occupied 2 minutes and 11 seconds whereas scenes of a fountain,
happy people, children playing in a shopping mall, helicopter views of the capital
Manama, and another view of one of the king's palaces occupied 1 minute and 24
seconds. The report also showed scenes of the king performing a traditional Bedouin
dance called Ardha, or of him surrounded by school students, people acclaiming the
king while following his parade, and a scene of the king reading a book in his private
office. Moreover, the report presented the king as an athlete as he welcomed the
National Football Team players at his palace. The report framed the king as a potent,
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prudent, and loveable gentleman on one hand and a courageous military commander
on the other (Figure 55).
Time

The king's scenes during the opening sequence report

Duration

00:00:35 to 00:00:41

/

6 seconds

00:00:41 to 00:00:44

3 seconds

00:00:45- 00:01:29

The king wearing a military dress while the Prime Minister
wearing Thawb
/

44 seconds

00:01:30- 00:01:35

The king and some of Al-Khalifa members dancing Ardha

5 seconds

00:01:36- 00:01:38

/

2 seconds

00:01:39- 00:02:20

41 seconds

00:02:21- 00:02:24

The king in a car waving to people; the king riding a horse
with companions; the king wearing Thawb and walking
while carrying sword; the king looking from the car sunroof
and waving to people; the King kissing a child; the king
shaking hands and kissing school girls; the King walking
beside the Prime Minister and the guards following them;
the king in a meeting with royal family members
/

00:02:25- 00:02:29

The king in his private office reading a book

4 seconds

00:02:30- 00:02:32

/

3 seconds

2 seconds

The voiceover stops: A big smile on the king's face while 18 seconds
listening to a school girl praise him and his political project
A song about the king with no voiceover: the king welcoming 41 seconds
00:02:52- 00:03:33
the national football team in his palace; the king standing on a
boat and waving to people; the king looking from the car
sunroof and waving to people; people raising the king's photo
while following his parade; the king looking from the car
sunroof and waving to people. The end of the report
Total scenes duration of the king and the royal family members: 2 minutes 11 seconds
Total scenes duration without the king and the royal family members: 1 minute 24 seconds
00:02:33- 00:02:51

Figure 55: With the Event: the king's scenes in the opening sequence report

A scene of the king walking alongside the Prime Minster while the Crown
Prince appears in the background was displayed during the report (Figure 56). The
king wears a military dress is followed by guards. The Prime Minister and the Crown
Prince were wearing Thawb. The voiceover commented: "Supported by will of the
people and the sagacity of the leadership, our motherland is healing from the wounds
of betrayal". The location where the scene was filmed is not clear.
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Figure 56: With the Event: Screenshot from minute 00:00:42 shows the king (left)
walking alongside with the Prime Minister (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 4, 2011)

In another sequence, the king was shown dancing the Ardha with his family
members (Figure 57). The Ardha is a traditional Bedouin dance. The king appears
wearing Thawb and carrying a sword alongside one of his sons. Another man
appears behind the king holding a giant flag of Bahrain while several of Al-Khalifa
family members perform the dance. The location where the scene was filmed is not
clear.

Figure 57: With the event: Screenshot from minute 00:01:35 shows the king dancing
Ardha with his family members (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 4, 2011)

In another sequence, the king was shown wearing a military dress while riding a
horse alongside two unknown guards who are carrying swords (Figure 58). The red
dress and the saddle of the king's horses represent the colour of the flag of Bahrain.
The scene signifies the strength and leadership qualities of the king. The location
where the scene was filmed is not clear.
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Figure 58: With the Event: Screenshot from minute 00:01:49 shows the king (middle) riding a
horse while wearing a military dress (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 4, 2011)

In another scene, the king appeared as walking while wearing traditional clothes with
a dagger (or Janbiya) and holding a sword (Figure 59). The Crown Prince appears in
the background followed by guards. The voiceover on Figure 58 and 59 commented
"Sir how great you were when confronting the big challenge, riding your purebred
horse and leading your honourable soldiers. You swore you will not soften". The
location where the scenes were filmed is not clear.

Figure 59: With the Event: Screenshot from minute 00:01:53 shows the king
carrying a sword (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 4, 2011)

In another sequence, the king appeared in the With the Event opening sequence
report receiving the national football team (Figure 60). The king wore a red sports
jacket while some players and the team's coach appear in the background. This scene
showed the sports qualities of the king who takes care of athletes and appreciates
their sporting achievements.
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Figure 60: With the Event: Screenshot from minute 00:03:00 shows the king with
the national football team of Bahrain (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 4, 2011)

Overall, the voiceover of the With the Event opening sequence report praised
the noble and the brave leader who conquered the "traitors" and saved the country
supported by his "honourable soldiers". Showing scenes of the king dancing the
Ardha symbolizes war as this Bedouin dance that originates from the Arabian
Peninsula, takes place when a tribe is heading to war or after defeating the enemy.
The dance is performed by the tribe's members to get them ready to face the enemy
or to celebrate the victory over those who challenged the will the tribe. The weapons
carried by the tribe's members are mainly swords. The members sing and praise the
tribe, its heroes and current leaders (Asharq Al-Awsat 2008; Janin and Besheer 2003,
p. 14). Usually, the performers of the dance that takes place in an open area dance
with pride and vigour.

5.7.4 With the Event: Use of the background
The background during With the Event showed images of the king, the Prime
Minister, the Crown Prince, and other Al-Khalifa family members. The event where
the images were taken is not clear. As shown in Figure 61, the panellists appeared
while an image of the Crown Prince smiling is displayed in the background. It seems
from the black and white colours that the image of the Crown Prince was taken at a
Bahrain Grand Prix event. This background often appeared during the discussion.
Other images in the background beside the Crown Prince cannot be clearly seen.
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Figure 61: With the Event: Screenshot from minute 00:34:52 shows an image of the
Crown Prince smiling in the background (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 4, 2011)

The three dimensional digital waving flag of Bahrain was also displayed
several times in the background of the studio set including during the phone call with
Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, pro-regime athletes, and athletes who
participated in The Athletes' March. As shown in Figure 62, the digital flag of
Bahrain is waving in a semi-clear sky behind the panellists which reinforces the
'patriotic' message and credentials of panellists and the programme.

Figure 62: With the Event: Screenshot from minute 01:00:53 shows the waving
flag of Bahrain in the background (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 4, 2011)

5.7.5 With the Event: Use of the crawler
The crawler placed at the bottom of the screen that showed messages sent by
the audience was not displayed in the first five minutes of With the Event There were
113 messages that were placed 164 times. Most messages were placed only once in
the crawler but other messages appeared several times (Figure 63). On average each
message contained ten words. Framing the Al-Khalifa family members and their
supporters was 100% positive, whereas framing the protesters and protests was 100%
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negative. The majority of the messages prayed to God to prolong the lives of the
King, the Prime Minister, the Crown Prince and Al-Khalifa family members. The AlKhalifa family was framed as "crown of the head" and the king as "the wise father"
whereas the supporters of the family framed themselves as "loyal" and "patriotic
people". They also prayed to God to protect the Al-Khalifa family and the country
from all evil. The pro-regime supporters vowed to sacrifice themselves for the sake
of the Al-Khalifa family and the country. It was noticed that message 6 "May God
Protects Bahrain and Keep it Khalifya Forever" was placed 11 times more than any
other message (02:00:00 to 02:05:00). This message signifies that Bahrain must be
ruled by the Al-Khalifa family forever. On the other hand, the Al-Khalifa family's
supporters were aggressive toward the protesters and the athletes involved in the
uprising as they were framed as "evil and enemies" who have a "lack of awareness"
and who "must be persecuted and punished" as they harmed Bahrain and its people.
Some messages were accompanied by an author's name but there is no way of
knowing if these names were authentic or pseudonyms, or if they were by real
audience members or pro-regime staff of the broadcaster. As well, there were 22
messages without an accompanying name and it became evident that most of these
messages were the ones that called out the protestors and demanded punishment.
These messages were placed several times but not as many times as message 6
referred to above.
- Message 6: All those players who were involved in the events must be prosecuted
(01:00:00 to 01:05:00).
- Message 12: Every player involved in the events must be prosecuted (02:00:00 to
02:05:00).
- Message 1: We demand a punishment for all ungrateful athletes starting from
Hubail and Sayed Adnan (02:30:00 to 02:30:35).
- Message 2: The people demand punishment of the players, the people demand
punishment of the players, they do not deserve clemency (02:30:00 to 02:30:35).
Message 1 and 2 (02:30:00 to 02:30:35) were screened in the crawler after the phone
interviews with the two football players Sayed Mohamed Adnan and A'ala Hubail.
The sanctions applied to some athletes were announced by the clubs during the
programme. Message 4 in the closing sequence of With the Event encouraged this
step and stated: "We thank the Al-Riffa and Al-Muharraq managements for the quick
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response to take procedures against the violators". Overall, the crawler suggested that
the uprising was an unpatriotic movement and that the people of Bahrain were
demanding to punishment for the athletes involved in the demonstrations.
The protesters

The Al-Khalifa family and their supporters

100% negative

100% positive

Evil, enemies, must be persecuted, must
be punished, lack of awareness,
punishment, they do not deserve
clemency, violator athletes

The wise leadership, your soldiers, long life, blessing, at
your own sweet will, sacrifice ourselves for you, Crown
of the head, blooming, champion, greetings, The wise
father, the noble Prime Minister, Bahrain is Khalifya,
Bahrain will remain Khalifya, patriotic, longevity, loyal
people
113 messages; 164 times

Total no. and frequency of messages
Figure 63: With the Event: The use of the crawler

5.7.6 With the Event: Use of the news ticker
The news ticker at the bottom of the screen showed news headlines. During
With the Event there was only one news headline that was related to the uprising and
it was placed six times. The news headline was about an event that was organized in
Bahrain Stadium to sign a huge kit of the national football team as a symbolic gift
that would be presented to the king (Figure 64). The event was called ""ما لها إال حمدها
which can be translated as "Only for Hamad" and it meant that the king is the only
legitimate ruler who should lead the nation. Praising and showing their obedience to
the king and the royal family was considered a 'patriotic' act. Using a sports facility,
Bahrain Stadium, the biggest stadium in the country, is allowed as long as it is used
to host "patriotic events". The panellists did not discuss the event and also did not
point to it during the programme.
No.

Time

1

Minute 00:30:00 to minute 00:35:00

2

Minute 01:00:00 to minute 01:05:00

3

Minute 01:30:00 to minute 01:35:00

4

Minute 02:00:00 to minute 02:05:00

5

Minute 02:30:00 to minute 02:35:00

News

Frequency

Due to a large turnout from the
Bahraini athletes to sign a huge
kit to support his highness the
king under the title "Only for
Hamad", the event will be
extended to another two days
at the request of the athletes.

1

Total frequency: 6 times
Figure 64: With the Event: The use of the news ticker
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1
1
1

5.7.7 With the Event: Use of images of the Athletes' March
With the Event displayed 22 edited digital images of The Athletes' March and
several of them were displayed more than once during the selected minutes. The
programme displayed ten edited digital images from minute 01:33:44 to minute
01:35:00, and 11 edited digital images were displayed during the phone call
interview with the football player A'ala Hubail from minute 02:00:00 to minute
02:00:26 and from minute 02:01:14 to minute 02:01:52. Another digital edited image
was displayed from minute 02:30:00 to minute 02:30:10. Figure 65 is a screenshot
that shows an edited digital image of The Athletes' March that was displayed in
minute 01:34:03. The image identifies four players and their sports club; from left to
right Hasan Abdulnabi (a basketball player), Ahmad Hassan Al-Durazi (a basketball
player), Sayed Hashim (Al-Ahli Club), and another whose first name was covered by
the word "Live" at the top right while the second name was Ghoulom (basketball
player). As the third identified person from the left appeared in the background, a
black arrow was used to point to him. There was a fifth identified person on the right,
but his face does not appear in this screenshot taken from the television programme.

Figure 65: With the Event: Screenshot from minute 01:34:03 shows an image of The Athletes'
March that was displayed during the programme (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 4, 2011)

Figure 66 shows another example of The Athletes' March edited digital
images that was displayed in With the Event. Four athletes were identified and their
faces were circled. Appearing from left to right are Ali Hassan (volleyball player),
Shaker Salman (football player), Ahmed Hassan Al-Durazi (basketball player) and
Mohammed Hassan (basketball player). The first player on the left Ali Hassan did
not face the camera as he was walking in the background and thus a blue circle and
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an arrow were used to draw the audience's attention to the target so he can be clearly
identified.

Figure 66: With the Event: Screenshot from minute 01:34:20 shows an
image of The Athletes' March (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 4, 2011)

During the display of The Athletes' March edited digital images in With the
Event and in Special Event, a soundtrack from the 2004 blockbuster American movie
National Treasure starring Nicolas Cage (Turteltaub 2004) was played. This
soundtrack was played several times in the movie particularly during the most
exciting scenes of the adventurous movie. This soundtrack was used during the two
programmes to create an atmosphere of excitement and to engage the audience with
the messages being sent.

5.7.8 With the Event: The closing sequence
In the last five minutes of With the Event, Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad AlKhalifa, the King's son and the President of the Bahraini Olympic Committee and the
Commander of Bahrain's Royal Guard was interviewed over the phone. The phone
call lasted for 2 minutes and 13 seconds from minutes 02:54:38 to 02:56:5. Before
the programme ended, the producers played a film clip of a Bedouin song.
Transcribed below is a translation of the phone call:
The host: Allow us to receive the president of the Bahrain Olympic
Committee, his highness Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad Al-Khalifa may
God protects him. Good evening Sheikh
Sheikh Nasser: Hello. Good evening.
The panellists: Welcome Bo Hamad (Sheikh Nasser's nickname).
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Sheikh Nasser: Greetings. Thank you. I don't want to take up too
much of your time. Well done guys. Good efforts all of you and all
the supporters who declared their loyalty and love to the Kingdom
of Bahrain, its leadership and its people. Everyone who called for a
toppling of the regime; may a wall collapse on his head.
The panellists: Well-said. Amen.
Sheikh Nasser: We are the youth and sport has no relationship with
politics and our approach is athletic, ethical and brotherly. People
(athletes) have involved themselves in matters (the uprising), people
lost the love of the fans, and other implicated themselves in
troubles. I don't want to take up too much of your time. Excuse me,
but anyone who has implicated himself in these matters and
implicated himself in this net, shall be held accountable. Whether
he was an athlete, socialite, politician, whatever he was, he will be
held accountable at this time. Today is the judgment day, and may
God grants patience and strength to all. May God keeps our Hamad,
Khalifa bin Salman and Salman bin Hamad.
The host: Amen.
Sheikh Nasser: Thank you.
The host: Your Highness Sheikh Nasser, May God protects you.
May be this is what people of Bahrain were waiting to hear that
everyone who spoke about toppling the regime will be held
accountable. This is what we thank you for. This reassured us and
soothed our hearts.
Sheikh Nasser: Indeed, they will be held accountable. Bahrain is
an island and there is nowhere to escape. Everyone involved in
these matters will be held accountable and everyone who supported
(the regime) will be rewarded. God willing, those who have been
patient and stood up with my master His Majesty the King Hamad
are known. As we knew who stood up against us, we know who
stood up with us, and days will judge.
Faisal Alsheikh (a studio guest): Sheik I have one word to say if
you allow me.
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Sheikh Nasser: Please.
Faisal Alsheikh: You are a man son of a man. Your words are a
crown for our heads. Today the speech of my master His Majesty
the King who said that we would not forgive those who offended
Bahrain. May God protects you and keep Al-Khalifa for us always.
Sheikh Nasser: Thank you and well done all.
Faisal AlSheikh: May God protects you.
The host: Thank you and may God prolongs your life. His
Highness Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, the President of the
Bahrain Olympic Committee. Thank you Sheikh.

Sheikh Nasser vowed that those who participated in the uprising would be
held accountable. He repeated "will be held accountable" four times and threatened
the protesters by saying that "Bahrain is an island and there is nowhere to escape"
which implied that the regime was planning to prosecute the protesters. Sheikh
Nasser differentiated 'us' as the regime and its supporters from 'them' the disloyal
people who stood up against the regime. He praised the panellists for their efforts by
saying "thank you, well done, and good efforts". At the end of With the Event, the
host commented saying that: "We got to the conclusion of this programme by
receiving the phone call from His Highness Sheikh Nasser, may God protects him.
That phone call reassured us and soothed the hearts of those who are watching us as
some will be held accountable" (02:58:03). The host also announced in the last
minute that Al-Muharraq Club decided to suspend all those who participated in the
Pearl Roundabout part of the protest, and that the player Mahmood Alojaimi from
Al-Riffa Club was suspended. It was also announced that the next day an urgent
meeting would be held by the Al-Hala Club and other clubs to discuss what was
shown during the With the Event programme.
It should be noted that using "Amen" by the hosts or the studio guests during
the phone call does not give sanctity on the issue or the person as religious
expressions such as "Amen", "God Willing", and "Thanks God", are part of the local
social culture and they are commonly used by all people in Bahrain even those who
do not practise Islam. However, using verses of the Quran or Hadith (the prophet's
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saying, teachings and deeds) in speeches frequently would give sanctity to the issue
being discussed and to the spokesman.
From minute 02:57:08, a film clip of a Bedouin song about the king was
played while displaying scenes of the king dancing Ardha (Figure 67). The lyrics
said in Arabic "  اللي، تسلم لنا يا حمد للمملكة والرعية، الكل غنى وقصد، للمملكة وللرعية،تسلم لنا يا حمد
 ونعم وفى بالعهد إصالح، درع البالد األبية، لعيون داره حمد، وان انتخت يا حمد بحريننا العربية،ونهضة قوية
 "الخليفي حمد دنوا له المعلقيةwhich can be translated as:
May God protect you Hamad for the kingdom and the
people. All sing and recite may God protects you Hamad for
the kingdom and the people. Who fulfils his promise,
reform and strong renaissance, who fulfils his promise, and
if our Arabic Bahrain seek help O Hamad, and for the sake
of his eye Hamad the shield of the proud country. What a
Khalify you are O Hamad, approach him the poetry.
The programme ended before the song ended. The lyrics of the song portrayed the
king once again as a popular and loveable leader and prayed to God to protect him
for the kingdom and the people. The lyrics of the song also pointed to the army when
the performer sang "the shield of the proud country" implying to the power possessed
by the king.

Figure 67: With the Event: Screenshot from minute 02:59:29 shows the king carries
a sword. the Arabic writing states:"What a Khalify You Hamad" (Bahrain Sports
Channel, April 4, 2011)

5.7.9 Special Event: Use of the characterization frame for the protests
The analysis examined the use of the characterization frame by the panellists,
the sports figures, and the report of the opening sequences during the selected time of
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Special Event (35 minutes). Key phrases of the characterization frame were used 31
times including 24 times (77.4%) neutrally and 7 times (22.5%) negatively (Figure
68). Key phrases of the characterization frame were not used before minute 02:30:00
to minute 02:35:00 and neither in the closing sequence between minute 02:50:26 to
minute 02:55:26. "The march" that indicated The Athletes' March was the most used
key phrase 14 times or (45.1%). While key phrases of the characterization frame
such as "The Athletes' March", "The March" and "The Sports March" portrayed the
uprising neutrally, these key phrases were followed or preceded with negative
notions. For example, the voiceover of the opening sequence report said that The
Athletes' March was organized by the athletes on the sideline of "the unfortunate
events" (00:01:53).
00:00:00 to 00:05:00
00:00:36

The security crisis

00:00:41

The Athletes' March

00:00:47

The sit in the GCC roundabout

00:01:03

The march

00:01:04

The Athletes' March

00:01:53

The Athletes' March

00:01:58

The unfortunate events

00:02:20

The spiteful march

00:02:21

The anti-regime march

00:03:28

The security crisis
00:30:00 to 00:35:00

/

/
01:00:00 to 01:05:00

01:01:44

The march

01:02:02

The crisis

01:02:09

The crisis

01:02:50

The sports march

01:03:01

The Athletes' March

01:03:13

The march

01:03:15

The march
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01:03:29

Sports march

01:03:34

The march

01:03:39

The march

01:04:00

The march

01:04:08

The march

01:04:15

The march

01:04:17

The march

01:04:47

The march

01:04:57

The march
01:30:00 to 01:35:00

01:30:37

The Athletes' March
02:00:00 to 02:05:00

02:00:13

The march

02:02:04

The march

02:02:08

The march

02:02:14

The Athletes' March
02:30:00 to 02:35:00

/

/
02:50:26 to 02:55:26

/

/
Total

31 times: (0 time: 0% P); (7 times: 22.5% N); (24 times: 77.4% Neu)
Figure 68: Special Event: Key phrases of the characterization frame of the uprising. (/)= no key
phrase of frame was used. (P)= positive, (N)= negative, (Neu)= Neutral.

5.7.10 Special Event: Use of the characterization frame for the Al-Khalifa family
Key phrases of the characterization frame of the Al-Khalifa family were used
22 times (calling the family members by their real names or positions were
excluded). Unlike the With the Event, the king was not framed individually in Special
Event. The most used key phrase was "the wise leadership" that referred to the King,
the Prime Minister, and the Crown Prince. Other key phrases including "the regime",
"the leadership", and "the leadership of Bahrain" were also used to point to the AlKhalifa family (Figure 69). During the programme, a member of the Al-Khalifa
family threatened the protesters saying that that his family members would not
121

tolerate "the insult". Sheikh Khalid bin Abdullah Al-Khalifa (the President of AlRiffa Club) also said in a phone call that his family members have military skills as
many of the Al-Khalifa family male members are subjected to military training and
join the Bahraini army or special forces (02:30:24 and 02:30:29).

00:00:00 to 00:05:00
00:02:20

The regime

00:02:46

The leadership
00:30:00 to 00:35:00
/

/
01:00:00 to 01:05:00

01:00:22

The regime

01:00:23

The nation's figureheads

01:01:09

The Khalify regime

01:03:01

The regime
01:30:00 to 01:35:00

01:30:08

The leadership
02:00:00 to 02:05:00
/

/
02:30:00 to 02:35:00

02:30:16

The royal family

02:30:24

Most of us are soldiers

02:30:26

We are not luxuriant

02:30:29

Soldiers
02:50:15 to 02:55:15

02:50:30

Our leadership

02:51:28

The leadership

02:52:01

Our Sheikh

02:52:02

Our figureheads

02:52:35

The wise leadership

02:53:18

The wise leadership

02:53:34

The leadership
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02:54:20

Our wise government

02:54:21

Our wise leadership

02:54:50

Our wise leadership

02:54:55

The leadership of Bahrain
Total

Frequency

22 times

Figure 69: Special Event: Key phrases of the characterization frame of the AlKhalifa family. (/)= no key phrase of frame was used.

5.7.11 Special Event: Use of the unpatriotic frame for the protesters and the
supporters
While the Al-Khalifa's supporters were labelled positively 6 times (100%) in
Special Event, their opponents were labelled 38 times; once (2.6%) positively, 10
times (26.3%) neutrally, and 27 times (71%) negatively (Figure 70). Neutral key
phrase such as "protesters", "some players", and "athletes" were used to frame the
protesters. However, these key phrases were followed or preceded with negative
notions. "Brother" was the only positive key phrase used in the two programmes to
portray the protesters. This key phrase was used sarcastically by the host to point to
the participants in The Athletes' March who were interviewed in the previous
programme. On the other hand, negative key phrases of the unpatriotic frame of the
protesters included "ungrateful people", "dupes", "abusers", "offenders", "criminals"
and "traitors". In a phone call with Sheikh Khalifa bin Ahmed Al-Khalifa, an
Honorary Member of Al-Riffa Club framed the participants of the Athletes' March as
"criminals and worthless". Sheikh Khalid also called on the local clubs to punish the
athletes as he called them "sons of Bahrain who fought Bahrain and brought shame
to themselves". Although the programme paid more attention to the protesters, the
Al-Khalifa family supporters were praised once again for their attitude during the
uprising. The supporters were framed as "sons", "brothers" and "lovers".
00:00:00 to 00:05:00
The Al-Khalifa family's supporters

The protesters

00:01:57

/

The protesters

00:02:19

/

Ungrateful people

00:02:46

/

Offenders

00:03:30

/

Participants
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in

the

security

events
00:03:39

/

Athletes

00:04:26

/

Dupes

00:30:00 to 00:35:00
/

/

/

01:00:00 to 01:05:00
01:00:15

/

Athletes

01:00:22

/

Abusers

01:00:30

/

The Athletes

01:00:38

/

Managers and referees

01:01:44

/

Athletes

01:04:33

/

Brothers

01:30:00 to 01:35:00
01:30:06

/

Criminals

01:30:14

/

They do not deserve greeting

01:30:25

/

They must be suspended for life

01:31:10

/

He is worthless

01:31:12

We made him

01:31:15

/

We made him a name

01:31:40

/

Sons of Bahrain fight Bahrain

01:3144

/

They must be suspended for life

01:31:49

/

Clubs

must

be

forced

to

suspend them for life
01:31:53

/

They must be suspended for life

01:32:04

/

Some players

01:32:27

/

They must be expelled

01:32:27

/

Shame on them

01:32:28

/

They do not deserve greeting

02:00:00 to 02:05:00
02:02:17

/

The traitors athletes

02:30:00 to 02:35:00
02:30:10

/

Opposition
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02:31:12

/

What so-called opposition

02:31:17

/

The opposition

02:31:52

White

Black

02:31:57

White

Black

02:32:36

/

02:33:25

Our brothers

/

02:33:26

Our lovers

/

02:33:27

Our sons

/

02:34:38

/

What so-called the roundabout

The opposition

group
02:50:15 to 02:55:15
02:51:01

/

The abusers

02:52:00

/

Vandals

02:52:01

/

Abusers

02:53:06

/

Players

02:54:54

May God protects them

/

6 times : (100% P)

38 times: (1time: 2.6% P); (10

Frequency

times: 26.3% Neu); (27 times:
71% N)
Figure 70: Special Event: Key phrases of the unpatriotic frame. (/)= not key phrase of frame was used.
(P)= positive, (N)= negative, (Neu)= Neutral.

5.7.12 Special Event: The opening sequence report
The host started Special Event by presenting his guests before showing a
report about With the Event that pointed to the feedback from With the Event that was
broadcast the previous week (Figure 71). The voiceover commented that the
justifications of the participants in The Athletes' March who were interviewed in the
previous programme were not convincing as they had no legitimate reason to protest
and therefore they deserved to be convicted by public opinion in Bahrain. The
voiceover of the report suggested that the majority of the people of Bahrain were
against the uprising. It also suggested that the protesters committed a sin by rallying
"against the regime". The voiceover said that With the Event revealed the "real face"
of the protesters who participated in "the spiteful people's march" that offended the
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country and its leadership. The report vowed that Bahrain Television would not
hesitate to reveal all facts and stand up against the demonstrators in the uprising.

Figure 71: Special Event: Screenshot of minute 00:01:05 the opening
sequence report (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 11, 2011)

Several edited digital images of The Athletes' March were displayed during
the opening sequences of Special Event. Figure 72 shows an edited digital image of
The Athletes' March that was taken during the speech following the end of The
Athletes' March. The speech was delivered by A'ala Hubail on a stage that was set in
the Pearl Roundabout. This stage was also used by other protesters and political
activist in their speeches during the activities that were held in the Pearl Roundabout.
appearing in the lift of the image is the football player A'ala Hubail during his
speech. The Arabic written stated " "عالء حبيل يلقي الكلمة ويطالب بإسقاط النظامwhich can be
translated as "A'ala Hubail during a speech that called to overthrow the regime".
A'ala's face was circled in blue beside Sayed Mohammed Adnan who appeared in the
middle of the image with Arabic writing that stated " "العب المنتخب الوطنيwhich can be
translated as: "a national team player". The third circled player was " صادق علي العب
 "كرة اليدwhich can be translated as "Sadiq Ali, Handball Player". Other athletes
appeared wrapping their bodies with the flag of Bahrain while holding a banner
which stated " "مسيرة الرwhich can be translated as "The march of". The second
banner (on right side) stated in Arabic that " "تفهم شعبنا للوطن كانwhich can be
translated as "Understands our people (out of frame) for the country". It should be
noted that the text in both banners in this image was out of frame.
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Figure 72: Special Event: Screenshot from minute 00:01:36 of the
opening report (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 11, 2011)

The next edited digital image of The Athletes' March (Figure 73) shows nine
athletes' faces were circled in blue but only seven of them were identified. Appearing
from left to right are Mahmood Mirza Al-Ajami, Hamad Abdulla Al-Hamad, Sayed
Ali Ashoor, Ibrahim Ahmed Abbas, Yaseen Almail (assistant manager), Mirza Ali
(volleyball player), Ali Abdulamir.

Figure 73: Special Event: Screenshot from minute 00:02:30 (Bahrain
Sports Channel, April 11, 2011)

5.7.13 Special Event: Use of the background
Unlike With the Event, images of the Al-Khalifa family members were not
displayed in the background set for Special Event. The programme dedicated the
background to the three dimensional digital waving flag of Bahrain. As shown in
Figure 74, the panellists appeared while the giant flag of Bahrain was waving in the
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background of the screen. This background set reinforces the 'patriotic' message and
credentials of the panellists and the programme.

Figure 74: Special Event: Screenshot from minute 02:00:27 shows the waving
flag of Bahrain in the background (Bahrain Sports Channel, April 11, 2011)

5.7.14 Special Event: Use of the crawler
There were 49 messages that were placed 59 times during the selected
minutes from Special Event (Figure 75). The crawler was displayed from minute
00:02:50 before and was stopped in minute 01:13:30 when the phone line was
opened to the audience. The crawler was 100% positive toward the Al-Khalifa family
and their supporters, while it was 100% negative toward the protesters. The messages
prayed to God to protect the King, the Prime Minister, the Crown Prince and all the
Al-Khalifa family from "all evil" and also praised the sagacity of the leadership and
prayed God to keep Bahrain Khalifya forever. The pro-regime supporters who sent
the messages displayed in the crawler framed themselves as soldiers who were ready
to redeem themselves for the Al-Khalifa family and Bahrain. For instance, message 5
stated "May God protects His Highness the King. We are your soldiers and at your
own sweet will" (00:30:00 to 00:35:00). On the other hand, the protesters were
framed as "evil", "plotters" and "malicious". For instance, message 2 stated "What
happened is a lesson that identified the friend from the enemy. We thank God for
everything. May God protects Bahrain, our government and the loyal people amen
amen" (01:00:00 to 01:05:00).

128

The protesters

The Al-Khalifa family and their supporters

100% negative

100% positive

Evil, enemies, must be persecuted, must
be punished, lack of awareness,
punishment, they do not deserve
clemency, violators

The wise leadership, your soldiers, long life, blessing, at
your own sweet will, sacrifice ourselves for you, Crown
of the head, blooming, champion, greetings, The wise
father, the noble Prime Minister, Bahrain is Khalifya,
Bahrain will remain Khalifya, patriotic, longevity, loyal
people
49 messages; 59 times

Total no. and frequency of messages
Figure 75: Special Event: The use of the crawler

5.7.15 Special Event: Use of the news ticker
There was only one news headline displayed during Special Event and it was
placed 51 times (Figure 76). The news announced an extension of an event that was
called " "سيوف الوالءor "Swords of Allegiance" that relocated to Bahrain Stadium
because of a large turnout. The event was a symbolic declaration of solidarity with
"the wise leadership". The use of swords implied refers war. The regime called on its
supporters to join the campaign against the protesters by declearing their loyalty to
the ruling family. The Swords of Allegiance event was considered sports news
because it was held in a sports field under the auspices of Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad
Al-Khalifa and involved pro-regime athletes. This event was not discussed by the
panellists of the programme.

No.
1
2
3

Time

News

Under the guidance of His Highness
Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad Al00:30:00 to 00:35:00
Khalifa, the signing Swords of
Allegiance to the wise leadership has
01:00:00 to 01:05:00
been extended to Saturday. The event
is being held in Bahrain Stadium
because the large turnout
Total frequency: 51 times
00:00:00 to 00:05:00

Frequency
7
17
17

Figure 76: Special Event: The use of the news ticker

To sum up, the findings show that the television coverage of the uprising
divided the people of Bahrain into two parties: the legitimate party represented by the
Al-Khalifa family and their supporters and the illegitimate party represented by the
protesters. The analysis shows that the coverage used the characterization frame of
the uprising to portray the uprising as an "illegitimate movement". Unlike the
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newspaper coverage, the television coverage did not explicitly use the consequences
frame. However, the overall aim of the television coverage was to deprecate the
uprising as a political movement and its consequences on the society. Additionally,
the characterization frame was used to portray the Al-Khalifa family as the
"legitimate authority" interlinked with the traditions and the history of the country.
The King and the Al-Khalifa family were at the centre of the television coverage.
While With the Event focused on the personal qualities of the King who was shown
as a courageous and wise leader, the Special Event focused on "the wise leadership"
and paid attention to the Prime Minister and the Crown Prince. The language used to
vilify the protesters by using the unpatriotic frames in the television coverage was
more direct than the language in the newspaper coverage. For instance, while the
protesters were framed as unpatriotic citizens in the newspaper coverage, the
television crawler and several of the Al-Khalifa family members framed the
protesters as "evil", "vandals" and "worthless". The television coverage praised the
Al-Khalifa family's supporters who were labelled as "Bahrain lovers" and "loyal"
citizens for their behaviour during the protests.
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Chapter 6: Discussion
Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the newspaper data from two pro-regime
newspapers during the Bahraini uprising in 2011. Chapter 5 provides an analysis of
two television programmes broadcast during a key period of the protests. The
analyses in both chapters demonstrate that sports media and politics are inextricably
linked in Bahrain. This present chapter explains in detail how the characterization
frame, the consequences frame, and the unpatriotic frame were used to vilify the
political movement.
The characterization frame and the consequences frame were exploited by the
sports coverage to calumniate the uprising, while the characterization frame was
exploited to glorify the ruling family, and the unpatriotic frame was used to
undermine the protesters while praising the supporters of the ruling family. These
three frames were accompanied by other propaganda techniques which involved a
reliance on official sources and the selective use of photographs in the newspaper
coverage. For the television coverage the techniques involved the strategic
arrangement of the studio's background set, the use of the crawler and the news
ticker across the screen during the broadcast, the manipulation of photographs taken
of individuals participating in The Athletes' March, and the use of background music
during key sections of the programme.
While newspapers and the main state-controlled television channel started
covering the uprising days after it began, the sports newspapers and the sports
channel were silent on the uprising until the broadcast of the special programme With
the Event on April 4, 2011. On April 6, 2011 local sports newspapers began to
explicitly report on the demonstrations including The Athletes' March that was
organized on February 21, 2011. The campaign against the anti-regime sports figures
was officially launched during this first television programme in a phone interview
with the king's son Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad Al-Khalifa who is the President of the
Bahrain Olympic Committee and also the Commander of Bahrain's Royal Guard.
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6.1 Strategy of vilifying the demonstrations
The strategy of undermining and declaring the demonstrations illegal
involved the use of two frames: the characterization frame and the consequences
frame.
The characterization frame
The characterization frame is used to define a political movement and its
objectives in order to impede it (Brasted 2005, p. 383). It is also exploited to
undermine the legitimacy of an uprising and question its motive (Kaufman et al.
2013). The purpose of using this frame is to either legitimize or disorganize the
movement to raise questions such as why the uprising occurred and to question its
goals. The campaign intended to vilify the demonstrations by framing them as
"unlicensed marches", "illegal gatherings", and "disgraceful acts". The Al-Khalifa
regime used the characterization frame in both its newspaper and its television sports
media propaganda campaign to encourage the public to condemn the protest and to
prevent the public from joining the movement. The demonstrations were presented as
an erroneous choice by radical individuals and suggested that the protesters did not
represent the interests of the good citizens of Bahrain. The protesters' demands for
political reforms including reducing the powers of the ruling family were not covered
or pointed to.
The consequences frame
People tend to form their view about an issue based on how it is framed in the
media (Iyengar 1990) as framing influences how the audience think about an event
(Kim and Willis 2007, p. 359) and who is responsible for it (p. 360). The public's
evaluation of the cause of the event is also influenced by how it is presented in the
media (An and Gower 2009, p. 107). The newspaper coverage of the protests focused
on the consequent upheaval and threat to national security and on the social threats
posed by the demonstrations in public spaces. At the same time, the newspaper
coverage ignored any specific information about the cause of the uprising and the
demands for political reform, a move towards democracy, and transparency about the
corruption of the regime. Overall, the newspaper coverage induced the public to
stand against the uprising that was argued would harm the country and divide the
people of Bahrain. Linking the uprising with instability and fear was intended to
encourage the public to maintain the status quo. The two television programmes,
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With the Event and Special Event, were a response to the uprising that called for
political reforms. While, the consequences frame was not addressed explicitly in the
television coverage, the two programmes incited public opinion to disagree with the
uprising that was led by protesters who were not loyal to their country or their
leaders. Overall, vilifying the uprising would result in vilifying its consequences.

6.2 Strategy of glorifying the Al-Khalifa family
The strategy of aggrandizing the Al-Khalifa family involved the use of the
characterization frame that was employed to favour the ruling family.
The characterization frame
The uprising questioned the legitimacy of the Al-Khalifa family. In response,
the sports media coverage employed the characterization frame to enhance and
preserve the sacredness of the ruling family led by the king. The Al-Khalifa family
was framed in the sports coverage of the uprising as the figurehead for the nation and
the guarantors of stability of the country. The rule of the Al-Khalifa family over
Bahrain is a tradition and historic right (El-Khury 1983, p. 322) and the tribal regime
believes that its powers must not be challenged, nor shared with others (Al-Naqeeb
1989, p. 148) as the family represents the legitimate alternative to lawful democratic
institutions (p. 151). The ruling families of the Gulf States were placed at the heart of
the emergent state-building project after independence (Partrick 2009, p. 4). The
identity and loyalty of the state are conflated with the identity and loyalty of these
families (p. 9). To justify their rule, a "civic myth" was created by the ruling families
to propagandize themselves as the heritage and an extension of the country's cultural
history and tradition (Kamrava 2013, p. 123).
The sports coverage of the uprising drew a mythical portrayal of the ruling
family in Bahrain and, particularly, of the king. Erin Bream (2004) points to two
features of a leader's personality cult that can be seen during demonstrations. These
are the spread of the cult figure's image and the portrayal of the leader as a hero who
can solve all problems. This leads the public to believe in the superiority of the
leader and consequently to protection from questioning of his policies (p. 134). After
the king's power was challenged during the uprising, the King of Bahrain wanted to
regain his position and his prestige and gain legitimacy; thus the television coverage
focused on his charisma.
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Non-democratic regimes propagandize their leaders as the protector of the
nation and its people (Byman and Linda 2010, p. 52). To retrieve their legitimacy
during an uprising, autocratic regimes employ several methods to repress the
protesters (Schedler 2012, p. 16). When a protest occurs, regimes assess the threat
posed by the protest by questioning who the protesters are and what their target is
and who they threaten and why (Davenport et al. 2011, p. 153). In the Bahraini
context, the regime is the ruling family and the king is the leader of the regime.
There was a major focus in the two television programmes on the power and prestige
of the king and the royal family. The opening sequence of the With the Event report
showed the king riding a horse, wearing military dress and dancing the Ardha The
purpose of these scenes was not just to present the charismatic personality of the
king, but also to protect his status from being questioned in the future. In other
words, the coverage was intended to make the public believe that the king's
personality is sacred, his decisions are always correct and he must not be challenged.
He leads the nation and his supporters love him and believe that he is the "saviour"
who would do whatever it takes to protect his country and his people.

6.3 Strategy of undermining the protesters and praising the supporters
The unpatriotic frame was used by the sports media to target the anti-regime
protesters on the one hand and to praise the supporters of the regime on the other.
The unpatriotic frame
The unpatriotic frame is used to distort protesters' images and to isolate
protesters from their society (Di Cicco 2010). The Bahraini protesters were framed as
a group that did not represent the majority of the people who believed in the
legitimacy of the regime and did not oppose the rule of the royal family. This frame
aimed to create boundaries between the protesters and the rest of Bahraini society.
These boundaries ease the targeting of the protesters by society, and hence protect
the community from the intruders. For instance, key phrases of the unpatriotic frame
in the newspaper coverage portrayed the protesters as "disloyal" and "offenders" who
insulted the nation, and its figureheads, and who aimed to harm Bahraini society and
the country. The government vowed that these "offenders" would be held
accountable for their activities during the uprising. In the television coverage, key
phrases of the unpatriotic frame such as "vandals", "traitors", "hypocrites", and "evil"
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were used to depict the protesters. The coverage incited emotions against the
protesters by framing them as "against us" in With the Event (00:33:06) and as
"against the regime" (00:34:01). Additionally, in minute 02:04:50 of Special Event, a
journalist interviewed on the phone, praised the local newspapers for the dismissal of
journalists who participated in the uprising and called these journalists nonBahrainis. The protesters were considered outlaws who should be fought. On the
other hand, the regime supporters were framed as "patriotic", as "noble" and as
members of the king's army. The sports media coverage of the uprising praised the
regime's supporters for their acts during the uprising as they refused to participate in
the protests, attacked the protesters, condemned the political movement, and declared
their loyalty to the Al-Khalifa family. In this context, the regime exploited the sports
media to delude the supporters into being the first line of defence in the face of the
protesters. The regime encouraged its supporters in every possible way to confront
the protesters. The supporters of the regime were motivated to become involved
physically by protesting against the uprising physically and in an online campaign to
'expose' those who participated in the demonstrations. These actions were promoted
by both the newspaper and television coverage as national missions.

6.4 Techniques to implement the strategies
Television was more influential medium than newspapers because of the
added visual and audio content in the coverage of the uprising. The common
denominators in the coverage were the reliance on official sources and the use of
photographs. In addition, the television coverage was characterized by the use of the
studio's background set for the two programmes, the use of crawlers and news tickers
across the screen, and the employment of background music.

6.4.1 Reliance on official sources
The findings in Chapters 4 show that all of the newspaper coverage was
based on official and pro-regime sources including sports federations, sports clubs, or
Al-Khalifa family members. The news supplied by official sources was subject to
bias in favour of the regime as official sources neutralised the perspectives of the
power challengers (McLeod 2007, p. 187). The official sources worked to support
the agenda of the regime (Dimitrova and Strömbäck 2008, p. 207) and protect the
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status quo (Dardis 2006, p. 118). In the beginning, the newspaper sports coverage
ignored the uprising and The Athletes' March. For weeks when the protests were
taking place, the sports supplements of the local newspapers avoided publishing any
explicit news about the protests. It was only after the broadcast of With the Event that
the newspapers began to cover the protests and it was from the regime's view of the
events. The newspaper coverage avoided interviewing the sports figures who
participated in the protests. It was not known whether this was due to an official
directive, or because of self-censorship.
However, the television coverage, included a live phone interview of three
sports figures during With the Event to 'justify' why they participated in the uprising,
while more than 60 sports figures identified in Special Event were not given the
opportunity to speak about why they participated in The Athletes' March. During the
phone interviews, the panellists did not tolerate the views of the participants of The
Athletes' March. The host and his studio guests interrupted the interviewees several
times. They treated the interviewees as defendants who had to justify their
participation and had to answer questions such as why they visited the Pearl
Roundabout and why they participated in The Athletes' march. The interviewees
seemed confused and they often asked to be given time to speak. The panellists
reproved and confused the interviewees to an extent that implied to the audience that
the protesters had no cogent argument. In one case, the national football player
Mohammed Sayed Adnan apologized for visiting the Pearl Roundabout and declared
his loyalty to the Al-Khalifa family. On the other hand, pro-regime athletes were
confident and intrepid. They were given time not only to express their views, but also
to attack the protesters while the panellists praised them. The studio and the guests of
the two programmes were amicable to the pro-regime sports figures who said the
athletes whose images were shown on television and in social media should be
punished.
Official sources also distracted attention from the protesters' demands in
regard to other marginal issues. The sports coverage distorted the 2011 uprising and
ignored the demand of the protesters who were called "vandals" and "criminals".
During the 2011 uprising, the regime strictly controlled coverage of the events. A
number of journalists reported that they were arrested, tortured, and detained for not
adopting the official interpretation of the uprising (Bahrain Independent Commission
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of Inquiry 2011, p. 307). Social media was also used by pro-regime activists to
identify and reveal the personal information of the journalists who were considered
to be anti-regime (p. 391). By doing that, the regime instilled fear in journalists to
prevent them from using their own observations or sources to cover the political
activities. It was important for the regime to control the flow of information by
controlling the local mainstream media and the Internet in order to prevent the
protesters from communicating with the people of Bahrain through the media.

6.4.2 Background of the two television programmes
The use of studio background sets distinguished the television coverage from
the newspaper coverage. The background of With the Event and Special Event
programmes displayed official digital images of the ruling family; particularly of the
King, the Prime Minster, and the Crown Prince. These official images are usually
found in the Bahrain News Agency website and they are often accompanied by
official news articles published in the local newspapers. The background also
displayed a three dimensional digital waving flag. The use of the flag and the images
was not arbitrary as images communicate a message (Lacey 1998, p. 5) that targets
the audience. Both the images of the ruling family and the flag symbolize the identity
and sovereignty of the country. Flag-waving symbolizes strong patriotism that shows
support for the nation and its agenda (The Chambers Dictionary 1998, p. 609; Dreier
and Flacks 2003, p. 397). It is also used to express citizenship and civic virtue
(Marmo 2010, p. 52).
The flag aimed to characterize the party of the Al-Khalifa family and their
supporters. Patriotism, according to the ideology of the regime, is associated with the
Al-Khalifa family. Because the uprising was portrayed as a movement that targeted
the ruling family, the panellists framed themselves as the lovers of the country and its
leadership and framed their acts (vilifying the demonstrations and calling to punish
the protesters) as patriotic. The ruling family also encouraged such behaviours.
Sheikh Nasser stated in his phone interview that the performance of the With the
Event panellists was evidence of "loyalty and love to the Kingdom of Bahrain, its
leadership and its people".
Interestingly, the protesters also carried the flag of Bahrain in their protests to
express their loyalty to Bahrain. The flag displayed in the background symbolized a
137

form of conflict between the opposing sides where each side believed that the flag
belonged to them. The two programmes showed the protesters carrying the flag of
Bahrain or wrapping it around them during the demonstrations. It was important then
for the regime to retrieve the national symbol by displaying the giant flag in the
background set.
The background was also used to strengthen the bond between the party
members; particularly the Al-Khalifa family's party. The size of the flag covered the
screen and shaded the individuals who appeared in the programmes. The message
sent through the background suggested that the ruling family was the legitimate
authority and called for the supporters from the audience to interact with the event.
The background epitomized the country as the flag represented the borders, the
images of the ruling family represented the legitimate rulers, and the loyal people of
Bahrain were represented by the panellists.

6.4.3 Crawlers and news tickers
The technique used by the two programmes to manipulate the audience
included the crawlers that displayed 'live' messages from the audience at the bottom
of the screen during the two television programmes and news tickers that displayed
scrolling text from news headlines in another bar below the crawler bar. For the
crawlers, the content of the messages from the audience was controlled by the
producers. All messages were allowed to appear in the two programmes. The crawler
was available to the audience to express their views about the uprising during With
the Event and it was stopped in the second half of Special Event when the phone line
was available to the audience. While in normal practice the protesting about political
events was condemned and considered an unpatriotic act, the television programme
actually solicited the audience's reaction and commentary. It is probable that because
it was demonstrating against the uprising and its demands, protesting in this case was
considered politically neutral. The comments that appeared in the crawler did one of
two things: either the comments praised the Al-Khalifa family or they condemned
the protesters. The ruling family appeared in the majority of the 162 messages that
were placed 223 times during the selected minutes of the two programmes. The
messages declared the loyalty to the Al-Khalifa family and prayed to prolong their
lives and keep Bahrain evermore under their rule.
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The messages called for the suppression of the protests and punishment for
the protesters who were described as "evil", "enemies", "plotters", and "violators".
While the messages were accompanied by names, it could not be confirmed whether
these names were of 'real' people or just propaganda by the regime. Only 22
messages (19.4%) were not accompanied by a name, and of these, several called for
the protesters to be punished. The messages included "All those players who were
involved in the events must be prosecuted", "All ungrateful athletes particularly
Hubail and Sayed Adnan must be held accountable", and "The people demand to
punish the players. The people demand to punish the players. They do not deserve
clemency". These three messages explicitly incited the audience and the regime to
take action against the protesters.
The news tickers of the two programmes placed two news headlines that were
related to the uprising. The two headlines covered two events that were held at the
time to respond to the involvement of the athletes in the uprising. The first event was
titled "It is only for Hamad" and indicated how the Al-Khalifa family interprets their
rule of Bahrain. Bahrain is a private property that is owned and must only be ruled by
the ruling family members. The event was about signing a kit of the National
Football Team. The kit symbolized the athletes while the signature was evidence of
the loyalty of the athletes to the regime. Through this event the ruling family
suggested that sports figures love and support the regime. The second event was
titled "Swords of Allegiance" and it was about signing a petition to declare loyalty to
the ruling family. Swords symbolized force and war and they were used in this
context as an explicit threat to the protesters. This threat of force was used to create a
sense of fear among the anti-regime audience and a sense of security among the proregime audience. These two events showed how the Al-Khalifa family took notice
and made sure they showed that athletes and sports figures were still supporting the
regime and its agenda.
The overall pro-regime tenor of the messages and the two news headlines
implied that pro-regime sentiment represented the majority while the protesters were
the deviant minority. The crawlers and the news tickers suggested that the call for the
suppression of the uprising and subsequent punishment of the protesters was from
the public, rather than from an oppressive government. The impact of the crawlers
and the news tickers reinforced an anti-protest sentiment and, by seemingly
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representing the 'public' opinion, gave authority for the punitive action taken against
the protesters in the following days and weeks.

6.4.4 Exploitation of the images of the protests
The fourth technique was the manipulation of the images of the protests. The
newspaper coverage avoided publishing photos of the protests except for four news
articles published in Al-Bilad. Three of these articles published four photos of The
Athletes' March while another news article published a photo which showed players
carrying a banner where they vowed to be soldiers of the king and remain loyal to
him. The three photos of the march were presented to the readers while the text of the
news articles vilified the uprising and the protesters. The other photo represented the
atmosphere within the regime and its proponents to depict the uprising as a
battlefield that required soldiers who were willing to sacrifice themselves for the
king and the country. The news articles of Akhbar Al-Khaleej did not publish any
photographs related to the uprising during its coverage of the events.
The two television programmes, however, displayed 38 edited digital images
of The Athletes' March. Most athletes' names and sport were identified, their faces
were circled in blue and a black arrow was used to point to them. Nick Lacey (1998,
p. 20) argues that everything is put in a picture intentionally to communicate a
message. Using a circle aimed to direct the audience's vision to the sports figures'
faces. Drawing a circle on a face is used in experimental studies to focus the
attention on the target (Allen and Gabbert 2013, p. 1984). Colours are also a method
used to draw the audience's attention to the content of the image (Lacey 1998, p. 38).
Studies show that colours influence people's perceptions of an object (Singh 2006;
Roberts et al. 2010). Blue is a positive colour (Sorokowski and Wrembel 2014, p. 11)
that is used to focus the audience's attention inward and to suggest quietness and
agreement (Elliot and Maier 2007, p. 250). Faces were selected from among several
athletes in each image and the blue circle was used not only to disclose The Athletes'
March participants, but also to identify them. As revealed later, the regime used the
same technique of circling faces to capture the protesters when the Bahrain
Independent Commission of Inquiry (2011) reported that pro-opposition university
students were shown pictures with circled faces and asked to identify individuals in
the images during investigations.
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The other graphic symbol was the black arrow. There are several referential
functions for the arrow symbol including fighting crimes (Monk 2013, p. 76). It is
used by the sign maker to send instructions that are expected to be followed by the
sign receiver (p.79) because the sign maker anticipates that the receiver will interpret
the message the way in which it was framed. The use of a black arrow gives a
negative perception about the athletes. Black often has a negative connotation. For
example, it has a negative connotation in religion (Singh 2007, p. 784), a connection
with anarchism (Sorokowski and Wrembel 2014, p. 13) and evil and death (Elliot
and Maier 2007, p. 250), law enforcement (Nickels 2007), and aggressiveness in
sport (Frank and Gilovich 1998).
The use of a blue circle and black arrow was intentional and the symbolism
of the two marks cannot be ignored. The television producers employed two different
colours, one for the circle and one for the arrow instead of employing the same
colour for both signs. The edited digital images of The Athletes' March were
displayed in With the Event for the first time beginning from minute 01:10:44 after
framing the protesters as "spiteful people", "unpatriotic people", and "hypocrites".
The edited digital image of the football player Mohammed Sayed Adnan was
displayed before he was interviewed on the phone and the edited digital images of
The Athletes' March were displayed during the phone conversation with the other
football player A'ala Hubail in minute 02:00:00. A day after With the Event was
broadcast, A'ala Hubail and about 100 athletes were arrested or suspended from
playing for their teams (Lulu 2011).
The images of The Athletes' March were taken out of context and set in
another context; what can be described as framing within framing. The first frame
was created by the programmes and the panellists to portray the uprising. The second
frame was created by the symbols. The protests were framed as a threat that must be
confronted while the black arrow and the blue circle framed the protesters as outlaws
who do not belong to Bahrain. These two signs were an intimation to the protesters
that their images and personal details would be identified and revealed and they
would be physically penalized. Displaying the images was the first phase of the
punishment applied to the protesters. It was a warning for those who had already
been involved as well as to those who had not yet been involved at the time in the
demonstrations.
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It can be argued that sports media was used as a means of surveillance and
punishment. The pro-regime audience of the two programmes and the sports
newspaper readers were encouraged to send any evidence they may have collected
about the protests to the commission of inquiry, including photographs, video
footage, and any personal information about individual protesters. While it is not
possible to determine if there was any follow-up by audience with solicitation of
information by the authorities, social media campaign established by pro-regime
supporters showed that incitement against the protesters and the invasion of their
privacy became relatively common place and was presented as national imperative.
This brings us back to Jones' (2012) observations about the role of pro-regime online
activists who are involved in trolling, naming, and shaming. It is clear, the campaign
was not limited to social media as sports media played a significant role in trolling,
naming and shaming the protesters. Overall, the images of the protests symbolized
the war of ideas as alluded to by Khalaf (2013) in the literature review in Chapter 2.
The Al-Khalifa family proposed that by manipulating the protests' images it was
fighting the malefactors who deserved to be penalized, while the same images
symbolized the determination and the ambition of the protesters to change the
political situation.

6.4.5 Use of music
Music was the fifth technique used by the two television programmes. A
soundtrack of National Treasure was used while the edited digital images of The
Athletes' March were displayed. According to Kelly Lawler (2014) and Samantha
Wilson (2013), National Treasure is considered a patriotic movie. Although the
soundtrack was chosen because it was composed for a patriotic movie, music
communicates particular messages. It is an important source of emotion in movies
(Cohen 2001, p. 249). In addition, it has the ability to focus attention (p. 258), to
affect attitudes and the mood (Allan 2007), to elicit a specific emotional response
(Parke et al. 2007, p. 1), and to win the consumer's loyalty (Ballouli and Hutchinson
2013). According to the Hollywood director George Lucas (2015) music and sound
are 50% of the entertainment in a movie.
Playing the soundtrack of National Treasure while displaying the edited
digital images alluded to something interesting happening. It created an atmosphere
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of excitement and a dramatic scene that integrated with other symbols. The
soundtrack was used during the two programmes as a means of communication. It
exploited the sensationalizing effect to engage the audience with the content and,
particularly, the edited digital images of The Athletes' March. The soundtrack was
also employed to induce the audience to interact with the message the way it was
framed. The music may not have framed the individuals who appeared in the images
as 'outlaws', but it played an important role in drawing the audience's attention to the
images and the symbols that portrayed the protesters as criminals.
Overall, there were three messages construed in the two television
programmes to convince the audience to believe in the regime's propaganda: the
uprising was an illegal and harmful movement, the Al-Khalifa family was the
legitimate authority, and the protesters were unpatriotic citizens whereas the
supporters of the family were true patriotic citizens. These messages were identified
after examining the visible text represented in the scenes of the television reports,
The Athletes' March edited digital images, the background, the readable text (the
crawlers and the news tickers), and the audio text (the dialogue of the panellists and
the soundtrack).

6.5 Implications of the propaganda campaign
The intention of the regimes propaganda was to divide the people of Bahrain
into two parties with no neutral zone between them: the party of the Al-Khalifa
family and their supporters on the one hand, and the party of the opposition and their
supporters on the other. The television coverage, for instance, insisted that it was a
black/ and white issue where Bahrainis were either with or against the regime. It was
a case of 'us' or 'them'. The 'us' represented the regime and its proponents; the 'them'
represented the opposition and its supporters. The regime's policy aimed to identify
the boundary between those who protected the country and those who endangered it
(Kluknavská 2014, p. 1). This policy was based on inherited collective identities that
define the enemies and the confederates (Tarrow 2011, p. 31).
The use of 'us and them' identities endeavoured to encourage the people of
Bahrain to endorse the regime's agenda and not be considered an enemy of the state.
According to Kimberly A. Powell (2011), the U.S. media adopted the us and them
policy during the coverage of the September 11 events. The coverage of the terrorist
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attack fostered the political climate of support for the invasion of Iraq by dividing the
world into two parties: the us, the good people represented by the United States and
its allies, and them, the terrorists represented by enemies of the United States.
Framing the conflict as a war between good and evil is a dehumanization process
where the opponents are framed as enemies and therefore the enemies who do not
deserve moral consideration (Maiese 2003). In other words, dehumanization is a way
to justify crimes or abuses against the opposing party (Steuter and Wills 2009).
Protesters who target the legitimate authority are more likely to persecuted through
arrest, dismissal from jobs or school, torture or death (Chang and Vitale 2013, p. 36).
Thus, the sports media coverage of the 2011 uprising in Bahrain attacked the
uprising and the protesters so as to justify the regime's action against them. It was
vowed that the sports figures and other society members involved in the protests
would be held accountable. Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad said in his phone interview
"They will be held accountable". This threat was repeated six times by Sheikh Nasser
and the panellists and was followed by another threat by Sheikh Nasser who said
"May a wall collapse on" those who demanded the toppling of the regime. This local
expression means that Sheikh Nasser wished bad on the protesters. This tone of
language had never been used by the Al-Khalifa family members in the media as
they are trained to communicate with diplomacy and tact. Sheikh Nasser's phone
conversation indicated that the predicament, which the regime was facing, meant that
the regime would be willing to do whatever it would take to defend their rule. The
king's son threatened the protesters explicitly in saying that "Bahrain is an island and
there is nowhere to escape". The military position held by Sheikh Nasser as the
Commander of Bahrain's Royal Guard could not be ignored. The With the Event was
used by a strong figure in the royal family as a platform for the threat of force. For
Sheikh Nasser, there were two types of people: the outlaws who would be held
accountable and the good citizens who would be rewarded.
According to Paul Y. Change and Alex S. Vitale (2013) extreme demands by
protesters play a role in determining the level of repression (p. 23). Repressive
actions are increased when protest-activities exceed the boundaries drawn by the
regime (p. 36). Therefore, the uprising was framed by the coverage and by the AlKhalifa family members as an intention to topple the regime. A'ala Hubail who
delivered The Athletes' March speech on the Pearl Roundabout, denied in the With
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the Event phone interview that he had demanded the downfall of the regime.
However, the panellists of With the Event and Special Event insisted that he had.
Hubail's edited digital image was displayed in the two programmes with a comment
"A'ala Hubail delivers a speech and demands to topple the regime". The host Faiz AlSada spoke "on behalf of the people of Bahrain" when he commented on Sheikh
Nasser's phone interview "Maybe this is what the people of Bahrain were waiting to
hear that everyone spoke about toppling the regime will be held accountable. This is
what we thank you for. This reassured us and soothed our hearts."
The Al-Khalifa family used all possible weapons including sport and sports
media to confront the social movement. Sport is often employed by authoritarian
regimes as a powerful force to control people. It is also used to propagate the
regime's values and ideology by taking advantage of the engagement of sport in
people's daily lives (Pujadas 2014, p. 10). In addition, controlling sports institutions
allow authoritarian regimes to prevent pro-opposition activities and provide support
to the regime's agenda (Byman and Linda 2010, p. 48). Garth S. Jowett and Victoria
O'Donnell (1999) define propaganda as "the deliberate and systematic attempt to
shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behaviour to achieve a response
that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist" (cited in Black 2001, p. 127).
The political use of sports media was a form of the Al-Khalifa family's
hegemony over Bahrain. During the uprising, sports media was exploited to
propagandize the regime's ideology and impose the regime's agenda on the people of
Bahrain. It is noted that the coverage of the two newspapers were very similar.
Although newspapers in Bahrain are privately owned, they adopt the regime's
propaganda. The propaganda of the sports media coverage of the 2011 uprising was
intended to create an atmosphere of fear of the social movement and the political
change that may occur as a result. The Propaganda Model (PM) discussed earlier was
developed to explain the modus operandi of the U.S. media, but it can be applied in
to the state-controlled media in Bahrain. Several elements of the PM can be
identified from the performance of the sports media during the 2011 uprising.
The first element is the concentration of the ownership of media and its
consequences on the modus operandi of the Bahraini media. Television in Bahrain is
owned and controlled by the regime and although newspapers are privately owned,
the regime keeps its dominant control over the media. The second element is the
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reliance on official and pro-regime sources to cover the uprising which led to the
reinforcement of the regime's agenda. The third element is the notion of the media
sports coverage elucidates the ideology of the regime and its attitude to democracy.
The forth element is "flak" which is negative responses to journalists' reports. Statecontrolled media institutions were employed in the context of the 2011 uprising to
censure journalists. The Al-Khalifa family members and pro-regime figures rebuked
and threatened sports figures and journalists who were involved in the uprising. The
pro-regime figures, in this case, were the culprits. The fifth element of the PM points
to the ability of dominant powers to unite the nation against 'enemies' who threaten
the status quo. The sports media coverage framed and targeted enemies who
demanded political reform. Although the PM was developed in the 1980s, the model
can be used to examine media under the authority of autocratic regimes.
To sum up, the 2011 uprising in Bahrain which challenged the sacredness of
the king and his family had questioned the legitimacy of the rule of the Al-Khalifa
family. The Al-Khalifa family responded by wielding their power and control over
the sports media to quell the protests. They countered their opponents by targeting
the protests and by vilifying the protesters as "vandals" who destabilized the country.
The coverage of the protests correlated the stability of the country with the AlKhalifa family. In other words, adhering to the rule of the Al-Khalifa family meant
the salvation from the 'crisis'. The institutional structure of the media in Bahrain
resembles theoretical components of the propaganda Model developed by Herman
and Chomsky. The discussion illustrates the significant role played by the sports
media in Bahrain to propagandize the legitimacy of the authoritarian regime during
the protests. It also elucidates the use of sports media as a means of communications,
manipulation, and for the maintenance of order.
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
This thesis has examined the role of Bahraini sports media in the uprising at
the Pearl Roundabout that began on February 14, 2011 when the autocratic rule of
the Al-Khalifa family was threatened as never before. While previous demonstrations
in Bahrain, including the protests between 1994 and 1999, were limited to the
involvement of opposition elites, political activists, labourers and students, the 2011
uprising involved Bahraini celebrity athletes and sports figures who previously had
not been particularly politically engaged. The unprecedented involvement in politics
by sports figures motivated the regime to engage in a propaganda campaign that used
the sports media to manipulate public opinion for its own ends.
To understand the role of the sports media during the protests, this thesis has
examined how sports media framed the 2011 demonstrations in Bahrain and
discussed the general strategies and specific techniques used to manipulate the
coverage of the events. The analysis was first informed by Herman and Chomsky's
Propaganda Model and then drew on content analysis of the news frames to show
that the Bahraini sports media coverage had portrayed the uprising as an illegal
movement that caused a conflict between legality and illegality, and between good
and evil. Seeking to justify the repression of the political protests, sports media was
exploited by the Al-Khalifa regime to vilify those who were involved in the protests.
The content analysis of newspaper and television sports coverage during a key period
of the political uprising (from March 31 to May 31, 2011) reveals how the
propaganda campaign relied on the cult of personality to frame the king and the AlKhalifa family as the figureheads for the nation, while framing the uprising as a
threat to the national identity of Bahrain. The sports media coverage suggested that
the leader himself was the state and that he was "the central means by which the will
of the masses is translated into the power of the state" (Kamrava 2011, p. 306). This
thesis has shown how sports media played a particularly strong role in Bahrain to
grant the Al-Khalifa family the legitimacy to carry out repressive actions on behalf of
the nation.
The sports media of Bahrain was employed to propagate the regime's
interpretation of nationalism which is strongly associated with loyalty to the ruling
family and which suggested that protests had threatened the stability of the country.
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By exploiting and manipulating media outlets, the Gulf State regimes regularly try to
convince public opinion about the disadvantages of democracy (Davidson 2013, p.
45). This was particularly effective in Bahrain, where sport plays a significant role in
the communities, and where public opinion is influenced by sports figures'
achievements and public activities. Given the dominance of sports in the culture in
Bahrain, using sports media was central to the regime's public communication
strategies.
This thesis has examined two major pro-regime sports newspapers in Bahrain
Akhbar Al-Khaleej and Al-Bilad. The findings show that both newspapers relied
heavily on official sources to report on the uprising. It also investigated two main
television programmes With the Event and Special Event, which were specially
broadcast on Bahrain Sports Channel to undermine the political movement.
The main role of sports media prior to the 2011 uprising was not only to
entertain but also to influence public opinion. However, after the 2011 uprising, the
role of sports media changed when it became involved in the suppression of the
uprising. Sports media played several tactical roles during the uprising including
humiliation, monitoring, threatening, punishing, and prosecuting the protesters.
Although most of the protesters who appeared in With the Event were arrested on the
second day, Special Event, which was broadcast a week later, continued incitement
against the protesters. Edited digital images of the protesters were displayed again
during the second programme, while the newspaper coverage continued reporting the
'abuses' committed by the sports figures and athletes. Humiliation is a social means
used to oppress other groups (Klein 1991, p. 93) and to pass orders that have to be
followed (Klein 2005). Sports media was used by the regime as a tool of humiliation.
Sports media was requiring those who participated in the uprising to declare their
loyalty to the Al-Khalifa family, apologize for participation in the protests, and
confess their unpatriotic actions in public.
In order to imply that the regime was still strong and in control of the
situation, sports media played a monitoring role by publishing images and the
personal information of the protesters. This was obvious when the two television
programmes published the full names, places of work and images of the participants
in The Athletes' March. This also signified that the regime was both watching and
recording the activities organized by the protesters. Using sports media to troll,
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shame and name the protesters communicated a message to the anti-regime protesters
as well as the pro-regime supporters. The regime's propaganda campaign implied to
the demonstrators that protesting was a crime against the state would not be
tolerated. In this context, sports media was a substitute for the criminal code because
participation in political activities resulted in the arrest and the punishment of those
who were involved. Additionally, sports media played the roles of public prosecution
and jurisdiction. Anti-regime protesters including sports figures and athletes, were
interrogated before they were physically arrested. Sports figures and athletes were
accused of committing a crime and sentenced to prison and their penalties were
published in the local newspapers or announced on television. Overall, the regime's
propaganda transformed the sports media from being an entertainment medium to an
explicit political tool. The content analysis shows sport media was used as a
propaganda tool by the regime to victimise and suppress the protesters. While some
of the protesters were shot in the streets by military force, others were targeted by the
sports media in television and newspaper reports.
The effectiveness of the sports coverage in changing public opinion has to be
taken into account because the 2011 uprising has failed to attain its goals. The
analysis of the behaviour of sports media during the 2011 uprising in Bahrain was
informed by the "protest paradigm" in political media as theorised by previous studies
of protest coverage (McLeod and Hertog 1992; De Vreese 2004; Boykoff 2006;
Brasted 2006; Jha 2007; Di Cicco 2010). While these studies examined the
undermining of protests by political media in order to maintain the status quo, the
present thesis shows how sports media can also be used by authoritarian regimes as a
propaganda tool to maintain the status quo and suppress political dissidents. For
instance, sports media was used during the first weeks of the 2011 Egyptian uprising
to back up the former regime of Hosni Mubarak (Zamalek's channel 2012). Sports
media at time had called on protesters to give up their political activities that
detribalized the country and harmed the economy. The Egyptian pro-regime sports
figures also sustained the former president's policies and reproved the protesters who
were framed as "infiltrators" for demanding the downfall of the regime. Nonetheless,
sports media in Egypt and those who stood against the uprising changed their position
after the fall of the former regime. Conversely, the regime in Bahrain has overcome
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the dilemma of the uprising while sports media continued to serve the regime's
agenda.
Sports media in Bahrain reflects the essence of the regime where the AlKhalifa family dominates and controls all aspect of the state. The sports coverage of
the 2011 uprising elucidates the regime's views of democracy. The structure of the
regime accepts only those who believe in the ideology that certifies that the AlKhalifa family is the legitimate alternative to lawful democratic institutions and that
the ruling family must not be challenged by any means. In other words, the coverage
of the uprising is an echo of the political environment that only allows the voice of
the ruling family and its supporters to be heard. The regime motivates the public
opinion not to think about the political and economic situations and to never question
the ruling family's policies. The regime identifies good citizens as only those who
follow the regime's instructions and interacts positively with them.
The Al-Khalifa family has a close relationship with sport and sports media.
The ruling family members preside over the strongest federations and sports clubs.
They involve themselves in sport and their activities receive considerable attention as
their sports news is published in the local sports newspapers on a daily basis. News of
the ruling family are written and sent to sports media by their official offices not just
for informational purposes, but most importantly to communicate political messages.
The ruling family realized early the importance of sports media and they have been
directing and occupying high positions in sport in Bahrain including the Bahrain
Olympic Committee and Bahrain Football Association. The regime also make it
mandatory that sports news is edited to frame the Al-Khalifa members to the public as
athletes, champions and supporters of sport and sports figures. There is an unwritten
understanding between sports journalists about how to deal with official sports news
articles. These articles, sent by email or fax, must be published. As discussed in
Chapter 1, official sports articles that cover the Al-Khalifa family's activities occupy
whole pages and are accompanied by several photographs.
As a research student in exile, the coverage of the sports media during the
uprising aroused my attention. I have worked in journalism for more than ten years
including five years with sports journalism. Political media rarely published official
statements about protests occurring across the country whereas sports media had
always refrained from covering political issues. Pointing to political issues in sports
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newspapers had always been subjected to restrictions even when these activities were
unrelated to local issues. I recall an event in 2010 when I worked as a sports journalist
with Al-Bilad. The Bahrain National Football Team had intended to visit the West
Bank to play a friendly match with the Palestinian National Football Team. The
Bahraini team had planned to travel to Jordan and then to the West Bank where the
match was to be held. That visit was controversial as citizens of Bahrain, which did
not have diplomatic relations with Israel, had to obtain approval from the Israeli
authorities who control the West Bank crossings with Jordan. For several days prior
to the visit, Al-Bilad sports newspaper had criticised the travel to the West Bank and
then it was prevented from writing about the issue. I remember asking the Al-Bilad
sports editor-in-chief about the reason and he answered that he was told not to mix
sport with politics. However, news articles that praised the visit and its positive
political impacts were allowed to be published in other local newspapers.
Therefore, I was surprised when Bahrain Sports Channel broadcast live the
programme With the Event and discussed the political events particularly The
Athletes' March. The performance of sports media during the 2011 uprising opened a
new era in the history of sports media in Bahrain as the propaganda employed to
serve the ruling family had finally been used without equivocation after being in the
background of sports coverage for decades. This explicit involvement of sports media
in politics encouraged me to examine closely the regime's propaganda.
The ruling family could not afford to lose the political game as the success of
the uprising would have meant the end of the rule of the Al-Khalifa family or
reduction of their powers. Television coverage of the protests took the lead as the
regime's propaganda campaign was launched officially by Sheikh Nasser bin Hamad.
Bahrain Sports Channel coverage was more effective than the newspaper coverage
because of the explicit imageries framed in the programmes to support the Al-Khalifa
regime and victimise the protesters. Although the studio set of the two programmes
looked unprofessional, the producers succeeded in delivering the pro-regime
messages to deliver via the edited digital images accompanied by background music
to stir the audience's sense of loyalty to the Al-Khalifa family.
There is a considerable scholarly effort that has examined social media during
The Arab Spring; however, the role of mainstream media during this period has been
overlooked. This thesis shows that mainstream media should not be neglected as it is
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still an important tool in the hands of autocratic regimes. It shows that mainstream
media play a significant role in communicating with a mass audience. This thesis also
shows that national television in the era of social media remains as an effective means
for influencing public opinion and imposing a regime's propaganda. Mainstream
sports media can also be as repressive as political media. This thesis shows that
authoritarian regimes believe in the importance of justifying their actions to the public
regardless of how these regimes view the will of their people. Sports media is
considered a significant element of force for autocratic regimes and a way to reflect
their ideologies. The role that sports media play is complicated. It is not only
exploited to legitimize political regimes and impose their ideologies, but it is also
exploited to disorganize opponents of autocratic regimes and to preserve the state's
power.
Further research can examine the extent that the sports media have influenced
the political process during The Arab Spring revolution where autocratic regimes
were compelled to step down and new regimes established such as in Tunisia and
Egypt where sport and sports figures are popular as they are in Bahrain.
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APPENDIX 1: Newspaper data translation samples
No.
1
2

Arabic

My translation to English

 المسيرات غير القانونيةThe unlicensed marches
 اإلساءة إلى قادة الوطن ومملكتنا الغاليةOffending the nation's figureheads and our dear
kingdom

3
4
5
9

 المسيرات غير القانونية وغير المرخصةThe unlicensed and illegal marches
 المسيرات المخلة باألمنMarches that breach security
 أعمال التخريبActs of sabotage
 اإلساءة إلى الوطن والقيادة الرشيدةOffending the nation and the leadership

7

 األحداث المؤسفةThe unfortunate events

9

 هدفت إلى اإلساءة إلى رموزنا وقيادتنا الرشيدةAimed to offend our figureheads and our wise
leadership

8

 زعزعة األمن واالستقرار في مملكتنا الغاليةDestabilizing the security and stability in our
dear kingdom

12

 المخطئون والمسيئون للقيادة الرشيدة و الوطنThe wrongdoers and the offenders of the dear
 العزيزnation

11

 التوترات األمنيةSecurity disturbances

10

 األحداث السياسيةPolitical events

13

 األزمة السياسيةPolitical crisis

14
12
19

 استهداف السلم األهليTargeting civil peace
 ما يسمى بمسيرة الرياضيينWhat is called The Athletes' March
 خرق القانون والنظامBreaching the law

17

 إثارة التوترات الطائفيةInciting sectarian strife

19

 توقف النشاط الرياضيSuspending of the sports activity

18

 إساءة يتعرض لها الوطن أو القيادة الرشيدةAbuse the nation or the wise leadership

02

 االعتصام في دوار مجلس التعاونThe sit- in the GCC roundabout

01

 المسيرة السياسيةThe political march

00
03

 عدم والئهم لوطنهم وقيادته الرشيدةDisloyal to their nation and its wise leadership
 المسيرة الرياضية المطالبة بإسقاط النظامThe Athletes' March that was called to
overthrow the regime

04

 األزمةCrisis

184

APPENDIX 2: Television data translation samples
No.

Arabic

My translation to English

1

 العظيم بوسلمانThe great Bo Salman (The King's agnomen)

2

 الظروف األمنيةSecurity events

3

 الخيانةTreachery

4

 غيوم الخوفClouds of fear

5

 أطماع الحاقدينMalice and greed

6

 االنفالتChaos

7

 درس قاسHarsh lesson

8

 ناس وطنيينPatriotic people

9
10
11

 من مع النظام ومن ضد النظامwho is with the regime and who is against
 ناكرو الجميلUngrateful people
 النظام ورموز البلدThe regime and the nation's figureheads

12

 المسيئونThe abusers

13

 الحاقدونSpiteful people

14
12
19

 أقنعة كثيرة سقطتMany masks fell
 ال ينتمون لهذه الديرةUnpatriotic
 الظروف األمنيةThe security circumstances
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APPENDIX 3: Television data translation samples (Crawler)
No.
1

Arabic

My translation to English

 وولي العهد ورئيس الوزراء والبحرين، اللهم احفظ مليكنا حمدMay God protects our King, our Crown Prince, the
 وشعبها الوفي آمينPrime Minister, Bahrain and its loyal people

2

 البحرين تاج على رؤوسنا وبوسلمان غالي على قلوبناBahrain is the crown of our heads and Bo Salman is
our sweetheart

3

 اللهم أدم علينا نعمة األمن واألمان واحفظ بحريننا الغالية منMay God protects and keep our dear Bahrain secure
 واحفظ يا رب مليكنا ورئيس الوزراء وولي، كل شر ومكروهfrom all evil and may the lord protect our King, the
 العهد واجعلهم ذخراً لنا لألبدPrime Minister, the Crown Prince and keep them
for us forever

4
5
6
7

 أحبك بابا خليفةI love you baba Khalifa
 حنا جنودك يا بوسلمانWe are all your soldiers Bo Salman
 وتبقى البحرين خليفيةBahrain will remain Khalifya
 رب اجعل هذا البلد آمنا مطمئناً سخاء رخاء ورد عنه كيدMay God secures and bless this country and protect
 الكائدين يا رب احفظ ملك القلوب احفظ حبيب قلب كل بحرينيit from the plotters' maliciousness O my Lord and
 خليفة بن سلمان يا رب طول في أعمارهم وارزقهم الصحةprotect the king of hearts and each Bahraini's
 والعافيةsweetheart Khalifa bin Salman. O God prolong their
lives and keep them well

8

 ما حدث في البحرين نعمة من هللا لنفرق فيه بين الصديقWhat happened is a lesson to identify the friend
 والعدو فنحمد هللا ونشكره على كل شيء وهللا يحفظ لنا البحرينfrom the enemy. We thank God for everything. May
 وحكومتنا وشعبنا الوفي آمين آمينGod protects Bahrain, our government and the loyal
people Amen Amen

9

 هللا يحفظ البحرين ومليكنا ورئيس الوزراء وولي عهده من كلMay God protects Bahrain, our King, our Prime
 مكروهMinister and the Crown Prince from all evil

10

 نرفع أسمى آيات الحب والوالء واإلخالص للقيادة الرشيدةWe declare our love, loyalty and trust in the wise
 لصاحب الجاللة الملك المفدى ورئيس الوزراء الموقر ووليleadership: His Highness the king, the distinguished
 العهد األمين سائلين هللا تعالى أن يحفظهم من كل سوء ويرجعPrime Minister, and the Crown Prince. May God
 البحرين الحبيبة كما كانت وأفضلprotects them from all evil and renovate Bahrain to
the best
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